UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT   LOS  ANGELES 


THE  GIFT  OF 

MAY  TREAT  MORRISON 

IN  MEMORY  OF 
ALEXANDER   F  MORRISON 


/ 


SUGGESTIONS 


ON 


GOVERNMENT 


BY 

S.  E.   MOFFETT. 


CHICAGO    AND    NEW    YORK: 

RAND.  McNALLY  &  COMPANY. 
1894. 


Copyright,  1894,  by  S.  E.  Moffett. 


««      «•    «    e      <-  C   (r  <  Cc    iTc' 


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CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I  —  The  Source  of  Power, 9 

II  —  Direct  Legislation, 24 

III  —  The  True  Functions  of  Representation,  46 

IV  —  The    Referendum    and    the     Popular 

?                      Assembly, 53 

<v          V  —  The  Branches  of  Government,      ...  60 

i        VI  —  Parties, 74 

VII  —  Municipal  Government, 86 

^     VIII  —  Town  and  County  Government,    .     .     .  105 

i2        IX  —  The  State  Legislature, 113 

K         X  —  The  State  Executive, 123 

2        XI  —  The  National  Legislature, 129 

uj       XII  —  The  National  Executive, 160 

<     XIII  —  Proportional  Representation,    ....  167 

^      XIV  —  The  Work  of  the  Popular  Assembly,    .  1 79 

S        XV  — The  Boss, 184 

o      XVI  —  The  Referendum  in  California,     .     .     .192 

t     XVII  —  Some  Practical  Examples, 196 

<3, 


(3) 

439069 


INTRODUCTION. 


This  book  is  an  attempt  to  suggest  remedies  for 
certain  defects  disclosed  by  the  experience  of  a 
hundred  years  in  the  working  of  our  national,  State, 
and  local  governments.  Considering  the  marvelous 
transformation  in  all  the  conditions  of  human  exist- 
ence, a  transformation  to  which  all  previous  history 
offers  no  parallel,  and  which  has  been  more  marked 
in  the  United  States  than  anywhere  else  in  the 
world,  the  political  institutions  of  a  century  ago  have 
served  our  purpose  wonderfully  well.  But  in  some 
important  respects  we  have  outgrown  them,  as  we 
must  have  done  if  they  had  been  devised  by  arch- 
angels. Our  present  needs  and  dangers  are  not 
those  which  the  fathers  of  the  Republic  foresaw. 
To  read  the  debates  on  the  adoption  of  the  Federal 
Constitution  is  like  intruding  upon  a  convention  of 
gibbering  ghosts.  We  hear  much  about  the  possi- 
bility of  the  overthrow  of  liberty  by  standing  ar- 
mies, about  the  control  of  elections  by  an  aristocracy 
headed  by  the  Society  of  the  Cincinnati,  and  about 
the  intrigues  of  foreign  powers,  corrupting  Presi- 
dents and  members  of  Congress,  but  nothing  about 
trusts,  syndicates,  and  omnipotent  railroad  corpora- 
tions, nothing  about  bosses  and  heelers,  about  con- 
solidated foreign  "votes,"  about  saloons  as  centers 

(5) 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

of  political  power,  about  "Solid  Nines"  and  "Solid 
Thirtccns  "  in  city  councils,  and  about  the  control 
of  elections  by  caucuses  and  conventions  controlled 
in  their  turn  by  the  "  machine."  In  short,  the  insti- 
tutions designed  to  meet  one  set  of  conditions  are 
now  called  upon  to  meet  quite  another.  Naturally 
they  have  broken  down  at  various  points,  some  of 
the  most  conspicuous  of  which  are  these : 

Our  executive  administration,  local.  State,  and 
national,  is  inefficient.  It  is  in  the  hands  of  politi- 
cal professionals,  who  are  necessarily  administrative 
amateurs.  Devoting  their  chief  attention  to  the 
science  of  politics,  they  are  naturally  unable  to  go 
deeply  into  the  science  of  government.  Brought  up 
in  the  idea  that  offices  exist  for  the  purpose  of  pay- 
ing salaries  on  various  scales  to  politicians  of  var}^- 
ing  degrees  of  influence,  it  seems  natural  to  them  to 
appoint  a  man  postmaster  at  Oshkosh  under  one 
administration,  send  him  as  consul  to  Bordeaux 
on  the  next  accession  of  his  party  to  power,  and 
recognize  his  services  on  a  future  occasion  by  mak- 
ing him  Governor  of  Arizona.  At  its  best  an 
administrative  system  managed  on  such  principles 
is  incapable ;  at  its  worst  it  is  both  incapable  and 
corrupt. 

Our  legislative  bodies  are  suffering  from  the  gen- 
eral paralysis  of  parliamentary  government  all  over 
the  world,  and  this  paralysis  is  especially  marked  in 
Congress,  where  intelligent  energy  should  be  most 
conspicuous.  It  is  becoming  almost  impossible  to 
pass  an  important  measure  to  which  powerful  inter- 
ests are  opposed.     The  time  of  Congress  is  wasted 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

in  roll-calls,  futile  attempts  to  hold  evasive  quorums, 
floods  of  superfluous  talk,  and  obsolete  ceremonies, 
and  all  the  channels  of  legislation  are  choked  by 
gorges  of  unnecessary  bills.  State  Legislatures  have 
generally  fallen  into  contempt,  and  city  councils 
beneath  it. 

Local  government,  the  peculiar  province  of  the 
English  race,  the  province  in  which  our  capacity 
from  prehistoric  times  has  been  most  conspicuously 
marked,  has  been  reduced  to  a  condition  of  imbe- 
cility and  corruption,  for  whose  match  we  must  look 
to  the  rule  of  a  Chinese  mandarin. 

The  individual  voter  has  almost  entirely  lost  con- 
trol over  legislation  and  administration.  In  local 
affairs  the  boss  is  supreme ;  in  national  matters 
parties  profess  to  act  in  accordance  with  the  popular 
will,  but  really  move  in  the  line  of  least  resistance, 
as  determined  by  the  comparative  strength  of  the 
various  ''pulls"  exerted  at  the  seat  of  government. 
Even  when  honestly  desirous  of  doing  what  the 
public  wishes  done,  they  have  no  means  under  our 
present  arrangements  of  knowing  definitely  what 
that  is.  The  Republican  successes  in  the  State  elec- 
tions of  1893  were  variously  interpreted  as  a  com- 
mand to  Congress  to  stop  reforming  the  tariff,  and  a 
rebuke  for  not  reforming  it  fast  enough ;  as  a  con- 
demnation of  the  President  for  pushing  through 
anti-silver  legislation,  and  an  expression  of  disgust 
at  the  delay  of  the  Senate  in  carrying  out  the  Presi- 
dent's policy.  There  is  no  lesson  whatever  that  an 
expert  political  weather  prophet  can  not  extract 
from  election  returns.     If  we  are  to  allow  the  popu- 


S  INTRODUCTION. 

lar  will  any  influence  at  all,  we  must  have  some 
means  of  making  it  unmistakable. 

Various  plans  for  the  improvement  of  our  political 
conditions  have  been  proposed.  I  offer  my  sugges- 
tions for  what  they  are  worth. 

Berkeley,  Cal.,  August,  1894. 


Suggestions  on  Government. 


CHAPTER    I. 

THE   SOURCE   OF   POWER. 

The  American  citizen  is  fond  of  calling  himself  a 
sovereign.  As  a  rule,  however,  his  only  act  of  sov- 
ereignty is  that  of  deciding  which  of  two  bosses  shall 
rule  over  him.  When  the  two  bosses  are  privately 
in  partnership,  as  they  often  are,  the  principle  of 
independent  self-government,  as  we  practice  it,  is 
carried  to  its  logical  limit. 

The  first  requisite  to  a  thorough  reform  in  Amer- 
ican politics  is  the  restoration  of  close  contact 
between  the  individual  citizen  and  the  agents  whom 
he  selects  to  conduct  his  public  affairs.  Everything 
depends  upon  that.  We  often  talk  about  the  advan- 
tages of  managing  the  Government  on  business 
principles,  but  no  attempt  has  yet  been  made  in  this 
country  to  carry  out  the  idea  to  its  natural  con- 
clusion. Municipal  reformers  have  imagined  that 
they  were  returning  to  business  principles  when 
they  advocated  the  concentration  of  executive  power 
in  a  mayor  elected  for  two  3'ears,  and  of  legislative 
power  in  a  council  elected  for  the  same  period,  and 
subject  to  the  mayor's  veto.     To  comprehend  the 

(9) 


10  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

business-like;  natiire-ofrthis  arrangement  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  imagine  it  transferred  to  the  affairs  of  a 
private'Qstabii.siiLne^^, ,;  \Ve.may  suppose  the  owner 
of  a  great  dry-goods  house  saying  to  his  manager: 
"  You  are  to  have  the  absolute  control  of  the  business 
for  two  years,  except  when  a  new  policy  is  to  be 
adopted,  and  then  you  will  have  the  assistance  of  a 
dozen  clerks.  I  shall  keep  my  eye  on  you,  and  if  I 
see  you  wasting  my  money  or  tangling  up  my 
affairs,  I  shall  beg  you  to  stop.  You  are  under  no 
obligation  to  pay  any  attention  to  my  wishes,  but,  if 
you  persist  in  wrecking  the  business,  I  may  get  a 
new  manager  when  your  two  years  are  up,  if  you 
have  left  anything  to  manage." 

The  first  principle  of  business  is  that  the  pro- 
prietor shall  have,  not  merely  the  right  of  reviewing 
the  actions  of  his  employes  at  fixed  intervals,  but 
absolute  control  of  them  all  the  time.  This  should 
also  be  recognized  as  the  first  principle  of  sensible 
politics. 

But  how  is  the  individual  voter,  who  is  the  political 
proprietor,  to  exercise  his  right  of  regular  control 
over  his  servants?  He  must  do  it  through  a  legal 
organization,  and  the  best  form  of  organization  for 
the  purpose  is  the  popular  assembl3\  The  ancient 
Teutonic  folkmoot  is  still  the  basis  upon  which  a 
thoroughly  trustworthy  government  must  rest.  All 
students  of  our  institutions  unite  in  commending  the 
admirable  workings  of  the  New  England  town  meet- 
ing, but  they  do  not  seem  to  realize  the  fact  that  the 
principle  of  the  town  meeting  is  not  bounded  by  the 
needs  of  a  rural  community,  but  is  one  of  universal 


THE   SOURCE   OF   POWER.  11 

application.  This  truth  has  been  more  nearly  recog- 
nized by  Mr.  Albert  Stickney  than  by  any  other 
writer  with  whom  I  am  familiar,  and  I  wish  at  the 
outset  to  acknowledge  my  obligations  to  his  works 
for  ideas  on  this  subject,  which  have  been  of  infinite 
service  to  me,  and  of  which  I  have  not  hesitated  to 
make  free  use.  But  even  Mr.  Stickney,  in  his 
luminous  exposition  of  the  value  of  the  public  meet- 
ing as  the  primary  organ  of  sovereignty,  falls  short 
of  appreciating  its  full  possibilities.  He  limits  the 
work  of  the  local  assembly  to  local  matters,  and 
contemplates  an  irrevocable  delegation  of  the  power 
of  the  people  to  representative  bodies ;  and  he  con- 
fides a  more  implicit  trust  in  these  bodies  than  there 
is  any  reason  to  believe  they  deserve,  or  would 
deserve,  even  Under  an  ideal  method  of  election. 
The  people  in  their  primary  assemblies  should  not 
only  be  the  ultimate  source  of  power,  but  its  per- 
manent depository.  They  should  be  able  to  check 
and  guide  the  proceedings  of  their  executive  and 
legislative  servants  at  every  stage. 

The  world  has  never  yet  had  an  opportunity  to 
see  what  a  scientifically  organized  system  of  govern- 
ment, regulated  by  public  meeting,  can  accomplish, 
and  yet  it  has  witnessed  some  amazingly  successful 
results,  even  with  the  imperfect  methods  hitherto 
in  vogue.  The  Athenian  Assembly  was  too  vast 
for  anything  like  real  deliberation ;  the  New  Eng- 
land town  meeting  tries  to  do  a  year's  business  in 
one  day,  and  the  Swiss  Landesgemeinde  combines 
both  of  these  disadvantages.  Excellent  work  on 
democratic  lines  is  done  by  village  communities  in 


12  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

various  countries,  but  as  it  is  all  of  a  local  nature  it 
fails  to  call  out  the  highest  interest  of  the  electors. 
An  assembly  of  moderate  size,  in  which  every  voter 
would  be  able  to  express  his  individual  opinions, 
and  which  would  not  only  deal  with  local  affairs  but 
would  directly  exercise  a  share  of  the  national 
sovereignty,  would  develop  a  degree  of  intelligent 
activity  in  the  citizenship  of  which  as  yet  we  have 
had  no  example. 

If  the  country  were  evenly  settled,  with  a  moderate 
degree  of  density,  it  would  be  easy  to  divide  it  into 
precincts,  or  townships,  of  about  five  hundred  voters 
each,  and  these  could  be  made  the  basis  for  a  sym- 
metrical system  of  representation  and  legislation ; 
but  we  must  build  upon  existing  conditions,  and 
make  some  sacrifice  of  symmetry  to  convenience. 
The  assembly  of  five  hundred  voters,  however,  may 
be  considered  the  normal  unit  of  the  body  politic. 
In  small  towns  it  would  constitute  the  supreme  local 
government ;  in  larger  ones  it  would  form  a  council 
district.  It  would  elect  a  county  supervisor,  and, 
alone  or  in  conjunction  with  others,  a  member  of  the 
State  Legislature.  It  would  be  the  organ  for  the 
expression  of  the  popular  will  in  the  initiative  and 
referendum.  It  would  be  an  arena  in  which  all 
political  and  social  elements  would  meet  on  common 
ground,  and  every  measure  of  public  policy  would 
find  assailants  and  defenders. 

The  American  citizen  is  the  most  diligent  at- 
tendant on  public  meetings  in  the  world,  but  the 
trouble  is  that  he  wastes  his  strength  in  futilities. 
It  is  pitiful  to  see  him  striving  to  satisfy  his  craving 


THE   SOURCE   OF   POWER.  13 

for  association  and  deliberation  with  his  fellow-men 
by  decking  himself  out  in  the  regalia  of  some 
"  order"  and  parroting  "  rituals,"  or  performing  the 
solemn  duty  of  "  attending  the  primaries,"  whose 
decisions  have  been  prepared  in  advance  and  forti- 
fied by  stuffed  rolls  in  the  back-room  of  some  saloon ; 
or  taking  part  in  indignation  meetings  to  make 
"  demands "  on  officials,  which  there  is  no  legal 
power  to  enforce  ;  or  joining  in  campaign  rallies  at 
which  candidates  rhapsodize  over  the  beauties  of 
platforms  which  they  will  forget  by  the  day  after 
election.  When  citizens  are  willing  to  put  them- 
selves to  so  much  inconvenience  to  accomplish 
imperceptible  results,  or  no  results  at  all,  it  is 
hardly  unreasonable  to  assume  that  they  will  be  will- 
ing to  take  a  considerably  smaller  share  of  trouble  for 
the  sake  of  exerting  a  direct  and  material  influence 
upon  the  management  of  public  affairs  in  all  their 
ramifications,  State,  local,  and  national. 

Universal  suffrage  has  been  criticised  for  making 
no  distinction  between  wisdom  and  folly  in  the 
voters.  Mr.  Stickney  has  explained,  so  well  that  the 
elaboration  of  the  point  here  would  look  like 
plagiarism,  how  the  popular  assembly  meets  this 
objection  by  making  votes  count  by  weight  as  well 
as  by  numbers.  The  man  of  intelligence  can 
explain  his  views  to  the  meeting  and  carry  his  less 
acute  auditors  with  him.  The  man  of  lustrous 
integrity  can  always  command  a  following  for  any 
plan  to  which  he  lends  the  sanction  of  his  name. 
Disreputable  votes  would  be  neutralized  by  the 
repulsive  influence  of  the  men  who  cast  them. 


14  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

The  habit  of  discussing  public  questions  in 
assemblies  in  which  all  shades  of  belief  were  repre- 
sented would  tend  to  promote  a  spirit  of  moderation 
and  mutual  concession.  Under  our  present  methods 
the  country  is  split  into  innumerable  cliques,  in  each 
of  which  narrow-minded  intolerance  is  rampant. 
The  members  of  bankers'  associations  encourage 
each  other  in  the  belief  that  farmers  are  visionar3f 
lunatics;  farmers  flock  together  in  alliances  and 
granges,  and  resolve  that  bankers  are  Wall  Street 
cormorants ;  manufacturers  and  railroad  managers 
commiserate  each  other  on  the  total  depravity  of 
workmen,  and  the  halls  of  labor  unions  echo  with 
denunciations  of  the  tyranny  of  employers ;  Repub- 
lican conventions  announce  that  Democrats  are 
bought  with  British  gold,  and  Democratic  conven- 
tions brand  Republicans  as  the  hirelings  of  the 
American  plutocracy.  Even  when  the  people  of  a 
city  are  discussing  such  a  matter  as  a  proposed  issue 
of  bonds  for  the  acquisition  of  water-works,  they 
do  not,  as  a  rule,  come  together  and  candidly  discuss 
all  the  arguments,  pro  and  con,  but  the  advocates  of 
the  proposition  hold  a  series  of  meetings  in  which 
the  opponents  of  the  plan  are  pilloried  as  the  tools 
of  a  corporation,  while  the  objections  to  the  scheme 
are  set  forth  in  another  series  of  meetings  in  which 
its  promoters  are  arraigned  as  the  heelers  of  polit- 
ical bosses.  Neither  side  gives  any  fair  considera- 
tion to  the  arguments  of  the  other.  A  common 
assembly,  in  which  men  of  all  parties,  creeds,  and 
positions  in  life  should  meet  on  even  terms,  and 
every  man  should  have  an  equal  opportunity  with 


THE   SOURCE   OF   POWER.  15 

every  other  to  convince  his  neighbors  of  the  sound- 
ness of  his  views,  would  be  sure  to  mitigate  asperi- 
ties, prevent  rash  and  unbalanced  decisions,  and 
secure  the  nearest  possible  approach  to  a  wise  deter- 
mination of  public  issues. 

The  assemblies  should  meet,  of  course,  at  the  most 
convenient  times  and  places.  Instead  of  accu- 
mulating so  much  business  as  to  absorb  an  entire 
day,  as  in  the  New  England  towns,  they  should 
meet  often  enough  to  dispose  of  their  work  com- 
fortably in  an  evening.  One  evening  in  a  month 
would  probably  be  found  sufficient  in  most  cases. 
Special  meetings  should  be  held  as  often  as  required. 
The  attention  of  the  assembly  should  not  be  dis- 
tracted by  a  multiplicity  of  duties.  As  a  rule,  not 
more  than  two  or  three  subjects  should  be  disposed 
of  at  one  meeting,  and  never  more  than  one  at  a 
single  vote. 

The  assemblies  would  dispense  with  all  our  pres- 
ent cumbrous  and  costly  election  machinery.  They 
would  take  charge  of  the  registration  of  voters, 
which  should  take  place  in  every  precinct  in  open 
meeting.  Any  qualified  resident  of  the  precinct 
should  have  the  privilege  of  signing  the  roll  at  any 
meeting,  subject  to  the  challenge  of  any  voter 
present,  but  he  should  not  be  permitted  to  take  part 
in  the  proceedings  until  the  following  month,  in 
order  to  give  time  for  an  investigation  of  his  right 
to  vote.  Ordinary  questions  coming  up  for  deci- 
sion would  usually  be  decided  viva  voce,  but  all 
elections  of  officers  should  be  by  ballot,  and  a  small 
number  of  voters,  say  five,  should  have  the  right  to 


16  sU(u;r^TK)\s  ox  ciovernment. 

demand  a  ballot  on  any  question.  Nominations  for 
oflicc  should  be  open  up  to  the  moment  of  balloting. 
The  essential  features  of  the  Australian  system 
could  be  preserved  with  the  utmost  cheapness  and 
simplicity.  A  small  booth  could  be  set  up  on  each 
side  of  the  platform,  in  full  view  of  the  meeting. 
The  secretary  could  be  provided  with  a  supply  of 
hand-stamps  and  movable  rubber  type.  Nominations 
being  called  for,  each  name  submitted  could  be  set 
up  in  a  stamp  for  each  booth.  When  the  nomina- 
tions were  concluded  the  stamps,  with  ink-pads 
and  a  sufficient  number  of  slips  of  blank  paper, 
could  be  put  in  the  booths,  and  the  voters  could  pass 
through,  one  at  a  time,  and  prepare  their  ballots. 
If,  from  intimidation  or  any  other  reason,  the  friends 
of  any  candidate  failed  to  nominate  him  in  open 
meeting,  there  would  be  nothing  to  hinder  them 
from  writing  his  name  on  their  ballots.  As  soon  as 
the  votes  were  cast  they  would  be  counted  in  the 
presence  of  the  assembly,  and  the  work  of  the  elec- 
tion would  be  over.  As  everything  would  be  done 
in  an  evening,  after  business  hours,  there  would  be 
no  need  of  paying  the  judges  and  clerks,  and  the 
whole  cost  of  the  election  could  be  limited  to  the 
price  of  the  blank  paper  and  ink  and  the  wear  and 
tear  of  the  hand-stamps. 

Of  course  this  plan  would  not  work  where  seventy 
or  eighty  officers  were  to  be  voted  for  at  once,  as  is 
often  the  case  under  present  conditions.  But  this 
multiplicity  of  elective  officers  is  recognized  on  all 
hands  as  an  evil  that  must  be  abolished  before  we 
can  hope  to  secure  any  improvement  in  our  govern- 


THE   SOURCE   OF   POWER.  17 

ment,  or  even  to  check  its  progressive  degradation. 
Under  a  proper  system  of  official  tenure,  there  would 
never  be  any  necessity  of  electing  more  than  one 
officer  at  a  time. 

The  plan  of  election  suggested  would  enable  us  to 
go  back  to  the  wise  and  safe  principle  of  majority 
rule.  No  candidate  should  ever  be  elected  except 
by  an  absolute  majority  of  all  the  votes  cast.  In 
this  country  circumstances  have  conspired  to  give 
the  pernicious  system  of  plurality  election  a  fac- 
titious popularity.  Chief  among  these  circumstances 
has  been  the  caricature  of  majority  rule  existing  in 
some  New  England  States  —  a  perversion  by  which 
a  small  minority  has  been  enabled  to  retain  perma- 
nent power.  Candidates  for  State  offices  have  been 
required  to  secure  a  majority  on  the  first  ballot,  and 
in  default  of  this  have  been  compelled  to  submit 
their  claims  to  a  Legislature  so  apportioned  as  to  be 
always  controlled  by  a  minority  of  the  people.  Can- 
didates for  the  Legislature  have  been  forced  into  an 
indefinite  succession  of  re-ballots,  without  any  pro- 
vision for  reaching  an  ultimate  conclusion,  until  the 
patience  of  their  constituents  has  been  exhausted 
and  the  attempt  at  election  has  been  abandoned. 
Instead  of  correcting  these  defects  the  tendency  has 
.  been  to  escape  from  them  by  plunging  into  plurality 
rule,  which  is  another  name  for  machine  rule.  When 
a  plurality  can  elect,  the  support  of  party  nomina- 
tions, good  or  bad,  becomes  a  necessity  for  voters 
who  regard  the  principles  of  their  party  as  more 
important  than  the  merits  of  candidates.  Any  divis- 
ion of    the  party  vote  may  let  in  the  other  side. 


18  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

When  a  majority  is  required  to  elect,  votes  may 
safely  be  scattered.  There  should  be  a  provision, 
however,  for  reducing  the  number  of  candidates 
after  the  first  ballot,  in  order  to  bring  the  contest  to 
an  early  conclusion.  It  would  not  be  expedient,  as 
Mr.  Gamaliel  Bradford  proposes,  to  eliminate  all  the 
candidates  but  the  highest  two  on  the  second  ballot, 
for  that  would  destroy  independent  voting  almost 
as  effectually  as  election  by  pluralities.  Suppose, 
for  instance,  that  the  Democrats,  being  in  the  major- 
ity in  a  given  constituency,  should  divide  their  votes 
on  the  first  ballot  among  four  candidates,  and  the 
Republicans  among  only  two.  Each  of  the  two 
Republican  candidates  would  probably  have  more 
votes  than  the  highest  Democratic,  and  the  Demo- 
cratic majority  would  be  reduced  on  the  second  bal- 
lot to  a  choice  between  Republicans.  This  possi- 
bility would  force  partisans  to  stick  to  the  regular 
nominees  from  the  beginning. 

Independent  voting  could  be  made  safe  enough 
for  all  practical  purposes  by  the  adoption  of  the 
preferential  principle,  combined  with  a  provision 
for  two  possible  supplementary  ballots.  The  work- 
ings of  the  system  will  be  described  in  more  detail 
in  the  chapter  on  Proportional  Representation,  but 
it  may  be  said  briefly  that  it  would  allow  every- 
voter  to  stamp  on  his  ballot  the  names  of  candidates 
in  addition  to  his  first  choice,  indicating  by  num- 
bers, or  by  the  arrangement  of  names,  his  order 
of  preference  among  them.  If  any  candidate  had 
a  majority  of  first-choice  votes  he  would  be  elected. 
If  not,  the  candidates  having  the  fewest  first-choice 


THE   SOURCE   OF   POWER.  19 

votes  would  be  eliminated,  and  their  votes  would 
be  counted  for  tliose  whose  names  stood  second 
in  order  on  their  lists.  This  process  would  be 
continued  until  some  candidate  had  a  majority 
or  the  preference  lists  became  exhausted.  Under 
this  plan  an  election  would  almost  always  be 
brought  about  on  the  first  ballot,  but  it  might 
occasionally  happen  that  the  voters  would  be  so 
divided  into  groups,  each  confining  its  expressions 
of  choice  within  its  own  circle,  that  after  all  possible 
eliminations  and  transfers  had  been  made  a  united 
majority  would  still  be  lacking.  In  this  case  a 
second  ballot  could  be  held,  limited  to  the  five 
candidates  receiving  the  highest  votes  on  the  first, 
or  to  such  smaller  number  as  remained  in  the  field 
after  the  possible  eliminations  had  been  completed. 
With  the  help  of  transfers  an  election  would  be 
almost  inevitable  on  this  ballot,  but  in  the  almost 
impossible  contingency  of  a  continued  failure  to 
elect  a  third  ballot  could  be  ordered,  at  which  only 
the  two  leading  candidates  could  be  voted  for. 
This  would  insure  a  choice  except  in  case  of  a  tie, 
when  the  result  could  be  decided  by  lot. 

Under  our  present  method  these  supplementary 
ballots  would  cause  some  trouble  and  expense,  but 
with  election  by  popular  assemblies,  in  the  manner 
suggested,  all  inconvenience  would  disappear.  In 
the  case  of  local  offices,  if  no  candidate  were  elected 
on  the  first  ballot,  the  chairman  of  the  meeting 
would  announce  the  fact,  and  order  a  second,  and,  if 
necessary,  a  third  trial,  on  the  spot.  In  the  case  of 
officers  representing  larger  constituencies  the  pro- 


20  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

cess  would  require  a  little  more  time,  but  no  more 
trouble  or  expense.  When  the  votes  were  can- 
vas.sed  by  the  central  authority  and  the  laek  of  a 
majority  discovered,  the  assemblies  would  be  noti- 
fied to  vote  again  at  their  next  meetings,  and  if  a 
third  ballot  were  required  the  process  would  be 
repeated.  If  time  pressed,  special  meetings  could 
be  called.  It  would  be  important,  of  course,  to  have 
all  meetings  at  which  joint  action  was  to  be  taken 
held  on  the  same  day. 

For  all  business  except  elections  the  presence  of  a 
majority  of  the  registered  voters  of  the  precinct 
should  be  required  to  constitute  a  quorum.  This 
would  prevent  the  affairs  of  the  locality  from  fall- 
ing into  the  hands  of  a  little  knot  of  regular 
attendants  at  the  meetings  while  the  citizens  in 
general  stayed  at  home.  The  assembly  should 
have  the  right,  just  as  in  the  case  of  a  representative 
legislative  body,  to  compel  the  attendance  of 
absent  members,  under  penalty  of  fine  or  sus- 
pension from  the  privilege  of  voting.  But  even 
if  it  did  not  exercise  this  right,  and  persistent 
abstentions  delayed  the  public  business,  no  harm 
would  result,  for  the  delinquents  would  begin  to 
feel  the  inconvenience  caused  by  their  neglect  of 
duty,  and  would  soon  muster  in  sufficient  numbers 
to  keep  the  machine  going. 

In  the  case  of  elections,  however,  no  fixed  quorum 
should  be  required.  The  proper  punishment  for  a 
failure  to  vote  for  good  officers  is  to  be  ruled  by  bad 
ones.  If  good  citizens  do  not  take  sufficient  interest 
in  their  own  affairs  to  elect  the  right  men  to  office. 


THE   SOURCE   OF   POWER.  21 

it  is  fitting-  that  the  persons  who  do  take  enough 
interest  to  vote  should  be  allowed  to  have  their  own 
way.  It  may  be  vSaid  that  the  same  principle  would 
apply  to  all  kinds  of  business,  but  there  is  a  differ- 
ence. An  unfortunate  choice  of  officials  can  always 
be  corrected,  especially  under  the  system  of  tenure 
to  be  hereafter  explained,  but  a  mistake  in  meas- 
ures is  sometimes  irremediable.  Besides,  if  the 
assemblies  were  allowed  to  act  on  all  questions, 
regardless  of  the  number  present,  the  fact  that 
business  always  got  itself  accomplished  somehow, 
whether  the  mass  of  the  voters  turned  out  or  not, 
might  induce  in  them  a  stay-at-home  habit,  which 
would  be  demoralizing. 

Even  if  parties  retained  their  vigor,  which  would 
be  impossible  after  the  custom  of  direct  legislation 
became  well  established,  the  combination  of  open 
nominations  and  majority  elections  would  destroy 
the  power  of  the  political  machines.  That  power 
rests,  first,  upon  the  control  of  nominations,  and, 
second,  upon  the  necessity  pressing  upon  the  rank 
and  file  of  the  party  of  supporting  those  nominations, 
under  penalty  of  suffering  defeat  in  the  election. 
If  anybody  could  nominate  candidates  up  to  the 
hour  of  voting,  and  partisans  could  scatter  their 
votes  without  fear  of  giving  the  election  to  the  other 
party,  a  machine  nomination  would  carry  no  more 
weight  than  would  be  given  by  the  character  of  the 
men  who  made  it. 

The  public-meeting  system  would  enable  young 
men  to  get  into  politics  without  crawling  through 
the  mud.     There  would  be  no  necessity  of  bargain- 


22  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

ing  with  a  boss  for  an  opportunity  to  be  heard. 
Iwcry  citizen  would  be  a  legislator  as  a  matter  of 
right.  He  could  attend  the  meetings  of  his  precinct 
assembly,  express  his  views  there,  and  fit  himself  by 
practice  in  debate,  in  lawmaking,  and  in  honorable 
political  strategy,  for  more  extended  responsibilities. 
No  debating  society  or  school  of  politics  could  com- 
pare in  fascination  or  in  educating  power  with 
this  open  arena,  whose  prizes  would  be  the  things 
that  grown  men  strive  for,  and  not  the  counterfeit 
honors  of  school-boys. 

There  is  many  a  man  who  would  not  accept  the 
Presidency  of  the  United  States,  if  he  had  to  pawn  his 
self-respect  with  a  boss  to  get  it,  but  who  would 
gladly  devote  time  and  effort  to  work  in  a  local 
assembly  which  he  could  enter  freely,  without  any 
man's  permission,  and  in  which  he  could  try,  by 
honest,  open  argument,  to  win  his  neighbors  to  his 
views.  The  practice  of  acting  together  in  such 
assemblies  would  develop  among  the  people  of  every 
locality  a  habit  of  listening  to  reason  instead  of 
basing  conclusions  entirely  upon  prejudice  and  pas- 
sion. The  feeling,  too,  that  their  deliberations  were 
not  mere  talk,  or  mere  appeals  to  officials  to  do 
something  that  might  be  refused,  but  were  in  them- 
selves the  very  mainsprings  of  political  action,  would 
give  them  the  sobering  responsibilities  of  power. 

When  we  remember  that  thousands  of  high- 
minded  citizens  are  now  willing  to  encounter  the 
repulsive  atmosphere  of  primaries  held  in  saloons 
and  billiard  halls,  for  the  sake  of  grappling  with 
political  evils  intrenched  behind  almost  every  pos- 


THE   SOURCE   OF   POWER.  23 

sible  advantage,  and  that  thousands  more  are  doing 
hard,  thankless,  unpleasant  work  for  the  sahie  ends 
through  Good  Government  clubs  and  similar  organi- 
zations, we  can  hardly  doubt  that  they  would  wel- 
come the  opportunity  to  make  a  clean,  open  fight  for 
the  right  on  a  fair  field. 


CHAPTER  II. 

DIRECT   LEGISLATION. 

The  ideal  democracy  is  that  form  of  government 
in  which  the  people  in  their  own  persons  make  their 
own  laws.  This  was  the  only  form  of  democratic 
rule  known  to  the  civilized  republics  of  antiquity. 
It  was  abandoned  for  purely  physical  reasons,  be- 
cause as  States  grew  in  size  it  became  impossible  for 
the  citizens  to  gather  and  deliberate  in  a  single 
assembly,  and  it  was  not  seen  how  they  could 
deliberate  and  vote  without  coming  together  in  one 
place.  This  was  why  Rousseau  thought  that  a  true 
republic  must  necessarily  be  small.  ^Montesquieu 
saw  the  logical  connection  between  democracy  and 
direct  popular  legislation,  and  he,  too,  was  staggered 
by  physical  difficulties.  "  As,  in  a  free  State,"  he 
said,  "every  man  who  is  held  to  have  a  free  spirit 
ought  to  be  governed  by  himself,  the  people  in  a 
body  ought  to  have  the  legislative  power;  but  as 
that  is  impossible  in  large  States,  and  subject  to 
many  inconveniences  in  small  ones,  it  is  necessary 
that  the  people  do  by  their  representatives  all  that 
they  are  unable  to  do  by  themselves." 

The  Teutonic  device  of  representation  was  such  a 
convenient  substitute  for  the  unwieldy,  popular 
mass-meeting  that  it  gradually  came  to  be  looked 
upon  as  a  political  end  in  itself,  instead  of  as  a  con- 

(24) 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION.  25 

venient  means  of  enabling  the  electorate  to  evade 
the  limitations  of  time  and  space,  and  we"  now  hear 
practical  methods  of  restoring  the  direct  rule  of  the 
people  criticised  as  "violations  of  the  representa- 
tive principle."  The  representative  system  is  a 
convenient  medium  for  the  transmission  of  political 
power,  just  as  a  system  of  shafts  and  pulleys  is  a 
convenient  medium  for  the  transmission  of  mechan- 
ical power,  and  it  would  be  precisely  as  reasonable 
to  object  to  a  plan  for  gearing  a  generator  directly 
to  the  machine  it  was  to  work,  as  a  violation  of  the 
shaft-and-pulley  principle,  as  to  object  to  a  practi- 
cable plan  of  direct  legislation  as  an  infraction  of  the 
principle  of  representation. 

The  Swiss  method  of  popular  law-making  through 
the  referendum  and  initiative  has  been  made  so  famil- 
iar to  the  American  public  through  the  works  of  Vin- 
cent, Adams  and  Cunningham,  Moses,  Winchester, 
McCracken,  Cree,  Sullivan,  and  others,  that  no  very 
detailed  account  of  it  is  necessary  here.  In  Switzer- 
land, thirty  thousand  voters,  or  eight  cantons,  may 
demand  the  submission  of  any  law  passed  by  the 
Federal  Assembly  to  the  people  at  the  polls,  and  fifty 
thousand  voters  may  demand  the  submission  of  a  con- 
stitutional amendment  proposed  by  themselves.  All 
the  cantons,  except  Freiburg,  have  the  referendum 
in  some  form,  and  in  several  of  them  it  is  obligatory. 
In  these  no  general  law  is  valid  until  it  has  been  rati- 
fied by  a  popular  vote.  The  voting  is  carried  on  by 
ballot,  precisely  as  in  the  election  of  officials. 

Although  this  particular  form  of  direct  legislation 
is,  as  I  believe,  capable  of  great  improvement,  it  is 


2G  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

SO  infinitely  superior  to  our  present  methods  of  law- 
making, that,  if  we  should  transplant  it  bodily  to  the 
United  States,  we  should  be  vastly  the  gainers.  The 
testimony  of  foreign  observers  to  its  admirable  work- 
ing in  Switzerland  is  almost  unanimous.  If  we  had 
nothing  but  theory  to  guide  us,  we  should  infer  that 
the  right  of  appeal  from  a  legislative  body  to  the 
people  would  greatly  diminish  the  intensity  of  party 
conflicts;  that  it  would  tend  to  keep  legislators 
of  ability  in  place,  regardless  of  their  opinion  on 
current  issues;  that  it  would  promote  sincerity 
among  public  men,  prevent  filibustering  and  log-roll- 
ing, check  corruption,  and  make  legislative  debates 
business-like  discussions  of  practical  matters,  instead 
of  oratorical  tournaments  for  the  benefit  of  the 
reporters.  Practical  Swiss  experience  has  shown 
us  these  results  in  actual  operation. 

"  One  in  visiting  the  chambers  of  the  Assembly," 
remarks  one  observer,  "  is  much  impressed  with 
the  smooth  and  quiet  dispatch  of  business.  The 
members  are  not  seated  with  any  reference  to  their 
political  affiliations.  There  are  no  filibustering,  no 
vexatious  points  of  order,  no  drastic  rules  of  cloture, 
to  ruffle  the  decorum  of  its  proceedings.  Interrup- 
tions are  few,  and  angry  personal  bickerings  never 
occur.  .  .  .  Leaves  to  print,  or  a  written  speech 
memorized  and  passionately  declaimed,  are  un- 
known ;  there  are  none  of  these  extraneous  and 
soliciting  conditions  to  invite  '  buncombe  '  speeches 
or  flights  of  oratory  for  the  press  and  the  gallery. 
The  debates  are  more  in  the  nature  of  an  informal 
consultation  of  business  men  about  common  inter- 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION.  27 

ests ;  they  talk  and  vote,  and  there  is  an  end  of  it. 
This  easy,  colloquial  disposition  of  affairs  by  no 
means  implies  any  slip-shod  indifference  or  super- 
ficial method  of  legislation.  There  is  no  legislative 
body  where  important  questions  are  treated  in  a 
more  fundamental  and  critical  manner."* 

The  same  author  adds  that  "  the  members  of  the 
Assembly  practically  enjoy  life  tenure  ;  once  chosen 
a  member,  one  is  likely  to  be  reelected  as  long  as 
he  is  willing  to  serve.  Reelection,  alike  in  the 
whole  Confederation  and  in  the  single  Canton,  is  the 
rule ;  rejection  of  a  sitting  member,  a  rare  exception. 
Death  and  voluntary  retirement  accounted  for  nine- 
teen out  of  twenty-one  new  members  at  the  last  gen- 
eral election.  There  are  members  who  have  served 
continuously  since  the  organization  of  the  Assembly 
in  1848.  Referring  to  this  sure  tenure  of  officials 
generally,  the  President  of  the  Confederation,  in  a 
public  address,  said  :  '  Facts,  and  not  persons,  are 
what  interest  us.  If  you  were  to  take  ten  Swiss, 
every  one  of  them  w^ould  know  whether  the  country 
was  well-governed  or  not,  but  I  venture  to  say  that 
nine  of  them  would  not  be  able  to  tell  the  name  of 
the  President,  and  the  tenth,  who  might  think  he 
knew  it,  would  be  mistaken.'  To  some  extent  this 
remarkable  retention  of  members  of  the  Assembly 
may  be  ascribed  to  the  fact  that  the  people  feel 
they  are  masters  of  the  situation  through  the  power 
of  rejecting  all  measures  which  are  put  to  the  popu- 
lar vote."  t 


*BoYD  Winchester,  "  The  Swiss  Republic,"  p.  78. 
f  Winchester,  p.  80. 


28  SUGGESTIONS   f)N    GOVERNMENT. 

And  again : 

"  The  members  of  the  Federal  Council  can  be,  and 
are,  continually  reelected,  notwithstanding  sharp 
antagonisms  among  themselves,  and  it  may  be 
between  them  and  a  majority  in  the  Assembly. 
They  also  continue  to  discharge  their  administrative 
duties,  whether  the  measures  submitted  by  them  are, 
or  are  not,  sanctioned  by  the  voters.  The  rejection 
of  measures  approved  and  proposed  by  them  does 
not  necessarily  injure  their  position  with  the  coun- 
try. The  Swiss  distinguish  between  men  and  meas- 
ures. They  retain  valued  servants  in  their  employ- 
ment, even  though  they  reject  their  advice.  Valuing 
the  executive  ability  of  these  men,  still  they  may 
constantly  withhold  assent  from  their  suggestions. 
The  Council,  substantially  in  its  present  form,  came 
into  existence  with  the  constitution  of  1848,  the  first 
election  of  its  members  taking  place  in  November 
of  that  year.  The  election,  therefore,  which  oc- 
curred on  the  13th  of  December,  1887,  was  the  four- 
teenth triennial  renewal  of  the  Council,  and  covered 
a  period  of  thirty-nine  years.  During  this  period 
the  complete  roster  of  the  members  embraces  only 
twenty-seven  names  ;  even  this  small  ratio  of  change 
resulted  in  seven  cases  from  death  and  eleven  from 
voluntary  retirement,  leaving  only  two  who  failed 
to  be  reelected  on  the  avowed  ground  of  political 
divergence.  This  most  remarkable  conser\'atism  on 
the  part  of  the  Assembly,  in  retaining  the  members 
of  the  Council  by  repeated  reelections,  has  survived 
important  issues  of  public  policy,  including  several 
revisions  of  the  constitution,  upon  which  there  was 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION.  29 

a  wide  diversity  of  opinion  in  the  Council,  _some  of 
whom  actively  participated  in  the  discussions,  antag- 
onizing the  views  of  a  majority  of  the  Assembly  — 
the  Assembly  to  which  they  owed  their  election,  and 
upon  which  they  relied  for  their  retention  in  office. 
Their  periodical  reelection,  though  seemingly  pro 
forma,  carries  with  it  a  salutary  sense  of  accountable- 
ness.  This  sure  tenure  of  service  in  the  Federal 
Council  makes  those  chosen  look  upon  it  as  the  busi- 
ness of  their  lives.  Without  this  peraianence 
attached  to  the  position,  such  men  as  now  fill  it 
could  not  be  induced  to  do  so."* 

The  testimony  of  other  witnesses  to  the  effect  of 
the  referendum  in  securing  stability  in  the  per- 
sonnel of  the  government  is  quite  as  emphatic. 
"  The  composition  of  the  National  Council  has 
changed  but  little  of  late,"  say  Adams  and  Cun- 
ningham. "  The  Swiss  voter  is  quite  ready  to  vote 
again  and  again  for  the  same  candidates  ;  he  proba- 
bly looks  upon  them  as  good  men  of  business  with 
long  experience  of  parliamentary  and  federal  af- 
fairs, and  he  knows  very  well  that  if  measures  are 
passed,  of  which,  for  some  reason  or  other,  he  does 
not  approve,  he  and  his  fellows  can  combine  to 
reject  them  at  the  referendum.  This,  however, 
does  not  prevent  him  from  again  voting  for  the  old 
representatives  at  the  next  election,  and  he  will  do 
so,  in  many  instances,  time  after  time."f 

"The  members   of  the   Federal   Council  are  re- 


*  Winchester,  p.  95. 

f Sir  F.  O.  Adams  and  C.  D.  Cunningham,  "The    Swiss  Con- 
federation," pp.  41-42. 


30  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

eligible,  and,  in  point  of  fact,  the  vSame  individuals 
remain  in  office  for  a  number  of  years,  notwith- 
standing the  existence  of  well-knowji  differences 
among  themselves,  and  between  some  of  them  and 
a  majority  in  the  Assembly.  There  have  been, 
hitherto,  only  two  instances  of  a  member  willing  to 
serve  not  being  reelected ;  but  from  time  to  time 
some  naturally  resign,  one  for  a  more  lucrative 
post,  another  to  become  the  head  of  a  diplomatic 
mission,  another  from  a  desire  to  retire  into  private 
life."* 

On  the  decorous  and  business-like  proceedings  of 
the  Swiss  legislative  bodies,  the  same  observers  re- 
mark: 

"  The  debates  are  carried  on  with  much  decorum. 
There  is  seldom  a  noisy  sitting,  even  when  the 
most  important  subjects  are  being  discussed  ;  inter- 
ruptions are  few,  and  scenes  such  as  unhappily  have, 
of  late,  been  painfully  frequent  in  our  House  of 
Commons,  do  not  exist.  It  is  true  that  there  are  but 
forty-four  members  in  one  chamber  and  one  hun- 
dred and  forty-five  in  the  other.  But  the  sittings 
strike  a  spectator  as  being  those  of  men  of  business, 
though  the  members  are  by  no  means  devoid  of 
eloquence."  f 

In  spite  of  the  absence  of  any  attraction  in  the 
way  of  high  salaries,  Switzerland  is  able  to  com- 
mand the  services  of  its  best  and  ablest  citizens  to  a 
degree  which  we  are  unable  to  approach.  The 
President   of  the   Confederation   is  paid  less  than 


*  Adams  and  Cunningham,  pp.  58-59. 
f  Adams  and  Cunningham,  p.  51. 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION.  31 

two  thousand  seven  hundred  dollars  a_  year,  and  the 
cost  of  the  entire  Executive  Council  does  not  reach 
seventeen  thousand  dollars.  But  this  modest  out- 
lay, which  would  hardly  satisfy  the  bookkeepers 
of  an  American  business  house,  secures  for  Switzer- 
land some  of  the  best  administrative  skill  in  the 
world.  "  Democracies  have  been  justly  reproached," 
says  a  recent  historian,  "  for  the  fact  that  their 
political  offices  are  not  always  filled  by  men  of 
recognized  ability  and  unstained  honor ;  that  the 
best  talent  of  the  nation  after  a  while  yields  the 
political  field  to  adventurers.  This  is  not  the  case  in 
Switzerland,  under  the  purifying  working  of  the 
referendum  and  initiative.  Nowhere  in  the  world 
are  government  places  occupied  by  men  so  well 
fitted  for  the  work  to  be  performed."  * 

Mr.  J.  W.  Sullivan  finds  that  "  an  impressive  fact 
in  Swiss  politics  to-day  is  its  peace.  Especially  is 
this  true  of  the  contents  and  tone  of  the  press. 
.  .  .  On  all  sides,  over  the  border  from  Switzer- 
land, political  turmoil,  with  its  rancor,  personalities, 
false  reports,  hatreds,  and  corruptions,  is  endless. 
But  in  Switzerland,  debate  uniformly  bears,  not  on 
men,  but  on  measures." 

"  Removals  of  federal  office-holders  in  order  to 
repay  party  workers  are  unheard  of." 

"  While  both  legislators  and  executives  are  elected 
for  short  terms,  it  is  customary  for  the  same  men  to 
serve  in  public  capacities  a  long  time.  Though  the 
people  may  recall  their  servants  at  brief  intervals, 


McCracken,  "  Rise  of  the  Swiss  Republic,"  p.  344. 


32  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

they  almost  invariably  ask  them  to  continue  in  serv- 
ice. Employes  keep  their  places  at  will,  during 
good  behavior.  This  custom  extends  to  higher 
offices  filled  by  appointment.  One  minister  to  Paris 
held  the  position  for  twenty-three  years;  one  to 
Rome,  for  sixteen.  Once  elected  to  the  Federal 
Executive  Council,  a  public  man  may  regard  his 
office  as  a  permanency.  Of  the  Council  of  1889,  one 
member  had  served  .since  1863,  another  since  1866. 
Up  to  1879  ^o  seat  in  the  Council  had  ever  become 
vacant,  excepting  through  death  or  resignation."  * 

All  observers  of  Swiss  politics  are  struck  by  the 
unwillingness  of  the  voters  to  sanction  sudden  and 
radical  changes.  The  referendum  is  the  most 
powerful  conservative  force  in  the  republic.  The 
people  are  fearless  in  accepting  innovations  when 
they  are  once  thoroughly  convinced  of  their  justice 
and  necessity ;  but  rash  and  ill-considered  projects 
have  no  chance  of  adoption.  On  the  3d  of  June, 
1894,  after  these  words  were  written,  the  Swiss 
electorate  voted  upon  a  bill  declaring  that  every 
man  had  a  right  to  employment,  and  that  if  he 
could  not  get  it  elsewhere  the  State  should  furnish 
it.  There  is  much  to  be  said  for  such  a  proposition, 
and  the  average  legislator  would  certainly  regard  it 
as  eminently  popular,  whatever  he  might  think 
about  its  wisdom,  but  the  people  of  Switzerland 
rejected  it  by  a  vote  of  three  hundred  and  eight 
thousand  to  seventy-five  thousand. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  dwell  upon  the  contrast 


J.  \V.  Slllivan,  "  Direct  Legislation  by  the  Citizenship." 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION.  33 

to  this  state  of  affairs  offered  by  our  own  conditions. 
When  a  leading  New  York  journal  complains  that 
"Senators  and  representatives  vote  for  the  most 
dangerous  measures,  not  because  they  believe  they 
are  sound  or  safe,  but  because  they  are  afraid  to 
oppose  them,  lest  ignorance  among  their  constituents 
should  deprive  them  of  their  places  in  Congress,"  it 
is  merely  formulating  a  truism. 

Our  political  methods  directly  penalize  independ- 
ence and  honesty.  As  the  only  way  of  passing  a 
given  law  is  to  elect  legislators  who  will  vote  for  it, 
and  the  only  way  of  repealing  it  is  to  turn  those 
legislators  out  and  replace  them  by  others  who  pro- 
fess different  opinions,  questions  of  legislation  are 
inevitably  and  inextricably  mixed  with  struggles  for 
official  place.  From  this  it  necessarily  follows,  that 
when  a  new  issue  comes  up  for  discussion,  our  law- 
makers are  under  the  stongest  possible  pressure  to 
align  themselves  upon  it,  not  according  to  their 
opinions  of  its  merits,  but  according  to  what  they 
believe  to  be  the  desires  of  their  constituents ;  and 
that  when  they  have  once  committed  themselves  in 
this  way,  they  are  impelled  to  do  all  in  their  power 
to  confirm  their  constituents  in  these  supposed 
desires,  which  they  themselves  may,  and  often  do, 
believe  to  be  dangerous  delusions. 

If  they  failed  to  read  the  prejudices  of  their  dis- 
tricts aright  in  the  first  place,  or  if,  having  read 
them  aright,  and  conformed  to  them,  they  allowed 
them  to  yield  to  increasing  enlightenment,  they 
would  be  in  danger  of  losing  their  seats.  Hence, 
insincerity  has  become  so   completely  the  rule   in 

3 


34  SUGGESTIONS   ON    GOVERNMENT. 

representative  governments,  that  it  has  come  to  rank 
as  a  virtue;  and  a  politician  who  is  always  true  to 
his  convictions  endangers  not  only  his  place,  but  his 
reputation.  That  this  is  literally  true  may  be  seen 
in  the  most  cursory  observation  of  current  politics 
in  America  or  Europe.  It  is  not  to  be  doubted,  for 
instance,  that  there  is  a  considerable  number  of 
Democrats  who  honestly  believe  in  protection,  and 
of  Republicans  who  honestly  believe  in  free  trade. 
They  are  expected,  however,  to  smother  their  own 
opinions,  and  speak,  and  vote,  in  favor  of  measures 
which  they  believe  to  be  wrong;  and  if  they  fail  to  do 
so  they  are  impaled  as  traitors  to  their  respective 
parties.  In  England,  a  Liberal  may  be  elected  to 
Parliament  on  a  general  pledge  to  favor  home  rule, 
and  when  he  begins  to  legislate  he  may  find  that  the 
particular  home  rule  bill  introduced  by  the  leaders 
of  his  party  is,  in  his  judgment,  so  radically  defective 
as  to  endanger  the  national  safety.  Nevertheless  he 
must  support  it  or  be  branded  as  a  renegade.  And, 
indeed,  this  enforcement  of  party  discipline  at  the 
expense  of  personal  independence,  and  even  honesty, 
is  a  necessity  under  the  present  system,  since  it  is 
the  only  way  in  which  the  people  can  retain  any 
sort  of  control  over  legislation.  But  its  effect  in 
lowering  the  tone  of  public  men  is  obvious.  No 
politician  can  habitually  defend  measures  of  which 
he  does  not  approve,  for  the  sake  of  retaining  his 
party  standing  and  official  place,  without  blunting 
his  sense  of  rigfht  and  wronof.  This  deterioration  of 
character  would  be  bad  enough  if  it  accomplished 
effective  results;  but  it  does  not  even  do  that.     The 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION.  35 

system  that  produces  it  is,  of  all  known  devices,  the 
clumsiest,  slowest,  and  most  uncertain  method  of 
reaching  any  desired  end.  It  has  kept  the  United 
States  in  a  ferment  over  the  tariff  for  a  hundred 
years  and  has  settled  nothing  yet.  Discussion  on 
this  subject  has  hardly  advanced  an  inch  since  the 
debates  on  the  first  Revenue  Act  of  1789.  For 
nearly  twenty  years  our  parties  have  been  trying  to 
find  out  what  the  people  want  done  about  silver,  in' 
order  that  the  politicians  may  know  what  opinions 
to  hold  themselves,  and  they  are  rather  more  at  sea 
now  than  they  were  in  1875. 

The  only  logical  theory  of  representative  govern- 
ment is  that  the  people  select  the  wisest  men  among 
them  to  decide  things  which  they  do  not  know 
enough  to  decide  for  themselves.  There  is  much  to 
be  said  for  such  a  theory  as  that.  If  it  could  be 
thoroughly  and  consistently  carried  out  it  would  be 
quite  likely  to  give  us  an  able  government  —  and  a 
corrupt  one.  But  it  never  is,  and  never  can  be,  con- 
sistently carried  out.  Public  opinion  will  insist  on 
making  itself  felt,  and  the  moment  public  opinion 
begins  to  interfere  in  the  deliberations  of  a  legisla- 
ture, we  paralyze  the  judgment  of  the  legislators 
without  giving  effective  play  to  the  desires  of  the 
people,  A  member  of  Congress,  intent  above  all 
else  upon  saving  his  seat,  hears  ascending  to  him  a 
confused  roar  of  demands  from  which  he  must  con- 
trive to  extract  the  divine  vox  popiili.  Delegations 
of  manufacturers  and  workingmen  visit  him  to  pro- 
test against  the  reform  of  the  tariff.  Mass  meetings 
of  his   party   insist  upon   immediate    and    radical 


36  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

reductions.  Newspapers  command  him  to  work  for 
high,  low,  medium,  or  no  duties  on  fifty  different 
articles  produced  or  consumed  in  his  district.  Let- 
ters and  telegrams  pour  in  upon  him  urging  him  to 
support  and  oppose  the  free  coinage  of  silver ;  to 
favor  the  coinage  of  the  seigniorage  and  its  .sale  as  old 
junk  ;  to  promote  the  extension  of  the  national  bank- 
ing system  and  the  substitution  of  State  bank  issues. 
He  reads  election  returns,  and  is  told  that  the  result 
means  that  the  people  do  not  want  tariff  reform ;  that 
they  are  incensed  at  the  delay  in  giving  it  to  them  ; 
that  they  are  enraged  at  Congress  for  its  partiality  to 
silver,  and  infuriated  at  the  President  for  his  devotion 
to  gold.  In  the  confusion,  his  own  opinions,  if  he 
ever  had  any,  utterly  evaporate. 

If  we  abandon  the  principle  of  independent  action 
by  legislators  tru.sted  to  do  what  is  best  without 
regard  to  public  opinion,  we  must  fall  back  on  the 
theory  that  the  members  of  a  law-making  body 
should  be  true  representatives  of  the  people,  endeav- 
oring, to  the  best  of  their  ability,  to  carry  out  the 
popular  will,  and  held  accountable  by  their  con- 
stituents for  the  fidelity  with  which  they  execute 
their  trust.  This  idea  is  clearly  stated  by  Mr. 
Woodrow  Wilson,  one  of  the  ablest  advocates  of  the 
party  system  of  legislation  : 

"  It  should  be  desired  that  parties  should  act  in 
distinct  organizations,  in  accordance  with  avowed 
principles,  under  easily  recognized  leaders,  in  order 
that  the  voters  might  be  able  to  declare  by  their 
ballots,  not  only  their  condemnation  of  any  past 
policy,  by  withdrawing  all  support  from  the  party 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION.  37 

responsible  for  it,  but  also,  and  particularly,  their 
will  as  to  the  future  administration  of  the  govern- 
ment, by  bringing  into  power  a  party  pledged  to  the 
adoption  of  an  acceptable  policy."* 

There  is  conspicuous  here  the  assumption,  which 
lies  at  the  base  of  all  the  arguments  in  behalf  of 
pure  representative  government,  that  a  "  party  pol- 
icy "  is  a  clearly  defined  unit,  which  may  be  unmis- 
takably condemned  or  approved  by  the  voters.  Yet 
the  fact  that  it  is  nothing  of  the  kind  is  one  that  lies 
on  the  very  surface  of  our  history.  We  have  never 
had  a  national  election  whose  returns  made  it  pos- 
sible to  determine  just  what  policy,  in  the  sense  of 
a  programme  of  legislation,  the  people  wanted, 
although  there  have  been  a  very  few  elections  in 
which  the  popular  will  on  some  one  overshadowing 
issue  has  been  made  tolerably  clear.  It  was  reason- 
ably plain  in  1864,  for  instance,  that  the  Northern 
people  favored  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  but  the 
election  threw  no  light  on  their  ideas  upon  recon- 
struction, emancipation,  negro  suffrage,  or  the 
finances. 

To  put  the  "  party-policy  "  idea  to  the  test,  let  us 
suppose  that  I  desire  the  reform  of  the  tariff,  and 
object  to  the  further  coinage  of  silver,  the  intensity 
of  my  wish  for  tariff  reform  being  represented  by 
one  hundred,  and  that  of  my  opposition  to  silver 
legislation  being  represented  by  ninety-nine.  Sup- 
pose that  my  party  passes  a  tariff  bill  satisfactory  to 
me,  and  also  passes  a  silver  coinage  bill.  I  am 
called  upon  to  render  judgment  upon  this  "  policy  " 


WooDRow  Wilson,  "  Congressional  Government." 

4S9069 


38  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

at  the  next  election.  I  do  violence  to  my  convictions 
on  the  silver  question  for  the  sake  of  my  preponder- 
ating convictions  on  the  tariff  ;  but  my  dissatisfaction 
(ninety-nine)  on  one  question  must  be  deducted  from 
my  satisfaction  (one  hundred)  on  the  other,  leaving 
me  a  net  vsatisfaction  of  only  one  instead  of  the  one 
hundred  and  ninety-nine  which  I  could  have  had  if 
I  had  been  allowed  to  vote  on  each  measure  by 
itself. 

But  this  is  putting  the  case  too  favorably  for  the 
"  policy  "  theory.  In  this  example  the  voter  does 
get  some  opportunity,  however  slight,  to  move  in 
the  direction  of  his  preponderating  desires.  But 
the  situation  is  not  often  so  simple.  Suppose,  for 
instance,  that  my  ideas  of  a  national  "  policy," 
quantitatively  expressed,  run  like  this : 

Tariff  reform loo 

Opposition  to  silver  coinage 99 

Economy  in  government 80 

Annexation  of  Hawaii 50 

Extension  of  civil-service  laws 50 

Strong  navy 40 

419 

Suppose  that  my  party  meets  my  wishes  on  tariff 
reform  and  economy  (one  hundred  and  eighty),  and 
the  other  party  on  silver,  Hawaii,  and  the  navy  (one 
hundred  and  eighty-nine),  while  neither  takes  a  satis- 
factory position  on  the  civil  service  (fifty).  Then,  if  I 
vote  for  my  party,  I  vote  for  a  policy  of  which  I 
approve  of  only  one  hundred  and  eighty  parts  and 
disapprove  of  two  hundred  and  thirty-nine,  and  if 
I  vote  for  the  other  I  vote  for  a  policy  of  which  I 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION.  39 

approve  of  only  one  hundred  and  eighty-nine  parts 
and  disapprove  of  two  hundred  and  thirty.  Thus 
my  net  satisfaction  is  fifty-nine  less  than  nothing  in 
one  case  and  forty-one  less  than  nothing  in  the  other. 
And,  moreover,  the  situation  is  almost  certain  to  be 
still  further  complicated  by  the  nomination  of  can- 
didates whom  I  do  not  consider  fit  to  hold  office,  but 
for  whom  I  must  vote  as  the  only  way  of  exerting 
an  influence  on  the  choice  of  any  policy  at  all.  If 
the  people  were  allowed  to  vote  on  measures  as  well 
as  on  men,  I  could  exert  my  full  power  at  the  polls 
in  favor  of  the  whole  four  hundred  and  nineteen 
points  of  the  policy  I  desired  to  see  carried  out,  and, 
in  addition,  I  could  vote  for  the  candidate  I  thought 
best  qualified  for  legislative  business,  regardless  of 
his  opinions  on  disputed  political  issues. 

A  disadvantage  of  representative  sovereignty, 
which  has  become  unpleasantly  conspicuous  within 
the  past  year,  is  the  power  it  gives  to  unscrupulous 
minorities.  When  one  party  holds  either  branch  of 
a  legislative  body  by  a  small  majority,  a  few  of  its 
members  can  absolutely  dictate  its  policy.  A  half 
dozen  protectionist  Democrats  in  the  Senate  held 
their  party  by  the  throat  last  spring  and  summer, 
and  compelled  it  to  adopt  a  tariff  programme  which 
five-sixths  of  its  voters  would  have  repudiated.  In 
order  to  pass  a  tariff  bill  it  was. necessary  to  buy  the 
vote  of  each  of  these  Senators  by  concessions  to  the 
interests  he  particularly  represented.  If  a  measure 
had  been  framed  by  a  majority  of  the  Democrats  in 
Congress  for  submission  to  the  people,  it  would  have 
been  drawn  on  broad,  logical  lines,  capable  of  public 


40  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

defense  on  general  principles.  As  the  object  in 
view  was  to  secure  the  votes,  not  of  six  or  seven 
million  citizens,  but  of  six  or  seven  Senators,  the 
measure  was  logically  and  necessarily  drawn  in  the 
interest  of  the  Senators,  rather  than  in  that  of  the 
citizens. 

Another  abuse  that  would  be  extirpated  by  direct 
legislation  is  the  practice  of  log-rolling.  An  average 
legislative  body  will  pass  half  a  dozen  bad  measures 
of  which  no  one,  taken  separately,  w^ould  have 
strength  enough  even  to  gain  consideration.  The 
advocates  of  an  unnecessary  insane  asylum  at  Goshen 
combine  with  the  champions  of  a  superfluous  nor- 
mal school  at  Podunk,  and  with  the  help  of  the 
friends  of  a  useless  reformatory  at  Wayback,  a 
legislative  majority  is  secured  for  a  combined  raid 
on  the  State  Treasury.  No  such  combination  would 
be  possible  in  a  popular  vote,  where  each  proposition 
would  have  to  stand  on  its  own  merits,  and  if  such  a 
poll  could  be  demanded,  most  of  the  schemes  whose 
success  depends  upon  vote-trading  in  legislatures 
would  never  be  heard  of. 

But  the  most  serious  evil  connected  with  the 
delegation  of  the  uncontrolled  law-making  power 
to  a  limited  number  of  representatives  still  remains 
to  be  considered.  It  is  the  leverage  given  to  corrup- 
tion. That  every  man  has  his  price  is  too  hard  a 
saying,  but  that  the  great  majority  of  men  have 
their  price  is  the  simple  truth.  When  votes  are 
quoted  at  two  dollars  apiece,  from  five  to  ten  per 
cent  of  the  voters  of  a  State  can  be  bought.  Ten 
dollars  apiece  w^ould  buy,  perhaps,  twenty  per  cent. 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION.  41 

a  hundred  dollars  apiece  would  buy  fifty  per  cent ; 
and  if  the  price  were  raised  to  a  hundred  thou- 
sand dollars  each,  it  is  doubtful  whether  one  voter 
out  of  twenty  in  any  State  of  the  Union  could  resist 
the  temptation.  Now,  it  often  happens  that  the 
enactment  or  defeat  of  certain  legislation  is  import- 
ant enough  to  rich  corporations  to  make  it  worth 
their  while  to  offer  a  hundred  thousand  dollars 
each,  if  necessary,  for  the  assistance  of  a  fev\'" 
members  of  Congress  or  of  a  State  Legislature, 
but  it  would  be  impossible  for  any  corporation  to 
offer  one  hundred  dollars  apiece  to  a  majority  of  the 
voters  of  the  United  States,  and  practically  impos- 
sible to  make  such  an  offer  to  the  majority  of  the 
voters  of  an  average  State.  There  are  other  ways, 
too,  in  which  the  private  interests  of  legislators  are 
made  to  influence  their  public  action.  The  Con- 
gressional silver  pool,  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of 
the  Sherman  law  of  1 890,  and  the  senatorial  specula- 
tion in  sugar  stock  during  the  manipulation  of  the 
Wilson  tariff  bill  in  the  Finance  Committee,  became 
national  scandals.  Every  great  railroad  whose  in- 
terests are  affected  by  legislation  has  its  attorneys  in 
Congress  or  in  the  State  Legislatures.  The  presi- 
dents and  chief  stockholders  of  important  corpora- 
tions have  held  seats  in  the  Senate,  and  openly 
spoken  and  voted  in  behalf  of  their  private  interests, 
without  betraying  a  thought  of  impropriety. 

It  is  said  that  the  true  remedy  for  these  evils  is 
to  elect  good  men  to  office.  The  advocates  of  this 
happy  and  original  idea  will  have  everything  their 
own  way  when  they  show  us  two   things:     First, 


42  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

how  to  insure  the  election  of  good  men,  and,  second, 
how  to  keep  them  good  after  they  are  elected.  It  is 
useless  to  expect  representatives  to  be  very  much 
better  than  the  people  they  represent.  It  is  as  much 
as  we  can  reasonably  look  for  if  they  are  no  worse. 
A  system  of  government  whose  satisfactory  opera- 
tion requires  the  continual  election  of  archangels  to 
office  is  not  a  practicable  working  system.  To  have 
a  really  stable  fabric  of  government,  we  must  base 
it  upon  enlightened  self-interest.  As  Mill  puts  it : 
"  The  ideally  perfect  constitution  of  a  public  office 
is  that  in  which  the  interest  of  the  functionary  is 
entirely  coincident  with  his  duty."  Now  the  self- 
interest  of  the  average  man,  acting  as  one  of  the 
mass  of  voters,  lies  in  the  direction  of  good  and 
honest  government.  It  is  worth  more  to  him  to 
have  cheap  sugar,  pure  water,  and  safe,  rapid,  and 
comfortable  transportation,  than  to  accept  fifty 
cents  from  the  sugar  trust,  a  dollar  from  a  water 
company,  and  two  dollars  from  a  railroad  to  be 
cheated,  poisoned,  jostled,  and  belated,  with  the 
prospect  of  being  eventually  flattened  out  or  burned 
alive  in  a  wreck.  But  the  average  man  in  the  place 
of  a  legislator  would  certainly  succumb  to  the  same 
influences  that  corrupt  the  politician.  It  is  the  con- 
centration of  temptation  that  makes  the  difference. 
The  pressure  that  would  be  easily  resisted  when 
spread  over  the  w^hole  community  becomes  crushing 
when  converged  upon  one  point.  And  this  concen- 
tration exists  simply  because  the  action  of  the 
legislative  body  is  final.  If  the  people  could  always 
demand  the  right  to  pass  upon  the  decisions  of  their 


DIRECT   LEGISLATION.  43 

representatives,  those  decisions  would  no  longer  have 
a  commercial  value  ;  the  lobby  would  disappear,  and 
legislative  bodies  would  once  more  become  delibera- 
tive assemblies  in  which  it  would  be  a  pleasure  for 
men  of  intelligence  and  conscience  to  sit,  and  in 
which  it  would  be  to  the  interest  of  all  the  members 
to  do  the  best  possible  work. 

An  appreciation  of  the  unfitness  of  legislative 
bodies  to  exercise  unlimited  power  has  led  to  a 
growing  practice  in  this  country  of  applying  the 
referendum  in  its  least  scientific  and  most  dan- 
gerous form.  Deprived  of  the  right  to  express  their 
will,  in  case  of  need,  in  an  orderly  way,  in  the  regu- 
lar channels  of  legislation,  the  people  have  resorted 
to  the  objectionable  devise  of  law-making  by  consti- 
tutional amendment.  In  many  States  the  distinction 
between  a  constitution  and  a  code  has  been  almost 
wiped  out.  To  check  unfaithful  legislatures,  the 
ordinary  course  of  law-making  has  been  so  hedged 
about  with  minute  restrictions  that  a  plausible  case 
of  unconstitutionality  can  be  made  out  against  any 
statute  distasteful  to  powerful  interests.  In  Califor- 
nia as  many  as  ten  constitutional  amendments  are 
submitted  to  the  people  by  a  single  legislature,  and 
an  edition  of  the  constitution  five  years  old  is  as  use- 
less for  instruction  in  the  actual  state  of  the  funda- 
mental law  as  a  five-year-old  almanac.  A  constitution 
ought  to  contain  nothing  but  a  frame  of  government 
and  the  necessary  guaranties  of  individual  liberty 
and  property  against  the  excesses  of  a  majority. 
To  protect  the  majority  against  betrayal  by  its  own 
servants  is  no  part  of  the  duty  of  an  organic  law. 


44  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

The  majority  ought  to  have  the  power  to  do  that  at 
all  times  for  itself.  If  that  power  were  secured  to 
it,  our  State  constitutions  could  be  cleared  of  all 
the  undergrowth  of  petty  restrictions  that  now 
encumbers  them,  and  the  noble  simplicity  of  the 
national  constitution  could  be  imitated  everywhere. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  people  are  not  qualified  to 
frame  the  details  of  legislation.  Undoubtedly  they 
are  not,  and  neither  is  a  numerous  representative 
body.  The  critics  of  Congress  and  of  our  State 
legislatures  can  hardly  find  words  to  describe  the 
botch- work  with  which  our  statute  books  are  annually 
disfigured.  Even  in  England,  where  the  control  of 
Parliament  by  the  Cabinet  secures  a  certain  degree 
of  unity  in  legislation,  things  are  not  much  better. 
On  this  point  Mill  remarks  : 

"  Any  government  fit  for  a  high  state  of  civiliza- 
tion would  have,  as  one  of  its  fundamental  elements, 
a  small  body  not  exceeding  in  number  the  members 
of  a  cabinet,  who  should  act  as  a  commission  of 
legislation,  having  for  its  appointed  office  to  make 
all  laws.  *  *  *  No  one  would  wish  that  this 
body  should  of  itself  have  any  power  of  enacting 
laws ;  the  commission  would  only  embody  the 
element  of  intelligence  in  their  construction  ;  Parlia- 
ment would  represent  that  of  will.  No  measure 
would  become  a  law  until  expressly  sanctioned  by 
Parliament ;  and  Parliament,  or  either  house,  would 
have  the  power,  not  only  of  rejecting,  but  of  sending 
back  a  bill  to  the  commission  for  reconsideration 
and  improvement." 

Now  this  device  would  work  precisely  as  well  in 


DIRECT  LEGISLATION.  45 

the  preparation  of  laws  to  be  submitted  to  the 
people,  as  in  that  of  laws  to  be  submitted  to  a  legis- 
lative body.  If  Parliament  or  Congress  is  incapable 
of  constructing  or  amending  bills  intelligently,  if 
its  proper  function  is  merely  to  consider  measures 
submitted  to  it  by  an  expert  commission,  to  say 
"yes"  or  "no,"  or  to  send  them  back  for  amend- 
ment, its  duties  are  quite  within  the  capacity  of  the 
mass  of  the  voters.  Of  course,  the  public  could  not 
take  time  enough  to  consider  all  the  bills  that  must 
be  passed  upon  by  a  legislative  body  in  the  course 
of  a  year,  but  those  supreme  issues  which  absorb 
the  popular  mind,  which  divide  parties,  and  with 
reference  to  which  legislators  profess  to  try  to  fol- 
low public  opinion,  could  be  quite  as  easily  disposed 
of  by  direct  vote  of  the  people  as  by  the  circuitous 
and  clumsy  method  of  electing  representatives  to 
guess  at  what  the  people  want. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   TRUE   FUNCTIONS   OF   REPRESENTATION. 

Notwithstanding  the  inefficiency,  confusion,  and 
corruption  that  have  flowed  from  the  abuse  of  the 
representative  principle,  the  fact  remains  that  the 
device  of  representation  in  its  proper  place  is  an 
indispensable  aid  to  good  government.  The  people 
can  safely  intrust  to  a  limited  body  the  ordinary 
work  of  legislation.  The  one  thing  which  they  can 
not  safely  delegate  to  anybody,  even  for  a  limited 
term,  is  the  sovereign  power.  They  may  never  have 
occasion  to  review  the  work  of  their  representatives 
but  unless  they  retain  the  legal  right  to  do  so  they 
will  inevitably  find  their  interests  betrayed.  The 
quality  of  finality  is  what  makes  the  acts  of  a  legis- 
lature worth  buying.  It  is  that  which  makes  such 
scenes  as  this  the  inevitable  prelude  to  the  close  of 
every  session  of  a  national  or  State  law-making 
body. 

"  Albany,  April  27th. —  Sparks  flew  in  both  houses 
of  the  Legislature  just  before  final  adjournment  to- 
day. For  an  hour  the  Senate  was  tied  up  on  the 
Huckleberry  Railway  bill,  owing  to  the  filibustering 
tactics  of  the  Democrats,  who  seemed  to  be  able  to  do 
what  they  pleased. 

"In  the  Assembly  there  were  several  scenes  of 
turbulence.     Ex-Speaker — ,  the  Democratic  leader, 

(46) 


THE   TRUE   FUNCTIONS   OF   REPRESENTATION.      47 

assisted  by  John  A.  —  of  King's,  Charles  C.  —  of 
New  York,  and  one-half  of  the  Democratic  minority, 
took  possession  of  the  well,  on  the  watch  for  '  sneak ' 
bills,  and  their  vociferous  objections  and  demands  to 
have  every  bill  of  a  questionable  character  read  kept 
the  House  in  an  uproar  which  the  pounding  of  the 
gavel  could  not  quiet.  Had  it  not  been  for  these 
watchful  and  energetic  young  men,  Mr.  —  of  Fulton 
and  Hamilton,  would  have  '  sneaked '  through  an 
innocent-looking  measure  that  contained  hidden  in 
one  page  a  clause  to  repeal  section  57  of  the  general 
insurance  law,  which  would  have  destroyed  the 
existence  of  the  American  Lloyds." 

If  a  ''sneak  bill"  could  be  challenged,  after  the 
adjournment  of  a  legislature,  and  compelled  to  run 
the  gauntlet  of  a  popular  vote,  it  would  not  be  intro- 
duced. The  people  would  never  be  compelled  to 
consider  a  palpably  dishonest  measure.  The  mere 
fact  that  a  constitutional  right  of  appeal  to  the  pells 
existed  would  purify  legislation  at  its  source. 
A  business  man  with  an  efficient  manager  may  be 
so  well  served  as  never  to  find  it  necessary  to  inter- 
fere with  his  subordinate's  decisions.  But  he  always 
is  careful  to  retain  the  power  of  interfering  if  neces- 
sary. If  his  confidence  in  his  manager's  fidelity 
and  ability  led  him  to  intrust  to  him  absolute 
authority  for  two  years  to  make  contracts,  buy  and 
sell  stock,  and  incur  debts  without  any  right  of 
review  on  his  own  part,  his  business  acquaintances 
would  suggest  that  what  he  needed  was  not  so  much 
a  manager  as  a  guardian.  And  yet  that  is  precisely 
what  the  people  do  in  their  political  capacity,  with- 


48  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

out  even  the  excuse  that  their  hired  managers  are 
able  and  honest.  On  the  contrary,  the  universal 
complaint  is  that  legislators  are  inefificient,  ignorant, 
and  corrupt,  in  spite  of  which  we  grant  them  powers 
which  it  would  be  unsafe  to  intrust  to  assemblies  of 
sages  and  saints. 

The  true  object  of  representation  is  the  conven- 
ient dispatch  of  business.  The  great  bulk  of  the 
laws  required  by  a  State  or  the  nation  may  properly 
be  disposed  of  by  representative  bodies,  provided 
always  that  the  people  retain  the  right  of  reviewing 
the  decisions  of  the  legislators  whenever  they  think 
proper.  It  is  not  probable  that  the  national  acts  so 
reviewed  would  average  more  than  one  a  year. 
Nobody  would  wish  to  submit  to  popular  vote  an 
ordinary  appropriation  bill,  or  a  bill  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  zoological  park  in  the  District  of 
Columbia.  It  is  only  those  great  measures  that 
touch  the  interests  and  arouse  the  passions  of  a 
whole  people,  or  which  affect  vast  combinations  of 
capital  so  closely  as  to  make  corruption  inevitable  if 
they  are  disposed  of  by  a  small  body,  that  need  to 
be  referred  to  the  decision  of  the  ultimate  sovereign. 
And  it  is  these  very  measures  that  now  fill  our  legis- 
lative bodies  with  ignorant  and  unscrupulous  mem- 
bers, attracted  by  the  opportunities  for  profit  in 
them,  and  which  repel  the  men  whose  character 
and  talents  ought  to  be  at  the  service  of  the  com- 
munity, but  who  do  not  care  to  risk  their  reputa- 
tions by  mingling  in  contests  from  which  no  man's 
name  emerges  unscathed. 

There  is  no  subject  more  important  to  the  ulti- 


THE  TRUE  FUNCTIONS  OF  REPRESENTATION.   40 

mate  welfare  of  this  country  than  that  of  the  scien- 
tific care  of  forests.  It  is  one  that  requires  much 
expert  investigation  and  studious  attention  to  de- 
tails. It  is  one  of  those  questions  which  could  be 
dealt  with  to  the  best  advantage  by  small  represent- 
ative bodies,  but  Congress  and  the  State  legisla- 
tures have  been  so  deeply  absorbed  in  interminable 
struggles  over  issues,  each  of  which  should  have 
been  settled  by  a  single  vote  at  the  polls,  that  they 
have  hardly  had  time  to  give  it  a  thought.  Inter- 
national copyright,  marriage  and  divorce  laws,  the 
promotion  of  scientific  research,  the  improvement  of 
the  patent  system,  the  development  of  irrigation, 
the  systematic  extension  of  water  transportation, 
the  elevation  of  Government  art  and  architecture, 
the  increase  in  the  efficiency  of  the  postal  service, 
and  the  investigation  of  the  best  means  of  relieving 
poverty,  checking  vagrancy,  and  preventing  crime, 
are  a  few  out  of  hundreds  of  subjects  which  might 
profitably  engage  the  attention  of  our  law-making 
bodies.  But  our  legislators  seldom  have  time  to 
think  of  such  things.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  within 
the  past  twenty  years  nine-tenths  of  the  time  of 
Congress  not  spent  in  the  consideration  of  the 
regular  appropriation  bills  has  been  devoted  to  the 
five  subjects  of  the  tariff,  the  currency,  the  South, 
pensions,  and  private  claims.  Of  these,  the  last 
should  not  have  come  before  Congress  at  all,  except 
for  the  formal  confirmation,  in  bulk,  of  the  decrees 
of  another  tribunal.  The  rest  were  proper  subjects 
for  decision  by  popular  vote.  A  commission  of 
eminent    protectionists    should   have   drawn   up   a 


60  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

symmetrical  protective  tariff ;  another  commission  of 
well-known  free-traders  should  have  framed  a  scien- 
tific tariff  for  revenue,  and  after  full  public  discus- 
sion the  people  should  have  been  allowed  to  choose 
between  them.  That  would  have  settled  the  matter 
on  a  logical  basis  without  waste  of  time.  As  it  is, 
the  majority  of  the  Senate  this  year  spent  five 
months  in  the  secret  manipulation  of  a  tariff  bill, 
not  in  order  to  study  and  discuss  its  effects  upon 
industry,  commerce,  and  the  public  revenues,  but  to 
see  how  many  favors  would  have  to  be  given  to 
each  of  a  number  of  Senators  for  his  vote.  What 
these  Senators  needed  was  to  be  protected  from 
themselves.  A  tariff  decision  by  the  people  would 
have  set  them  free  for  useful  legislative  work  of  a 
kind  which  the  people  would  not  be  competent  to 
perform. 

So  with  the  currency.  Doubtless  the  question  of 
monetary  standards  is  too  recondite  to  be  fully  under- 
stood by  the  average  voter,  but  the  average  voter 
who  is  honestly  trying  to  discover  the  truth  is  at 
least  more  likely  to  reach  a  sensible  conclusion  than 
the  Congressman  who  carefully  avoids  the  truth  if 
it  runs  counter  to  his  interpretation  of  the  ignorant 
prejudices  of  his  constituents.  No  harmonious 
currency  policy  adopted  twenty  years  ago,  even  if 
wrong  in  theory,  would  have  been  likely  to  do  the 
damage  that  has  been  wrought  by  the  unspeakable 
botch-work  of  insincere  compromises  perpetrated  by 
politicians  playing  for  their  seats.  The  jNIassachu- 
setts  Railroad  Commission,  although  it  has  no  power 
to  enforce  its  decisions,  exerts  more  influence  and 


THE   TRUE   FUNCTIONS   OF   REPRESENTATION.      51 

commands  more  respect  than  the  commissions  in 
other  States  whose  laws  invest  them  with  autocratic 
authority.  The  reason  is  obvious.  In  Massachusetts, 
the  commission,  acting  only  through  reason,  must 
make  the  wisdom  of  its  recommendations  clear  to 
the  people,  the  Legislature,  and  the  railroads.  It 
can  not  substitute  brute  force  for  argument.  Having 
no  powers  of  oppression  the  corporations  do  not  feel 
obliged  to  exert  themselves  to  fill  it  with  their  tools, 
and  men  of  high  standing  can  serve  in  it  without 
endangering  their  reputations.  Similar  considera- 
tions would  improve  the  quality  and  increase  the 
influence  of  legislative  bodies  if  they  were  deprived 
of  the  dangerous  gift  of  unchecked  power.  They 
could  be  safely  trusted  then  to  deal  with  a  much 
wider  range  of  subjects  than  now.  Men  of  ability 
and  character  would  be  glad  to  join  them,  and  take 
part  in  the  discussion  of  the  social,  industrial, 
economic,  scientific,  and  artistic  questions  with 
which  they  could  occupy  themselves,  when  there 
was  no  longer  any  danger  of  becoming  involved  in 
a  scandal  over  the  grant  of  a  franchise  or  the  pas- 
sage of  a  law  to  relieve  a  railroad  of  its  taxes. 

The  adoption  of  an  important  policy  is  a  matter 
that  should  usually  be  decided  by  the  people,  but 
the  detailed  legislation  needed  to  provide  for  its 
execution  is  properly  the  work  of  the  people's  rep- 
resentatives. In  some  cases,  indeed,  the  people 
themselves  should  attend  even  to  the  details.  A 
tariff  bill,  for  instance,  which,  as  usually  framed, 
contains  a  scandal  in  every  line,  should  be  drawn  up 
by  a  few  experts  of  national  reputation  and  voted 


52  SUGGESTIONS   f)N'   GOVERNMENT. 

upon  as  a  whole.  But,  in  general,  the  citizens  can 
safely  confine  themselves  to  the  broad  outlines  of 
legislation.  To  fill  in  the  lights  and  shadows  in  the 
most  effective  way  is  the  true  function  of  represen- 
tation. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  REFERENDUM  AND  THE  POPULAR  ASSEMBLY. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  the  referendum  in 
its  primitive  form,  as  applied  in  Switzerland,  and, 
for  a  few  specific  purposes,  in  the  United  States. 
In  this  form  it  is  subject  to  certain  disadvantages  — 
not  great  enough,  indeed,  to  overbalance  its  supreme 
merits,  but  sufficiently  serious  to  give  a  standing- 
ground  for  the  opposition  of  conservatives  reluc- 
tant to  make  any  change  in  established  institutions. 
If  often  used  it  is  expensive.  Our  elections  are 
conducted  on  a  costly  plan.  The  fees  of  judges, 
inspectors,  and  clerks,  rent  of  booths,  printing  of 
ballots,  advertising  election  proclamations,  publica- 
tion of  registers,  and  other  necessary  outlays,  make 
up  a  total  load  of  expense  which  no  community  likes 
to  incur  any  oftener  than  necessary.  More  important 
still  is  the  fact  that  so  large  a  proportion  of  the  total 
vote  is  cast  without  any  clear  understanding  of  the 
questions  to  be  decided.  If  proposed  laws  were  sub- 
mitted to  popular  vote,  they  would  be  published  in 
the  newspapers,  but  that  would  not  imply  that  they 
would  be  generally  read  —  still  less  understood. 
Undoubtedly  thousand  of  voters  would  either  cast 
their  ballots  in  entire  ignorance  of  the  subjects  at 
issue,  or  would  neglect  to  cast  them  at  all.  And 
those  who  thought  they  were  voting  intelligently 

(53) 


54  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

would  in  many  cases  be  simply  carrying  out  the 
policy  of  certain  newspapers,  without  ever  having 
considered  the  other  side.  Moreover,  there  are  com- 
plications in  the  way  of  securing  and  verifying 
signatures  to  petitions  for  the  referendum.  Lastly, 
a  vote  on  laws  held  simultaneously  with  a  general 
election  for  officers  would  add  to  the  already  too 
great  confusion  in  the  mind  of  the  voter,  while  if  it 
were  held  at  a  different  time  there  would  be  another 
election  day,  with  its  inevitable  inconvenience  and 
disorganization  of  business. 

All  these  difficulties  would  be  completely  obviated 
by  the  system  of  popular  assemblies  described  in  the 
first  chapter.  The  people  being  already  organized 
and  in  the  habit  of  meeting  at  convenient  times, 
there  would  be  no  necessity  for  elaborate  and  expen- 
sive arrangements  for  recording  their  opinions. 
Suppose,  for  instance,  that  the  question  were  whether 
the  State  taxes  on  improvements  and  personal  prop- 
erty should  be  abolished.  The  people  would  be 
called  upon  to  vote  in  their  assemblies  on  the  night 
of  a  regular  monthly  meeting.  At  the  appointed 
time  each  assembly  would  gather  in  its  hall.  The 
advocates  and  opponents  of  the  proposition  would 
advance  their  respective  arguments.  When  the 
discussion  had  proceeded  far  enough,  a  vote  would 
be  taken.  Every  voter  would  have  at  least  some 
understanding  of  the  question  at  issue,  and  the 
understanding  would  be  fresh  —  not  the  mere  dried- 
up  itnpressions  of  almost  forgotten  readings.  In  all 
probability,  too,  the  matter  would  have  been  fully 
discussed   at  previous   meetings   as  well  as  in  the 


REFERENDUM   AND   POPULAR   ASSEMBLY.  55 

press  in  the  intervals,  so  that  the  final  debate  would 
be  merely  the  summing  up  of  arguments  already 
familiar.  The  vote  would  involve  no  more  expense 
than  the  cost  of  a  quire  of  white  paper  and  a  pad 
of  stamping  ink.  It  would  be  completed  in  an  hour, 
and  counted  in  the  presence  of  the  meeting  in  ten 
minutes  more. 

All  the  difficulty  in  deciding  what  measures  should 
be  submitted  to  vote  would  be  obviated.  There  would 
be  no  need  of  collecting  and  verifying  names  for 
petitions.  A  certain  number  of  assemblies  could 
have  the  right,  at  any  time,  to  demand  the  referen- 
dum on  any  bill.  It  could  be  provided,  if  thought 
advisable,  that  if  the  vote  for  this  proposition  in  the 
assemblies  reached  a  certain  figure,  the  measure 
should  be  submitted  even  if  its  advocates  were  in  a 
minority  in  each  assembly,  but  this  would  be  a 
superfluous  precaution,  since  any  measure  whose 
friends  commanded  a  majority  in  the  nation  or 
State  would  necessarily  have  a  majority  in  a  suffi- 
cient number  of  assemblies  to  secure  its  submission. 
The  necessity  of  obtaining  the  affirmative  action  of 
these  assemblies  in  advance  would  be  a  useful 
check  upon  the  activity  of  agitators,  who  might 
otherwise  be  continually  disturbing  the  people  with 
calls  to  vote  upon  propositions  that  had  no  chance 
of  success. 

Mill  devotes  a  chapter  to  the  elaboration  of  the 
thesis:  "Representative  Government  the  Ideally 
Best  Policy,"  and  every  argument  in  it  is  designed 
to  show  the  superiority  of  democrac}'-  over  monarchy 
or  aristocracy.     The  capital  thus  accumulated   for 


56  SUGGESTIONS   ( ».\    GOVERNMENT. 

popular  rule  is  transferred  to  the  rule  of  representa- 
tive bodies  with  an  easy  celerity  that  reminds  the 
startled  observer  of  Heller"'s  invisible  transfer  of  a 
live  rabbit  from  his  sleeve  to  a  hat.  "  From  these 
accumulated  considerations,"  the  chapter  concludes, 
"  it  is  evident  that  the  only  government  which  can 
fully  satisfy  all  the  exigencies  of  the  social  state  is 
one  in  which  the  whole  people  participate  ;  that  any 
participation,  even  in  the  smallest  public  function, 
is  useful ;  that  the  participation  should  be  every- 
where as  great  as  the  general  degree  of  improvement 
of  the  community  will  allow  ;  and  that  nothing  less 
can  be  ultimately  desirable  than  the  admission  of  all 
to  a  share  in  the  sovereign  power  of  the  vState.  But 
since  all  can  not,  in  a  community  exceeding  a  single 
small  town,  participate  personally  in  any  but  some 
very  minor  portions  of  the  public  business,  it  follows 
that  the  ideal  type  of  a  perfect  government  must  be 
the  representative." 

It  is  evident  that  this  conclusion  is  anything  but 
warranted  by  the  premises.  It  has  been  shown  in 
Switzerland  and  elsewhere  that  it  is  quite  possible 
for  all  to  participate  in  much  more  than  "  minor 
portions  of  the  public  business,"  even  when  that 
participation  is  facilitated  by  no  special  organization, 
and  the  system  of  local  assemblies  would  enable  a 
nation  of  any  size  to  act  as  conveniently  as  a  small 
community,  without  some  of  its  most  conspicuous 
dangers.  The  chief  peril  of  democracy  in  the 
ancient  and  mediaeval  city  states  was  the  liability  to 
sudden  tumults,  or  inconsiderate  decisions.  A 
plausible  demagogue,  getting  the  ear  of  the  popular 


REFERENDUM   AND   POPULAR   ASSEMBLY.  57 

assembly,  could  induce  it  to  take  action  which  it 
regretted  as  soon  as  it  had  time  for  sober  thought. 
Athens  voted  on  one  day  to  massacre  the  men  of 
Mitylene,  and  on  the  next  revoked  the  sentence.  In 
this  country,  under  the  plan  proposed,  a  national 
question  important  enough  to  be  submitted  to  the 
people  would  be  voted  upon  simultaneously  in  thirty 
thousand  different  assemblies.  In  each  there  would 
be  likely  to  be  men  who  could  oft'er  fair  statements 
of  the  opposing  arguments,  but  no  Cleon  could  make 
his  voice  reach  far  enough  to  have  any  dangerous 
influence  on  the  total  result.  The  division  of  the 
voting  population  into  small  bodies  would  be,  not  a 
mere  physical  necessity,  but  a  thing  advantageous 
in  itself. 

Montesquieu  said  :  "  The  great  advantage  of  rep- 
resentatives is  that  they  are  capable  of  discussing 
affairs.  The  people  are  not  at  all  fitted  for  this, 
which  forms  one  of  the  chief  inconveniences  of 
democracy."  Under  the  plan  proposed  the  people 
would  discuss  affairs.  They  do  it  now,  but  for  the 
most  part  they  do  it  ignorantly.  They  meet  their 
friends  on  street  corners,  or  in  saloons,  or  churches, 
or  lodge-rooms,  and  casually  exchange  prejudices 
based  on  carelessly  written,  hastily  read,  and  half- 
understood  newspaper  articles.  They  come  together 
in  political  meetings,  where  all  are  of  one  way  of 
thinking,  and  listen  to  plausible  speakers  who  are 
under  no  obligation  to  consider  facts  or  reason  as 
long  as  they  flatter  the  prepossessions  of  their  hear- 
ers and  make  things  warm  for  the  enemy.  In  a 
popular  assembly  representing  all  classes  and  all 


68  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

factions,  and  invested  with  a  share  of  sovereign 
power,  there  would  be  discussions  seriously  deserv- 
ing the  name.  The  stump-speaker  would  not  revel 
in  misrepresentations  with  impunity,  because  his 
opponents  would  be  there  to  expose  him.  It  is 
likely  that  the  debates  in  such  an  assembly  would 
be  quite  equal,  in  enlightening  effect,  to  those  in 
Congress,  for  what  they  might  lack  in  ability  they 
would  make  up  in  sincerity.  Congressional  discus- 
sions to  a  great  extent  are  sham  battles.  The  par- 
ticipants are  not  trying  to  convince  each  other  or  to 
exert  any  influence  upon  the  determination  of  the 
question  at  issue,  but  to  impress  their  constituents. 
This  is  why  the  reader  of  the  Congressional  Record 
is  so  often  exasperated  at  seeing  fallacies  and  mis- 
statements repeated  and  reiterated  after  one  of  the 
speakers  has  so  manifestly  demolished  them  that 
nobody  has  attempted  to  answer  his  arguments.  He 
wonders  whether  the  debaters  can  be  so  densely 
stupid  as  not  to  understand  the  refutation  that  is  so 
luminously  clear  to  an  average  intelligence.  Noth- 
ing of  the  kind.  They  are  merely  counting  on  the 
fact  that  they  can  have  their  fallacies  printed  and 
circulated  in  their  districts,  while  their  constituents 
will  probably  never  see  the  refutation.  It  is  this  that 
makes  Congressional  debates  so  unsatisfactory  as  a 
means  of  arriving  at  truth.  They  purport  to  be  dis- 
cussions when  they  are  really  symposia  of  unrelated 
stump-speeches.  In  the  popular  assemblies  there 
would  be  none  of  this  double  purpose.  Having  no 
constituents,  the  speakers  would  attempt  to  influence 
nobody  beyond  their  immediate  hearers.     Those 


REFERENDUM   AND   POPULAR   ASSEMBLY.  59 

hearers  would  have  to  be  convinced,  iu  the  very 
presence  of  the  advocates  of  opposing  opinions,  and 
every  argument  advanced  would  have  to  be  met  on 
the  spot  by  a  counter-argument  appealing  to  the 
reason  and  sense  of  fairness  of  the  audience.  The 
conclusion  reached,  whatever  it  might  be,  would  be 
the  honest  judgment  of  the  assembly  on  the  merits 
of  the  conflicting  arguments,  and  not  a  prearranged 
verdict  based  on  ulterior  considerations.  And,  as 
truth  is  single,  and  exists  in  itself,  while  error  is 
multifarious  and  exists  only  in  the  minds  of  those 
who  hold  it,  it  is  likely  that  the  truth  would  find  its 
way  into  all  the  assemblies,  while  fallacies  would  be 
limited  in  range.  It  would  certainly  be  remarkable 
if,  after  full  and  candid  discussion,  the  same  errors 
should  commend  themselves  to  the  reason  of  a 
majority  of  the  voters  in  thirty  thousand  independent 
meetings,  composed  of  citizens  of  all  classes,  parties, 
and  habits  of  thought.  It  will  hardly  be  main- 
tained that  such  a  thing  would  be  as  probable  as  the 
control  of  a  single  legislative  body  by  prejudice, 
carelessness,  or  sinister  influences. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE  BRANCHES  OF  GOVERNMENT. 

Since  the  time  of  Montesquieu,  it  has  been  cus- 
tomary to  treat  the  powers  of  government  as  falling 
naturally  into  three  branches,  legislative,  executive, 
and  judicial.  As  a  convenient  working  arrange- 
ment this  division  is  satisfactory,  but  not  as  a  funda- 
mental principle.  In  that  sense  there  are  properly 
only  two  divisions  —  the  legislative-executive,  or 
political,  on  one  side,  and  the  judicial  on  the  other. 
The  theory  that  the  branches  of  government  should 
be  co-ordinate  and  independent  is  properly  appli- 
cable only  to  these  two  —  it  does  not  apply  to  the 
legislative  and  executive  subdivisions  of  the  polit- 
ical branch  in  their  relations  with  each  other.  The 
duty  of  the  judiciary  is  that  of  measuring  the  rights 
of  citizens  by  an  existing  standard  —  that  of  the 
laws  and  constitutional  guaranties  in  force  at  the 
time  when  the  acts  to  be  judged  were  to  be  per- 
formed. This  duty  necessarily  lies  outside  of  the 
discretionary  powers  of  a  legislature,  and  can  not  be 
properly  fulfilled  if  confused  with  them.  But  there 
is  no  such  broad  distinction  between  the  legislative 
and  executive  powers.  The  executive  is  the  hand 
of  the  legislature,  carrying  out  whatever  that 
decrees.  The  power  of  making  laws  necessarily 
implies  the   power   of   procuring  their  execution. 

(60) 


THE   BRANCHES   OF   GOVERNMENT.  61 

Without  that  power  a  legislature  is  a  mere  debating 
society.  But  a  numerous  assembly  is  nof  fit  for  the 
practical  work  of  carrying  out  its  own  decrees,  and, 
therefore,  as  a  simple  matter  of  convenience,  the 
duty  of  execution  is  wisely  intrusted  to  officials 
employed  for  that  express  purpose.  These  officials 
should  properly  be  the  servants  of  the  legislature, 
not  its  independent  associates.  In  just  so  far  as 
they  are  independent  they  weaken  the  energy  of 
government,  divide  responsibility  and  impart  con- 
fusion where  there  should  be  unity  and  simplicity. 

Nevertheless,  there  are  good  reasons  for  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  executive  in  the  American  system 
of  government,  the  chief  of  which  is  that  our  legis- 
lative bodies  are  not  trustworthy.  As  a  rule  they 
perform  even  their  own  work  so  ill  that,  so  far  from 
wishing  them  to  control  the  executive,  the  people 
prefer  an  executive  strong  enough  to  guide,  and,  if 
need  be,  coerce  the  legislature.  An  Andrew  Jack- 
son is  always  sure  of  popularity.  Congress  has  no 
policy  of  its  own,  and  even  when  elected  under  an 
express  mandate  to  carry  out  some  policy  demanded 
by  the  people  it  muddles  and  blunders  away  its  time, 
wanders  off  into  mischievous  byways,  and  accom- 
plishes anything  at  all  only  under  the  spur  of  con- 
tinual executive  and  journalistic  admonitions.  State 
and  city  legislatures  are  still  more  imbecile  and 
infinitely  more  corrupt.  The  idea  of  making  presi- 
dents, governors,  and  mayors  the  servants  of  con- 
gresses, legislatures  and  common  councils,  as  at 
present  constituted,  is  utterly  out  of  the  question. 

That  the  executive  power  should  be  subordinate 


62  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

to  the  legislative  by  no  means  implies  that  the  legis- 
lative body  should  take  the  lead  and  leave  the 
executive  to  follow  in  its  wake.  The  guide  of  an 
exploring  expedition  is  subordinate  to  the  travelers 
to  whom  he  shows  the  way.  It  would  be  well  for  the 
executive  to  carry  its  leadership  of  the  legislature 
to  a  much  greater  extent  than  is  ever  seen  in  Amer- 
ica. It  should  formulate  policies,  draw  up  bills,  and 
urge  their  enactment.  Only  there  should  be  no  pos- 
sibility of  a  clash  between  the  two  powers.  In  case 
of  a  disagreement,  the  will  of  the  legislature  should 
always  prevail,  unless  overruled  by  the  people. 

To  insure  the  necessary  unity  in  the  political 
branch  of  the  government  without  incurring  the 
evils  of  legislative  mob-rule  on  the  one  hand,  or  of 
a  perpetually  belligerent  party  executive  of  the 
English  type  on  the  other,  six  things  are  necessary. 

1.  Every  member  of  the  legislative  body  must  be 
individually  responsible  to  his  constituents,  and 
subject  to  recall  at  any  time. 

2.  The  people  at  large  must  have  the  right  at  any 
time  of  passing  at  the  polls  upon  anything  done  or 
left  undone  by  the  legislature. 

3.  The  practical  experience  gained  in  administra- 
tion must  be  made  available  for  use  in  legislation 
by  giving  the  heads  of  executive  departments  seats 
in  the  legislative  body,  and  allowing  their  proposals 
for  improvements  in  the  laws  affecting  their  depart- 
ments to  take  precedence  over  those  of  ordinary 
members. 

4.  The  financial  budget,  including  all  receipts  and 
expenditures,    must    be    treated  as  a  whole,    and 


THE   BRANCHES    OF   GOVERNMENT.  63 

framed  with  the  active  cooperation  of  the  treasury- 
officials. 

5.  The  executive  must  have  unlimited  powers  of 
suggestion  and  initiative,  but  no  power  of  veto.  It 
must  be  given  every  facility  for  guiding  legislation, 
but  none  for  creating  a  deadlock. 

6.  The  appointment  and  removal  of  subordinate 
executive  officials  must  be  entirely  free  from  legis- 
lative interference,  but  the  supreme  executive  head 
must  be  subject  to  removal  by  a  sufficiently  large 
legislative  majority  —  two-thirds,  for  instance  —  on 
due  notice,  giving  the  people  time  to  interfere. 

The  continuous  responsibility  of  the  individual 
legislator  to  his  constituents  —  not  an  intermittent 
responsibility,  reaching  a  crisis  every  two,  four,  or 
six  years,  but  one  effective  at  every  moment  of  his 
career  —  would  rank  with  the  referendum  as  a  force 
for  the  maintenance  of  a  high  standard  of  represent- 
ation. The  practice  of  ceding  uncontrolled  power 
for  a  term  of  years  corrupts  even  good  men  —  that 
of  keeping  the  representative  always  within  reach 
would  secure  good  service  even  from  bad  ones. 
The  organization  of  the  voters  in  popular  assemblies 
would  enable  this  control  to  be  exercised  with  the 
utmost  facility.  In  States  of  moderate  size  one 
assembly  could  elect  a  member  of  the  legislature, 
and  in  any  city  at  present  existing  in  America  one 
would  be  a  sufficient  constituency  for  a  member  of 
the  common  council.  In  such  cases  the  control  of 
the  representative  would  be  simplicity  itself.  If  he 
were  credibly  accused  of  selling  his  vote  to  a  corpo- 
ration, or  of  speculating  in  a  stock  affected  by  his 


64  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

official  action,  he  would  be  summoned  before  his 
assembly  to  explain.  If  his  explanation  appeared 
unsatisfactory  his  credentials  would  be  revoked,  and 
another  representative  would  be  elected.  In  the 
largest  vStates  it  would  be  necessary  for  two  or 
three  assemblies  to  combine  for  the  election  of  a 
member  of  the  legislature,  but  the  procedure  in  this 
case  would  be  almost  as  simple  as  in  the  other.  In 
any  assembly  any  voter  dissatisfied  with  the  course 
of  his  representative  could  move  that  he  be  called 
upon  for  a  defense.  If  the  motion  prevailed,  the 
defense  would  be  presented  to  all  the  assemblies 
of  the  district,  and  they  would  all  vote  upon  its 
acceptance. 

In  the  case  of  a  member  of  Congress,  when  a  hun- 
dred assemblies  might  form  the  constituency,  the 
proceedings  would  be  a  little  less  summary,  but 
equally  effective.  Printed  instead  of  oral  explana- 
tions could  be  furnished,  although  the  representative 
should  have  the  right  to  appear  in  person  before  any 
assembly  if  he  desired.  To  prevent  annoyance  from 
frivolous  complaints  it  could  be  provided  that  no  vote 
on  the  question  of  recall  should  be  taken  except  on 
demand  of  ten  assemblies,  and  that  the  representa- 
tive should  not  be  compelled  to  submit  to  the  ordeal 
twice  within  six  months. 

This  unbroken  control  of  the  representatives  by 
the  constituencies  would  dispense  with  the  necessity 
for  periodical  elections.  The  suggestion  of  Mr.  Stick- 
ney  that  members  of  legislative  bodies  should  hold 
office  as  long  as  their  conduct  satisfied  their  fellovr 
members  is   entirely  impracticable,  and  would  be 


THE  BRANCHES  OF  GOVERNMENT.       65 

Open  to  obvious  objections  if  it  were  not,  but  a 
tenure  dependent  on  the  will  of  the  constituency- 
would  be  both  practicable  and  desirable.  Under 
such  a  system  there  would  be  no  general  election 
day,  and  no  fixed  term  of  office.  When  there  was  a 
vacancy  from  any  district  the  people  would  elect  a 
man  to  fill  it.  As  long  as  he  gave  satisfaction  he 
would  not  be  disturbed.  He  would  be  free  to  devote 
himself  to  the  business  of  legislation  without  the 
necessity  of  preparing  to  meet  an  approaching 
political  revolution.  If  he  ceased  to  do  good  work 
his  constituents  would  recall  him  and  elect  some- 
body else  in  his  place.  There  would  be  no  disturb- 
ance of  business,  no  general  political  upheaval,  no 
sudden  and  violent  changes  of  policy,  no  wholesale 
substitution  of  apprentices  for  experienced  legis- 
lators. The  legislative  body  would  maintain  its 
continuous  existence,  and  the  methods  of  conducting 
business  would  not  have  to  be  relearned  at  every 
session. 

The  advantages  of  direct  legislation  by  the  people 
have  already  been  fully  discussed.  It  is  sufficient 
to  point  out  here  the  effect  of  the  referendum  and 
initiative  upon  the  relations  between  the  legislative 
and  executive  branches  of  the  government.  With 
the  right  reserved  to  the  people  to  pass  final  judg- 
ment upon  any  measures  deeply  affecting  their 
interests,  all  occasion  for  clashes  between  law- 
makers and  administrators  would  disappear.  The 
wrestle  between  President  Cleveland  and  the  Senate 
over  the  silver  question,  with  its  accompanying 
scandals   in   the   distribution   of  patronage,   would 


66  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

have  been  impossible  if  the  whole  subject  could 
have  been  referred  to  a  popular  vote.  It  was  be- 
cause Congress  and  the  President  were  jointly  in 
complete  possession  of  the  sovereign  power  that  they 
wrangled  over  it  like  dogs  over  a  bone.  They 
would  not  have  quarreled  over  the  right  way  to 
frame  a  measure  for  submission  to  the  people.  If 
this  appeal  were  always  open  in  the  last  resort, 
Congress  would  always  be  willing  to  listen  respect- 
fully to  the  suggestions  of  the  President,  accepting 
them  as  the  advice  of  an  expert  counselor,  and  not 
as  the  dictation  of  a  rival  power. 

The  official  who  has  to  execute  a  law  has  better 
opportunities  than  anybody  else  for  knowing  how  it 
works  and  what  changes  in  it  are  desirable.  It  is 
most  important  that  this  experience  should  be 
utilized  by  the  legislative  body  to  the  fullest  extent. 
To  make  the  head  of  a  department  dependent  upon 
the  good-will  of  some  private  member  for  the  intro- 
duction of  a  needed  bill,  upon  the  courtesy  of  a 
committee  for  a  perfunctory  hearing  upon  it,  and 
upon  the  indifferent  services  of  half-instructed 
friends  for  its  advocacy  upon  the  floor,  is  to  sacrifice 
knowledge  to  ignorance  and  force  the  government 
needlessly  to  put  up  with  poor  work  when  it  could 
have  good.  In  a  legislative  body  not  dominated  by 
party  passion  or  selfish  interests,  thorough  knowl- 
edge will  always  take  the  lead.  I^Iere  eloquence 
counts  for  little,  but  a  man  who  knows  exactly  what 
he  is  talking  about,  and  who  can  give  a  candid  and 
satisfactory  answer  to  every  question  propounded, 
can  generally  carry  his  point.     This  expert  knowl- 


THE  BRANCHES  OF  GOVERNMENT.       67 

edge,  of  course,  is  possessed  by  each  official  only  with 
regard  to  his  own  department.  The  very  fact  that 
the  Secretary  of  War  has  given  such  conscientious 
attention  to  his  own  work  as  to  enable  him  to  speak 
with  authority  upon  it,  disqualifies  him  from  speak- 
ing with  similar,  or  any,  authority  upon  the  work  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  This  would  be  the 
sufficient  condemnation,  if  there  were  no  other,  of 
the  English  system  of  cabinet  solidarity,  under 
which  fifteen  gentlemen  assume  a  joint  responsi- 
bility for  things  which  only  one  of  them  knows  any- 
thing about.  The  presence  of  heads  of  departments 
in  the  legislative  body,  each  speaking  for  his  own 
department,  would  enable  each  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  exert  its  proper  influence  on  the  other. 
The  executive  officials  could  initiate  legislation,  and 
the  legislator  could  hold  the  officials  to  the  proper 
performance  of  their  duty.  Any  reported  delin- 
quency in  a  department  could  be  brought  at  once  to 
the  test  of  a  series  of  questions  propounded  to  the 
head  of  that  department  on  the  floor.  These  ques- 
tions could  not  be  evaded,  and  unsatisfactory  replies, 
often  repeated,  would  inevitably  lead  to  a  change  of 
officials.  That  executive  bills  should  have  prece- 
dence over  those  introduced  by  private  members  is 
a  necessary  corollary  from  the  considerations  that 
make  it  desirable  to  give  the  heads  of  departments 
seats  in  the  legislative  body.  As  these  officers  pos- 
sess peculiar  knowledge  of  the  needs  of  their 
departments,  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  the  measures 
they  propose  are  more  urgent  than  those  suggested 
by  others.    Of  course,  all  the  advantages  to  be  gained 


68  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

from  the  presence  of  department  chiefs  in  the  legis- 
lative bodies  could  be  secured  without  giving  them 
votes. 

The  unity  of  the  budget  is  a  principle  so  essential 
to  anything  like  scientific,  or  even  decent,  finance 
that  nothing  but  inexhaustible  wealth  has  enabled 
this  country  to  get  along  without  it.  Our  national 
financial  system  appears  deliberately  designed  for 
the  encouragement  of  extravagance.  The  taxes  are 
fixed  for  an  indefinite  period,  and  the  rates  are 
based  to  a  great  extent  on  considerations  independ- 
ent of  the  needs  of  the  Government.  The  general 
appropriations  are  under  the  control  of  eight  dif- 
ferent committees  of  the  House  and  two  of  the 
Senate,  and  special  appropriations  for  particular  pur- 
poses may  be  proposed  by  any  member  of  either 
branch  and  reported  by  any  committee.  Any  appro- 
priation may  be  amended  to  any  extent  by  either 
house,  and  any  committee  may  report  bills  involving 
permanent  expenditures  on  an  unlimited  scale.  Each 
committee  feels  bound  in  honor  to  secure  as  large 
appropriations  as  possible  for  the  subjects  within  its 
own  jurisdiction,  and  feels  under  no  obligation  to 
exert  itself  toward  maintaining  a  balance  between 
the  total  receipts  and  expenditures  of  the  govern- 
ment. A  single  agency,  having  control  of  the  whole 
subject  of  finance,  and  including  the  Secretary''  of 
the  Treasury  in  its  membership,  would  probably 
save  more  than  the  entire  cost  of  the  army  and  navy 
every  year. 

If  law-making  is  to  be  carried  on  by  the  har- 
monious cooperation  of  the  legislative  and  execu- 


THE  BRANCHES  OF  GOVERNMENT.       69 

tive  powers,  there  is  obviously  no  room  for  an 
executive  veto.  Under  the  system  suggested  the 
functions  of  the  executive  would  be  advisory,  not 
dictatorial.  If,  after  hearing  all  the  arguments  the 
administrative  officials  had  to  offer,  the  legislature 
still  persisted  in  going  wrong,  the  proper  and  all- 
sufficient  substitute  for  a  veto  would  be  an  appeal 
to  the  people.  The  referendum  would  constitute  a 
check  on  reckless  legislation  more  effective  than 
any  executive  interference  could  possibly  be,  and 
the  voters  would  be  restrained  by  no  timidity  in  its 
application. 

As  regards  the  sixth  point,  I  must  renew  the 
expression  of  my  obligations  to  Mr.  Stickney,  whose 
exposition  of  this  branch  of  the  subject  leaves 
hardly  anything  to  be  desired.  The  weakest  point 
in  Mr.  Stickney's  scheme  of  government  is  the 
omnipotence  and  irresponsibility  of  his  legislative 
assemblies.  It  is  this  which  would  cause  the  whole 
fabric  to  break  down  if  it  could  ever  be  brought  to 
trial  among  a  people  of  democratic  traditions, 
which  would  be  an  impossibility  in  itself.  But 
concerning  the  constitution  and  the  responsibility 
of  the  executive,  the  plan  is  very  nearly  perfect,  and 
it  accords,  in  most  essential  respects,  with  the  views 
that  are  becoming  generally  held  by  political 
thinkers.  It  establishes  an  unbroken  chain  of 
responsibility  from  the  lowest  executive  official  to 
the  legislature.  Each  chief  of  a  bureau  should  be 
personally  responsible  for  the  management  of  that 
bureau.  That  he  may  not  be  able  to  lay  the  blame 
for  mismanagement  on   incapable   or  corrupt  sub- 


70  SUGGESTIONS  ON  governmi-:nt. 

ordinatcs,  he  must  have  the  power  of  removing  any 
who  fail  to  do  good  work.  vSimilarly,  every  head  of 
a  department  must  be  responsible  for  the  condition 
of  that  department.  He  must  obtain  certain  results 
from  every  bureau,  and  the  instrument  by  which  he 
must  enforce  them  is  the  power  of  appointment  and 
removal  of  the  bureau  chiefs.  The  supreme  execu- 
tive head,  in  his  turn,  must  be  responsible  for  the 
efficiency  of  the  government  in  every  department, 
and  he  must  change  the  head  of  any  department 
that  appears  to  be  badly  managed.  Thus  far  we 
are  not  very  remote  from  the  theory,  although  con- 
siderably removed  from  the  practice,  of  our  present 
system  of  national  administration.  But  when  we 
come  to  the  responsibility  of  the  chief  executive, 
we  find  something  lacking.  We  do  not  theoretically 
accept  the  English  principle  that  the  king  can  do  no 
wrong.  We  hold  that  the  President  is  responsible, 
but  we  have  omitted  to  provide  any  means  of 
enforcing  that  responsibility.  We  can  refuse  to 
reelect  him  at  the  end  of  his  four  years'  term,  but  if 
he  be  not  a  candidate  for  reelection,  as  often 
happens,  and  always  when  he  is  in  his  second  term, 
he  is  as  irresponsible  as  a  Turkish  sultan.  Ob\'iously 
the  whole  chain  of  accountability  is  worthless  when 
this  most  important  link  is  missing.  If  the  chief 
executive  officer  should  be  responsible,  as  is  gener- 
ally admitted  in  America,  that  responsibility  must 
be  enforceable  by  somebody,  and  that  somebody 
can  hardly  be  other  than  the  legislature.  Here  we 
have  the  unity  of  the  government  secured,  and  we 
have  the  work  of  each  man  judged  by  the  authority 


THE   BRANCHES   OF   GOVERNMENT.  71 

most  competent  to  decide  whether  it  be  well  or  ill 
done. 

Here  Mr.  Stickney  stops.  Everybody  thus  far 
has  an  effective  responsibility  to  an  immediate 
superior,  all  ending  in  the  legislature.  To  whom  is 
the  legislature  to  be  responsible  ?  To  itself  !  Elected 
to  serve  during  good  behavior,  the  members  are 
mutually  to  judge  the  behavior  of  each  other,  and  to 
expel  those  who  fall  below  a  proper  standard.  This 
rediictio  ad  absiirdujn  sufficiently  explains  why  Mr. 
Stickney's  many  acute  and  admirable  ideas  have  not 
had  the  vogue  they  deserve.  The  present  condition 
of  the  United  States  Senate  indicates  the  fate  of  a 
government  whose  ultimate  powers  were  lodged  in 
a  body  free  from  any  control  but  that  of  its  own 
conscience.  The  natural  sequence  of  the  responsi- 
bility of  the  executive  to  the  legislature  is  to  make 
the  legislature  responsible  to  the  people.  Each 
individual  member  should  be  accountable  to  his  own 
constituents  for  any  wrong  in  which  he  had  a  share. 
In  that  way  only  can  a  permanent  regard  for  the 
public  interests  be  insured. 

The  effective  control  of  the  legislature  over  the 
executive  could  be  greatly  promoted  by  the  presence 
of  the  heads  of  departments  on  the  floor.  Without 
that  presence  the  chief  executive  might  sometimes 
have  difficulty  in  determining  whether  things  were 
going  well  in  his  administration  or  not.  His  sub- 
ordinates, of  course,  would  tell  him  that  they  were, 
and  he  might  not  find  it  easy  to  check  their  asser- 
tions. But  if  the  heads  of  departments  had  seats  in 
the  legislative  body  their  manner  of  encountering 


72  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

criticisms  would  show  conclusively  where  the  truth 
lay,  and  if,  after  that,  their  chief  refused  to  call  them 
to  account  for  established  mismanagement,  he  would 
properly  be  subject  to  discipline  himself. 

Although  the  power  of  removal  should  everywhere 
be  unchecked,  it  seems  reasonable  to  believe  that 
entrance  to  the  public  service,  in  the  lowest  grades, 
should  be  by  open  competitive  examination,  fol- 
lowed by  probationary  work,  and  that  appointments 
in  the  higher  grades,  up  to  those  which  demand  a 
degree  of  talent  which  could  not  be  secured  without 
free  range  of  choice,  should  be  made  by  promotions 
from  the  lower.  This  plan  works  well  in  the  army 
and  navy,  where,  indeed,  the  idea  of  promotion  is 
maintained  to  the  very  top.  It  is  the  rule  of  the 
civil  service  in  the  best  administered  foreign  coun- 
tries, and  it  has  been  applied  with  success  to  a  lim- 
ited extent  in  our  own.  Persons  who  have  won  their 
places  on  their  own  merits  are  likely,  on  the  whole, 
to  be  better  qualified  than  those  selected  through 
favoritism,  and  the  power  of  removal  would  be  a 
sufficient  protection  against  the  injury  of  the  ser- 
vice by  the  accidental  intrusion  of  the  undeserving. 

The  object  of  the  requirement  of  due  notice  before 
the  removal  of  the  chief  executive  by  the  legislative 
body  is  obvious.  It  would  not  only  give  the  accused 
official  an  opportunity  for  defense,  but  would  enable 
the  people,  if  they  thought  him  unjustly  treated,  to 
stop  the  proceedings,  and,  if  necessary,  recall  their 
representatives.  The  need  for  a  two-thirds  vote  for 
removal  would  also  protect  an  accused  head  of  the 
government  against  tyrannical  action  by  a  hostile 


THE  BRANCHES  OF  GOVERNMENT.       73 

majority.  It  should  be  understood,  however,  that 
removal  as  a  means  of  enforcing  a  proper  responsi- 
bility in  the  government  would  not  be  analogous  to 
our  present  process  of  impeachment.  There  would 
be  no  formal  trial  and  no  necessity  of  alleging  crime 
or  misdemeanors.  Simple  mismanagement  would 
be  enough,  and  the  discretion  of  the  legislature 
would  be  absolute. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

PARTIES. 

It  is  an  American  and  English  habit  of  mind  to 
regard  a  free  people  as  necessarily  divided  into  two 
great,  hostile,  political  organizations.  This  sup- 
posed necessity  has  even  been  exalted  into  an 
immutable  principle  of  human  nature.  The  sug- 
gestion that  it  might  be  possible  to  conceive  a  free 
government  without  permanent  parties  has  been 
disposed  of  by  the  summary  rejoinder  that  such  a 
thing  would  require  a  preliminary  reconstruction  of 
the  constitution  of  the  mind.  If  this  be  true,  of 
course  the  question  is  settled,  but  possibly  a  little 
reflection  may  put  it  in  a  different  light. 

The  party  system  may  be  considered  in  two 
aspects  —  first,  as  to  its  necessity ;  second,  as  to  its 
desirability.  If  it  be  an  inevitable  outgrowth  of 
the  human  mind,  of  course  the  discussion  of  the 
second  point  will  have  a  merely  academic  interest. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  parties  can  be  shown  to  have  no 
essential  connection  with  the  constitution  of  the 
universe,  it  may  be  worth  while  to  devote  some 
attention  to  the  question  whether  they  are  a  good 
thing  in  themselves. 

Parties  are  supposed  to  be  the  outgrowth  of  the 
differences  of  opinion  and  interest  characteristic  of 
free  communities.      Such  differences  have   always 

(74) 


PARTIES.  75 

existed  and  may  always  be  expected  to  exist.  The 
question  is  whether  they  necessarily  tend  to  form  a 
permanent  line  of  cleavage,  splitting  the  community 
into  two  approximately  equal  parts,  each  of  which 
acts  in  political  matters  as  a  unit,  in  opposition  to 
the  other.  There  are  something  like  fifteen  million 
voters  in  the  United  States.  That  they  should 
divide  in  the  proportions  of  seven  millions  to  each 
of  two  great  parties,  and  a  million  to  three  or  four 
scattering  factions,  seems  no  more  necessarily 
implied  in  the  nature  of  things  than  that  eight,  ten, 
twelve,  or  fourteen  millions  should  act  together,  or, 
on  the  other  hand,  that  no  single  group  should 
exceed  half  a  million  or  a  million.  If  seven  million 
voters  can  act  together  as  a  party,  there  appears  to 
be  no  reason  why  they  could  not  act  together  if  they 
constituted  the  whole  nation.  Yet  we  know  that 
when  there  were  only  seven  million  voters  in  this 
country,  party  lines  were  as  deep  as  now,  and  when 
there  were  only  a  million,  half  of  them  were  indus- 
triously engaged  in  fighting  the  rest. 

This  curious  persistence  of  party  divisions,  regard- 
less of  the  number  of  persons  involved  in  them, 
seems  to  lend  color  to  the  theory  that  there  is  some 
mysterious  and  irresistible  propensity  of  human 
nature  that  compels  a  community  to  segregate  itself 
on  factional  lines.  And  there  is  an  irresistible 
tendency  in  that  direction,  but  it  has  nothing  to  do 
with  human  nature  in  the  abstract.  It  is  the  direct 
result  of  our  present  methods  of  government,  which 
are  so  arranged  that  political  results  can  be  attained 
only  by  putting  certain  men  in  office.  Electioneering 


76  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

for  office,  being  thus  made  an  indispensable  means 
to  the  attainment  of  any  desired  object,  naturally 
comes  to  be  regarded  as  an  end  in  itself.  The 
people  who  wish  the  enactment  of  certain  measures 
are  compelled  to  associate  themselves  for  the  elec- 
tion of  certain  men.  Immediately  personal  ambi- 
tions and  loyalty  to  individual  leaders  overshadow 
the  nominal  objects  of  party  organization.  Soon  a 
habit  of  joint  action  on  all  occasions  is  formed 
among  men  who  originally  came  together  for  cer- 
tain definite  purposes.  The  party  assumes  the 
coherence,  discipline,  and  permanence  of  an  army  ; 
it  persists  long  after  the  issues  on  which  it  came 
into  existence  have  been  settled,  and  we  have  the 
curious  conception  of  "loyalty  "  and  "  treason  "  to  a 
voluntary  association  created  solely  for  the  effective 
joint  action  of  its  members  on  matters  upon  which 
they  all  agree. 

The  attempts  to  find  an  enduring  philosophical 
basis  for  parties  are  as  remote  from  practical 
affairs  as  Lucian's  discussions  of  the  politics  of 
the  moon.  In  England  it  is  generally  said  that 
men  naturally  fall  into  the  two  great  divisions  of 
those  who  are  satisfied  with  things  as  they  are  and 
those  who  want  a  change.  In  America  we  are  told 
that  the  line  of  separation  is  that  between  the 
believers  in  a  centralized  government  and  the  advo- 
cates of  the  rights  of  the  States.  In  practice  these 
distinctions  are  entirely  mythical.  The  Tory  Demo- 
crats, who  are  among  the  most  zealous  conservative 
campaigners  in  England,  are  less  opposed  to  change 
than  the  Whig  aristocrats  who  continue  to  act  with 


PARTIES.  77 

the  Liberals.  In  this  country  the  most  sweeping 
encroachments  on  the  rights  of  the  States  since  the 
time  of  reconstruction  have  been  made  by  Demo- 
cratic administrations  and  Democratic  Congresses. 

There  is  no  obvious  connection  between  the 
exclusion  of  slavery  from  the  Territories  and  the 
protection  of  manufactures  by  tariff  duties.  Yet 
the  Republican  party,  which  owed  its  existence  to 
the  former  idea,  and  which  was  originally  composed 
of  men  holding  all  varieties  of  opinions  on  economic 
subjects,  now  makes  protection  its  supreme  test  of 
orthodoxy,  in  spite  of  which  it  still  retains  the 
allegiance  of  low-tariff  men  who  joined  it  solely 
because  of  its  position  on  the  dead  and  forgotten 
issue  of  slavery. 

That  the  persistence  of  parties  is  the  result  of 
struggles  for  official  place,  rather  than  of  differences 
with  regard  to  principles  or  policies,  is  demonstrated 
by  the  fact  that  the  two  great  parties  remain  nearly 
equal  in  strength.  When  one  greatly  preponder- 
ates over  the  other  for  any  length  of  time,  there  is 
a  reorganization.  This  approximate  equality  is 
necessarily  involved  in  contests  for  place,  because  it 
is  essential  to  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  such 
struggles  that  each  side  should  have  a  chance  of 
success.  If  the  question  at  issue  were  impersonal, 
there  would  be  no  more  improbability  of  an  equal 
division  than  of  a  division  in  any  other  proportion. 
The  difference  is  well  illustrated  by  the  election  of 
1892  in  California.  On  that  occasion  the  Democratic 
vote  for  presidential  electors  ranged  from  1 17,840  to 
118,174,   and   the  Republican  vote  from  117,504  to 


78  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERN'MKNT. 

1 18,027.  At  the  same  time  the  people  voted  on  nine 
constitutional  amendments  and  other  propositions. 
On  the  question  whether  United  States  Senators 
should  be  elected  by  the  people  there  were  187,958 
votes  in  the  affirmative  against  13,342  in  the  nega- 
tive. The  act  authorizing  the  San  Francisco  Harbor 
Commissioners  to  issue  bonds  to  the  amount  of 
five  hundred  thousand  dollars,  for  the  construction 
of  a  new  ferry  depot,  was  approved  by  a  vote  of 
91,296  to  90,430.  An  educational  qualification  for 
the  suffrage  was  favored  by  151,320  votes  to  41,059. 
The  proposition  to  refund  the  State  debt  was 
rejected  by  85,604  votes  in  the  negative  to  79,900  in 
the  affirmative.  Three  constitutional  amendments 
were  defeated  —  the  first,  altering  the  power  of  the 
governor  with  reference  to  vetoes,  by  87,708  votes  to 
69,286 ;  the  second,  extending  the  length  of  legisla- 
tive sessions,  by  153,831  to  36,442,  and  the  third, 
increasing  the  salary  of  the  lieutenant-governor,  by 
128,743  to  43,456.  Two  were  ratified,  one,  limiting 
local  debts,  by  108,942  to  59,548;  and  the  other, 
authorizing  all  cities  of  over  three  thousand  five 
hundred  inhabitants  to  frame  their  own  charters,  by 
114,617  to  42,076. 

The  fate  of  these  nine  propositions  ranged  all  the 
way  from  defeat  by  a  margin  of  117,389  votes  to 
success  by  a  majority  of  174,616.  Yet  if  they  had 
depended  entirely  upon  legislative  action,  and  the 
Democrats  had  indorsed  them  all  while  the  Repub- 
licans opposed  them,  or  the  Republicans  had  indorsed 
them  all  and  the  Democrats  opposed  them,  or  one 
party  had  taken  precisely  the  ground  on  each  which 


PARTIES.  79 

the  returns  show  the  people  to  have  favored  while 
the  other  took  precisely  the  opposite  ground,  no 
politician  familiar  with  the  facts  will  say  that  there 
would  have  been  a  difference  of  ten  thousand  votes 
in  the  strength  of  the  party  tickets.  Nor  would  the 
difference  have  been  much  greater  if  the  Republican 
platform  had  declared  for  free  trade  and  the  Demo- 
cratic one  for  protection,  or  vice  versa.  Democrats 
would  have  continued  to  vote  for  Cleveland,  and 
Republicans  for  Harrison,  in  any  circumstances. 

In  all  the  States  it  is  more  usual  for  constitutional 
amendments  to  be  decided  by  enormous  majorities 
one  way  or  the  other  than  by  close  votes.  This  is 
sufficient  evidence  that  there  is  nothing  in  the 
nature  of  things  impelling  the  people  to  split  into 
two  equal  parts  on  questions  of  principle.  There  is 
no  reason  to  suppose  that  if  the  tariff,  or  silver,  or 
any  other  of  the  questions  that  now  afford  the  pre- 
text for  party  battles,  were  submitted  without  per- 
sonal complications,  the  result  would  be  different. 

But  with  all  questions  of  principle  eliminated,  it 
would  be  impossible  to  maintain  party  divisions. 
When  the  politician  could  no  longer  rally  his 
cohorts  with  an  appeal  to  "  stand  by  the  immortal 
principles  of  our  party,"  and  the  stump-speaker  had 
nothing  to  say  except,  "  Elect  Smith  because  he 
wants  the  office,"  political  allegiance  would  sit 
lightly  on  the  masses.  If  one  candidate  were  con- 
spicuously superior  to  his  opponent,  the  people  would 
be  likely  to  flock  to  his  support  as  generally  as  the 
people  of  California  supported  the  proposition  to 
take  the  election  of  United  States  Senators  out  of 


80  SUGGESTION'S   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

the  hands  of  the  Legislature.  This  would  be 
especially  probable  if  the  methods  of  election  were 
properly  reformed. 

So  much  for  the  inherent  necessity  of  parties. 
What  of  their  desirability  ?  In  England,  where  the 
system  is  carried  to  its  logical  extreme,  the  country 
is  in  a  state  of  unceasing  political  war.  Every 
important  measure  proposed  in  Parliament  is  a  party 
measure,  which  must  be  supported  in  all  its  details 
by  the  members  of  one  party,  even  when  they  per- 
sonally disapprove  of  it,  and  desperately  fought  at 
all  stages  by  the  members  of  the  other,  even  when 
they  think  it  in  the  public  interest.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  a  session  the  Cabinet  looks  over  the  majority 
upon  which  it  must  depend  to  keep  it  in  office.  Then 
it  reckons  up  the  various  reforms,  jobs,  and  fads 
upon  which  the  hearts  of  different  fractions  of  this 
majority  are  especially  set,  and  composes  from  them 
a  "programme,"  each  item  of  which  is  the  price  of 
a  certain  group  of  votes,  and  may  be  distasteful,  not 
only  to  the  whole  of  the  minority  party,  but  to  the 
bulk  of  the  majority.  If,  as  sometimes  happens, 
there  is  some  paramount  issue  on  which  the  national 
mandate  has  been  clearly  expressed,  this  central  dish 
on  the  parliamentary  board  is  garnished  with  a 
variety  of  relishes,  added  to  please  small  cliques  of 
members  whose  support  is  necessary  to  the  success 
of  the  party  in  its  chief  objects.  No  measure  pro- 
posed by  the  minority,  however  meritorious  it  may 
be,  has  any  chance  of  adoption.  There  is  no  pos- 
sibility of  candid  discussion,  for  almost  every  mem- 
ber speaks  as  an  attorney,  not  as  an  unprejudiced 


PARTIES.  81 

reasoner,  and  the  few  free  lances  who  sa)^  what  they 
think  generally  forfeit  their  influence  by  their 
infractions  of  party  discipline,  and  gain  the  reputa- 
tion of  being  erratic  and  untrustworthy.  The  best 
way  to  attain  sound  ideas,  as  Matthew  Arnold  tells 
us,  is  to  let  the  mind  play  easily  about  the  subject 
under  consideration,  and  form  its  judgment  uncon- 
sciously from  a  contemplation  of  the  topic  from  all 
sides.  "  For  this  judgment  comes  almost  of  itself  ; 
and  what  it  displaces,  it  displaces  easily  and  natu- 
rally, and  without  any  turmoil  of  controversial  rea- 
sonings. The  thing  comes  to  look  differently  to  us, 
as  we  look  at  it  by  the  light  of  fresh  knowledge. 
We  are  not  beaten  from  our  old  opinion  by  logic ; 
we  are  not  driven  off  our  ground  ;  our  ground  itself 
changes  with  us." 

If  we  were  looking  for  the  process  of  all  others 
most  radically  irreconcilable  with  the  "sAveet  rea- 
sonableness," through  which  the  truth  is  best 
approached,  we  should  find  it  in  the  clash  of  vin- 
dictive, unthinking,  and  irreconcilable  prejudices 
that  constitutes  an  English  party  contest. 

In  America  things  are  better  in  some  respects 
and  worse  in  others.  Partisanship  here  is  less 
universal  in  its  scope,  but  even  more  squalid  in  its 
manifestations.  The  bulk  of  the  legislation  of  Con- 
gress, and  almost  all  of  that  of  an  average  State 
legislature,  in  ordinary  times,  is  non-partisan  in 
character,  and  an  adroit  leader  of  the  political 
minority  may  have  almost  or  quite  as  much 
influence  in  its  passage  as  if  he  belonged  to  the 
majority.     But  where  the  partisan  spirit  does  get 


82  SUGGESTIONS   UN   GOVERNMENT. 

in,  its  developments  are  expressibly  small  and 
mean.  It  turns  out  door-keepers,  degrades  school- 
teachers, and  makes  spoils  out  of  the  sufferings  of 
paupers.  It  is  the  sole  support  of  the  power  of 
bosses.  It  makes  the  promotion  of  one  "  party- 
measure,"  which  it  often  fails  to  carry,  the  excuse 
for  years  of  jobbery  and  plunder. 

The  persistence  of  parties,  under  our  present 
conditions,  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  citizen 
exhausts  all  his  political  power  for  a  fixed  period 
in  a  single  act,  and  that  act  the  election  of  some 
man  or  men  to  office.  There  may  be  a  dozen  prin- 
ciples which  he  would  like  to  see  embodied  in 
legislation,  but  he  can  neither  vote  for  each  of  them 
directly  nor  for  a  different  man  for  each  principle. 
The  best  he  can  do  is  to  vote  for  a  candidate  whose 
views,  on  the  whole,  are  most  nearly  in  accordance 
with  his  own,  and  resign  himself  to  being  mis- 
represented on  the  points  upon  which  he  and  his 
candidate  differ.  From  this  has  arisen  the  habit  of 
picking  out  what  seem  to  be  for  the  moment  the 
most  important  subjects  in  dispute,  making  them 
the  issues  on  which  candidates  contest  for  election 
and  ignoring  less  pressing  matters.  This  at  once 
divides  the  community  into  parties,  having  the 
nominal  ultimate  purpose  of  carrying  out  their 
characteristic  principles,  and  the  actual  immediate 
purpose  of  getting  their  candidates  into  oflEice.  To 
attain  this  immediate  purpose  the  parties  bid  for 
the  support  of  groups  of  voters  with  special  hob- 
bies by  expressing  S3'mpathy  with  their  desires,  and 
the  result  is  the  modern  "  platform,"  with  its  amaz- 


PARTIES,  83 

ing  jumble  of  ideas,  which,  as  a  whole,  corresponds 
to  nobody's  real  opinions,  and  least  of  all" to  those  of 
the  men  who  draw  it  up. 

The  party  system,  dividing  the  mass  of  the  com- 
munity into  two  immovable  and  nearly  equal 
sections,  puts  the  entire  control  of  politics  into  the 
hands  of  the  small  mobile  element  between.  Some 
of  these  floating  voters  are  independents,  who 
honestly  try  to  use  their  power  in  the  public 
interest,  but  in  too  many  cases  they  are  in  the 
market,  either  for  legislative  favors  or  for  ready 
cash.  The  purchasable  vote,  whether  of  tramps  or 
of  millionaires,  would  be  harmless  if  the  desires  of 
the  whole  people  had  free  play.  It  is  a  division 
which  gives  so  much  importance  to  the  "  balance  of 
power"  that  enables  floaters  and  trusts  to  dictate 
terms  to  party  managers. 

As  party  government  has  naturally  grown  out  of 
present  conditions,  so  it  would  naturally  disappear 
if  the  conditions  were  changed.  There  is  no  reason 
why  the  man  who  believes  in  free  trade,  the  single 
gold  standard,  and  the  Government  ownership  of 
railroads,  should' seek  all  those  objects  through  one 
political  organization,  except  that  under  our  present 
methods  he  has  only  one  vote,  and  must  cast  it  for 
the  candidate  of  one  political  organization  or  lose  it. 
If  he  could  vote  on  each  important  measure  sepa- 
rately he  would  probably  belong  to  one  association, 
or  party,  devoted  to  the  propagation  of  the  free- 
trade  idea  ;  to  another  working  for  the  gold  standard, 
and  to  another  engaged  in  agitating  for  the  nationali- 
zation of  railroads.    He  would  no  more  expect  always 


84  SHfiGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

to  associate  with  the  same  men  in  political  matters 
than  in  social,  religious,  and  business  matters.  A 
man  does  not  attempt  to  promote  the  Westminster 
Confession,  encourage  vaccination,  prevent  cruelty 
to  animals,  and  deal  in  stocks  through  a  single 
organization,  and  there  is  no  more  reason  why  a 
single  party  should  have  the  work  of  handling  a 
dozen  unrelated  problems  of  government.  The 
mere  fact  that  all  are  called  Democrats,  and  act 
together  on  two  or  three  questions,  is  not  enough  to 
form  one  class  of  Representatives  Bland,  Johnson, 
Harter,  Bryan,  Cockran,  and  Tracy,  sharply  marked 
off  from  another  class  containing  Senators  Aldrich, 
Sherman,  Cameron,  Hansbrough,  Teller,  and  Wol- 
cott. 

With  the  introduction  of  direct  legislation  and  the 
abolition  of  periodical  elections,  parties  would  cease 
to  be  either  permanent  or  rigid.  If  free  trade  once 
became  thoroughly  established,  and  settled  beyond 
danger  of  early  disturbance,  the  party  formed  to 
work  for  it  would  disappear.  New  groups  would  be 
continually  forming  and  dissolving.  There  would 
be  no  danger  from  excesses  of  party  spirit,  since 
men  would  lose  the  habit  of  regarding  themselves 
as  members  of  hostile  armies  when  their  allies  on 
one  question  were  their  opponents  on  another.  As 
the  bulk  of  American  legislation  now  is  non- 
partisan, and  those  questions  which  arouse  partisan 
antagonisms  would  then  be  withdrawn  from  the 
determination  of  the  legislative  bodies  and  referred 
to  the  people,  there  would  be  no  occasion  for  parti- 
sanship in  the  representative  assemblies,  and  men 


PARTIES.  85 

would  be  elected  to  them  simply  on  the  score  of 
their  general  ability  and  character,  and  would  be 
kept  in  office  as  long-  as  they  did  satisfactory  work. 
There  would  be  an  end  then  of  the  curious  super- 
stition that  an  idea  whose  reasonableness  commends 
it  to  half  of  the  nation  must  necessarily,  by  that  very 
fact,  be  repugnant  to  the  other  half. 


CHAPTER  VIL 

MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT. 

The  various  evils  for  which  it  is  the  purpose  of 
this  book  to  suggest  remedies  are  felt  in  their 
acutest  form  in  the  government  of  cities.  They  are 
so  keenly  realized  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  spend 
any  time  here  in  expatiating  upon  them.  Applying 
the  principles  already  discussed  to  the  affairs  of  a 
typical  city,  let  us  see  what  the  results  would  be 
likely  to  be  as  compared  with  those  of  the  present 
method. 

Suppose  our  city  to  contain  five  hundred  thousand 
inhabitants,  of  whom  one  hundred  thousand  are 
voters.  We  divide  it  into  two  hundred  election 
precincts,  with  approximately  five  hundred  voters 
in  each.  For  every  precinct  we  provide  a  meeting 
hall.  Of  course,  three  or  four  adjoining  precincts 
could  often  use  one  convenient  building  in  com- 
mon. There  would  be  a  primary  assembl}'  in  each 
precinct  composed  of  all  the  qualified  voters  within 
its  limits.  These  assemblies  would  hold  regular 
monthly  meetings  in  the  evenings,  after  working 
hours,  and  special  meetings  as  often  as  necessary. 
Each  precinct  would  be  entitled  to  one  representa- 
tive in  the  city  council,  and  this  representative 
would  be  the  only  municipal  officer,  except  the 
auditor,   for   whom   the  citizens   would   vote.      He 

(86) 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT.  87 

would  hold  his  place  as  long  as  he  suited  his  con- 
stituents, and  whenever  he  ceased  to  give  satis- 
faction his  assembly  could  revoke  his  credentials 
and  elect  somebody  else.  The  members  of  the  city 
council  would  receive  no  salaries.  They  would 
hold  weekly  meetings  in  the  evening,  and  would 
be  expected  to  have  some  private  occupation  or 
means  of  support  with  which  their  public  duties 
would  not  interfere.  They  would  elect  the  mayor, 
whom  they  would  have  the  power  of  removing, 
after  two  months'  notice,  by  a  two-thirds  vote. 
The  mayor,  like  the  members  of  the  council,  would 
have  no  fixed  term  of  office. 

The  mayor  would  appoint  all  the  heads  of  the 
executive  departments,  except  the  auditor,  and  they 
would  hold  office  at  his  pleasure.  He  would  also 
appoint  the  municipal  judges,  who  would  retain 
their  places  during  good  behavior,  and  would  not  be 
subject  to  removal,  except  after  formal  trial  on 
definite  charges.  All  appointments  would  be  made 
on  the  sole  responsibility  of  the  appointing  power, 
without  the  necessity  of  confirmation.  The  heads 
of  departments  would  have  seats  in  the  city  council, 
and  each  would  be  ex  officio  a  member  of  the  com- 
mittee having  jurisdiction  over  the  subjects  dealt 
with  by  his  department.  The  mayor,  also,  would 
have  the  right  to  address  the  council  at  any  time. 
Each  head  of  a  department  would  have  the  right  of 
appointing  and  removing  his  immediate  subordi- 
nates, and  they  in  turn  would  have  the  right  of 
appointing  and  removing  the  officials  under  them; 
the  principle  being  that  every  man  in  the  public 


88  SUGGKSTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

service  should  be  directly  responsible  to  his  imme- 
diate superior,  and  to  nobody  else.  Thus  there 
would  be  an  unbroken  chain  of  responsibility  from 
the  lowest  clerk  or  janitor,  through  the  chief  of 
bureau,  head  of  department,  mayor,  and  city  council, 
direct  to  the  people.  Every  superior  official  who 
connived  at  a  wrong  committed  by  a  subordinate 
would  take  it  on  his  own  shoulders,  and  the  matter 
would  come,  by  two  or  three  stages  at  most,  to  the 
mayor,  whose  failure  to  act  would  subject  him  to 
removal  by  the  city  council,  any  member  of  which 
who  condoned  the  offense  would  be  liable  to  chal- 
lenge by  any  citizen  in  his  precinct  assembly,  fol- 
lowed by  a  vote  of  dismissal. 

The  auditor  would  be  elected  by  the  citizens  at 
large,  acting  through  their  several  assemblies.  He 
would  appoint  his  own  deputies  and  would  be  sub- 
ject to  removal  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the  council, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  mayor.  If  reelected,  however, 
he  would  not  be  liable  to  removal  again  within  a 
year.  It  would  be  his  duty  to  examine  all  claims 
against  the  city  ;  to  refuse  to  audit  any  improper 
bills  ;  to  maintain  a  general  oversight  over  the  finan- 
cial operations  of  the  municipal  government,  and  to 
report  to  the  council,  of  which  he  would  be  ex  officio 
a  member,  any  discoveries  of  misconduct  or  sugges- 
tions of  improvement.  Every  executive  department 
w^ould  have  a  single  head,  but  the  superintend- 
ent of  schools  would  have  the  assistance  of  an 
advisory  council  of  twelve  principals  selected  by 
himself.  All  important  educational  matters  would 
have  to  be  referred  to  this  council  for  public  discus- 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT.  89 

sion  and  advice,  but  the  -ultimate  decision  in  all 
cases  would  rest  with  the  superintendent  alone. 
Similarly,  the  chief  of  police  would  receive  expert 
advice  from  a  board  of  captains,  and  the  chief  of  the 
fire  department  from  a  board  of  district  engineers, 
but  the  final  control  of  each  department  would  be 
undivided.  The  city  council  would  have  the  right 
to  pass  any  municipal  ordinance,  without  liability  to 
executive  veto,  but  on  demand  of  one-fifth  of  the 
members  of  the  council,  of  the  mayor,  or  of  ten  pre- 
cinct assemblies,  any  measure  so  passed  could  be 
submitted  to  popular  vote  for  approval  or  rejection. 
In  the  same  way  a  vote  could  be  procured  on  any 
measure  on  which  the  council  had  refused  to  pass. 

To  see  how  such  a  system  would  work,  let  us  com- 
pare it  with  the  present  methods  in  actual  operation. 
San  Francisco  is  an  average  city,  with  which  I  have 
the  advantage  of  a  more  thorough  acquaintance  than 
with  any  other.  It  contains  about  sixty  thousand 
registered  voters,  and  consequently,  under  the  plan 
proposed,  would  be  divided  into  one  hundred  and 
twenty  precincts,  giving  a  city  council  of  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty  members.  In  each  precinct  the 
people  would  vote  at  indeterminate  times  for  the 
auditor  and  for  a  member  of  the  council.  Only  one 
of  these  would  be  elected  at  a  time,  and  the  people 
would  have  to  show  very  much  less  political  capacity 
than  they  have  ever  shown  yet  if  they  did  not  scru- 
tinize the  names  suggested  with  critical  attention. 

Under  the  present  system  every  citizen  of  San 
Francisco  is  expected  to  vote  every  two  years  for  a 
mayor,  sheriff,  auditor,  treasurer,  city  and  county 


90  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

attorney,  coroner,  tax  collector,  county  clerk,  record- 
er, district  attorney,  public  administrator,  surveyor, 
superintendent  of  streets,  four  .superior  judges,  four 
police  judges,  five  justices  of  the  peace,  twelve 
supervisors,  and  twelve  members  of  the  board  of 
education  —  a  total  of  fifty  municipal  officials,  in 
addition  to  those  elected  to  fill  vacancies.  Each 
citizen  is  also  called  upon  to  vote  at  the  same  time 
for  a  representative  in  Congress,  and  a  member  of 
the  State  Assembly ;  and  every  four  years  for  an 
assesssor,  superintendent  of  schools,  nine  presi- 
dential electors,  a  governor,  lieutenant-governor, 
secretary  of  State,  controller,  State  treasurer.  State 
superintendent  of  public  instruction,  surveyor-gen- 
eral, attorney-general,  railroad  commissioner,  mem- 
ber of  the  State  board  of  equalization.  State  senator, 
two  or  more  supreme  justices,  and  clerk  of  the 
supreme  court.  At  the  last  election,  moreover,  it 
was  necessary,  in  addition  to  all  this,  to  vote  for  or 
against  five  constitutional  amendments  and  four 
propositions,  and  at  the  next  election  there  will  be 
nine  constitutional  amendments  to  be  voted  upon. 
Whenever  a  citizen  of  San  Francisco  goes  to  the 
polls  he  is  required  to  assist  in  filling  from  sixty  to 
eighty  different  offices,  and  is  obliged  to  select  from 
among  about  three  hundred  candidates.  It  would 
be  natural  to  expect  him  in  despair  to  give  up  all 
attempts  at  discrimination  and  vote  a  straight  party 
ticket,  and  the  fact  that  a  large  majority  of  the  bal- 
lots deposited  in  San  Francisco  are  scratched  testifies 
to  an  honest  determination  to  perform  political 
duties  which  would  work  wonders  for  good  govern- 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT.  91 

ment  if  it  were  exercised  under  less  discouraging 
circumstances.  The  mayor  of  San  Francisco  is 
generally  honest.  The  majority  of  the  legislative 
body,  or  board  of  supervisors,  and  most  of  the  heads 
of  departments,  are  always  corrupt.  Seven  mem- 
bers of  the  board  of  supervisors  can  pass  any  ordi- 
nance that  does  not  require  the  mayor's  signature, 
and  nine  can  pass  anything  over  his  veto.  It  has 
been  customary  to  organize  a  "  Solid  Nine "  for 
transactions  in  legislation  of  all  descriptions,  but 
sometimes  there  are  more  than  three  honest  mem- 
bers in  the  board,  and  then  it  is  necessary  to  be  con- 
tent with  such  speculations  as  can  be  carried  through 
by  a  "  Solid  Seven."  This  considerably  restricts  the 
field  for  enterprise.  Lately  the  discovery  that  the 
annual  order  fixing  water  rates,  which  is  usually 
considered  the  most  profitable  perquisite  of  the 
board,  can  be  legally  enacted  without  the  mayor's 
signature,  has  largely  increased  the  possibilities 
open  to  a  bare  majority,  and  correspondingly  reduced 
the  importance  of  the  mayor. 

The  income  of  the  water  company  is  over  one 
million  six  hundred  thousand  dollars  a  year.  The 
maintenance  of  this  income  depends  entirely  upon 
the  votes  of  seven  members  of  the  board  of  super- 
visors, and  these  seven  men  have  it  in  their  power 
to  keep  the  company's  stock  at  par  or  practically  to 
wipe  out  its  value.  The  stock  has  never  fallen  very 
far  below  par.  The  people  have  repeatedly  elected 
supervisors  pledged  to  make  material  reductions  in 
water  rates,  but  the  pledges  are  never  kept.  Under 
the  present  system  of  government  there  is  absolutely 


92  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVKRNMENT. 

no  remedy  for  these  breaehes  of  faith.  Almost  all 
of  the  nostrums  commonly  recommended  have  been 
tried.  The  plan  of  "  electing  good  men  to  office  "  is 
followed  at  almost  every  election,  and  the  only 
re'sult  is  to  turn  good  men  into  bad.  The  most  sub- 
stantial and  respected  citizens  in  the  community 
turn  rascals  when  they  become  supervisors.  The 
concentration  of  temptation  is  too  much  for  them. 
The  plan  of  rewards  and  punishments  has  been  tried 
to  the  fullest  extent.  For  years  it  has  been  the 
custom  to  promote  honest  supervisors  to  the  mayor- 
alty, and  from  that  the  road  has  been  open  to  the 
governorship,  while  dishonest  ones  have  been 
dropped  into  political  oblivion  at  the  end  of  their 
first  terms.  There  have  always  been  a  few  ambi- 
tious aspirants  in  training  for  higher  office,  but  the 
majority  of  the  supervisors  have  been  willing  to 
sacrifice  their  political  future  for  the  sake  of  winning 
an  independent  competency  for  life  in  two  years. 
Mass  meetings  have  been  held,  and  "  ringing  resolu- 
tions" adopted,  mayors  have  remonstrated,  and 
newspapers  have  bombarded  the  board  with  "  scath- 
ing editorials,"  but  as  all  these  protests  have  been 
destitute  of  legal  authority,  the  community  having 
given  an  irrevocable  power  of  attorney  for  two 
years,  the  supervisors  have  stolidly  consummated 
their  bargains  without  even  taking  the  trouble  to 
defend  them. 

What  would  have  been  the  situation  under  the 
plan  proposed  ?  In  the  first  place  it  would  have 
been  necessar}'^  for  the  corporation  to  obtain  pos. 
session  of  sixty-one  men  instead  of  seven,  and  this 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT.  93 

fact  alone  would  have  been  likely  either  to  raise  the 
cost  beyond  what  the  company  could  afford  to  pay, 
or  to  reduce  the  temptation  to  a  point  at  which  it 
could  be  resisted.  Supposing  this  difficulty  sur- 
mounted, the  work  would  have  only  begun.  As 
soon  as  the  corporation  acquired  possession  of  a 
councilman,  he  would  be  recalled  by  his  precinct 
assembly,  and  another  sent  to  take  his  place. 
It  would  be  necessary  to  corrupt  the  whole 
city  before  a  stable  majority  in  the  council 
could  be  secured.  But  before  matters  had  pro- 
gressed very  far  in  that  direction,  the  subject 
would  have  been  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the 
council  and  submitted  to  a  direct  vote  of  the 
people.  Obviously  bribery  under  such  circum- 
stances would  be  a  waste  of  money,  of  which  no 
sensible  corporation  would  be  guilty.  A  reasonable 
policy  would  be  adopted,  which  could  be  defended 
before  the  public  by  honest  arguments,  and  the 
resources,  now  spent  in  corruption,  would  be  saved, 
to  the  common  benefit  of  the  pockets  of  the  stock- 
holders and  the  morals  of  the  community. 

Another  common  evil  in  San  Francisco  is  fraudu- 
lent street  work.  Paving  contractors  are  usually 
expected  to  share  their  profits  with  the  officials 
who  pass  upon  the  performance  of  their  contracts. 
If  they  make, a  satisfactory  division,  bad  work 
passes  as  easily  as  good.  If  they  refuse,  good  work 
is  as  certain  to  be  rejected  as  bad.  Obviously  good 
jobs  under  such  conditions  are  scarce.  The  public 
knows  that  this  sort  of  thing  is  going  on  all  the  time, 
but,  not  knowing  how  to  apply  a  remedy,  it  does 


94  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

nothing.  It  would  do  no  good  to  complain  to  the 
mayor.  He  has  no  authority  to  interfere  with  street 
work.  That  is  under  joint  control  of  the  superin- 
tendent of  streets  and  the  street  committee  of  the 
board  of  supervisors.  These  irresponsible  auto- 
crats may  be,  and  often  are,  of  different  parties,  so 
that  even  the  resource  of  partisan  discipline,  such  as 
it  is,  fails  when  applied  to  them.  Is  a  party  respon- 
sible for  a  corrupt  superintendent  of  streets  to  be 
punished  for  the  benefit  of  a  party  responsible  for 
his  corrupt  partners  in  the  board  of  supervisors? 
And  what  if  the  situation  be,  as  sometimes  happens, 
that  the  obnoxious  officials  do  not  represent  either 
party,  but  were  elected  by  a  non-partisan  uprising 
for  reform  ?  Of  course  the  people  can  threaten  the 
culprits  with  individual  defeat  at  the  next  election, 
and  this  is  usually  done,  but  the  menace  of  political 
action  two  years  in  the  future  does  not  protect  the 
streets  in  the  meantime  —  not  to  speak  of  the 
paralyzing  certainty  that  the  persons  to  be  elected 
will  faithfully  copy  the  examples  set  by  their 
predecessors. 

If  the  government  were  organized  on  the  pro- 
posed basis,  any  imperfect  piece  of  street  work 
would  be  noticed  by  the  citizens  of  the  precinct 
immediately  affected,  and  would  be  discussed  at 
the  next  meeting  of  their  local  assembly.  The 
councilman  from  that  precinct  would  be  called  upon 
to  have  the  matter  righted.  He  would  demand  an 
explanation  from  the  superintendent  of  streets  in 
an  open  session  of  the  council.  If  the  superin- 
tendent  laid   the    blame    upon   a    subordinate,   he 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT.  96 

would  be  required  to  dismiss  that  subordinate  or 
assume  the  responsibility  himself.  If  he  chose  the 
latter  alternative,  it  would  become  the  duty  of  the 
mayor  to  remove  him,  and  the  failure  of  the  mayor 
to  take  action  would  be  punishable  by  the  council, 
which  in  turn  would  be  held  to  account  by  the 
voters  in  their  various  assemblies.  Of  course  the 
discovery  of  misconduct  would  not  necessarily  be 
left  entirely  to  the  people  of  the  localities  especially 
affected.  Any  resident  of  the  city  would  have  the 
right  to  direct  attention  to  an}^  fault  he  might 
discover  in  the  administration  of  any  branch  of  the 
government.  Any  member  of  the  council  could 
force  any  head  of  a  department  to  furnish  a  public 
explanation  of  any  suspicious  circumstance  occur- 
ring within  his  jurisdiction.  Newspaper  charges  of 
mismanagement  and  corruption,  which  now  are 
empty  sensations,  forgotten  as  soon  as  made,  would 
then  lead  in  every  case  to  definite  results.  No 
journal  could  be  so  destitute  of  influence  as  to  be 
unable  to  secure  the  cooperation  of  a  councilman  in 
putting  its  accusations  into  official  form.  Instead 
of  calling  upon  the  people  to  rise  and  beat  the  air  in 
unavailing  wrath,  it  would  be  able  to  concentrate 
the  whole  force  of  public  opinion,  not  only  in  a 
moral,  but  in  a  legal,  form  upon  the  precise  points 
at  which  it  could  accomplish  the  needed  results. 

But  nov%'  let  us  proceed  to  the  crucial  test  of 
municipal  reform  in  America  the  government  of 
the  city  of  New  York.  Any  plan  that  would  insure 
a  pure  and  efficient  administration  there  would 
work  well  anywhere. 


96  SUGGESTIONS   ON  GOVERNMENT. 

New  York  is  governed  by  corporations  of  politi- 
cians organized  to  exploit  the  various  sources  of 
revenue  legitimately  and  illegitimately  controlled 
by  the  persons  who  hold  the  municipal  offices. 
The  corporation  at  present  in  possession  is  known  as 
Tammany  Hall,  but  it  is  a  mistake  to  suppose  that 
the  defeat  or  even  the  total  destruction  of  Tammany 
would  imply  any  permanent  change  in  the  methods 
of  municipal  administration.  It  is  estimated  that 
the  city  government  of  New  York  is  equivalent  to  a 
capital  of  eight  hundred  million  dollars,  the  income 
of  which  may  be  enjoyed  by  whatever  combination 
of  politicians  succeeds  in  capturing  it.  It  is  doing 
violence  to  all  the  principles  of  human  nature  to 
imagine  that  this  booty  will  be  left  to  the  disposal  of 
high-minded  political  amateurs  after  the  art  of 
acquiring  it  has  been  so  thoroughly  taught  by 
Tammany  and  its  predecessors.  Reform  is  spas- 
modic, but  greed  is  permanent.  Greed  works  all 
the  time ;  reform  works  when  it  has  no  previous 
engagements.  If  Tammany  were  destroyed,  a  new 
combination,  just  as  powerful  and  just  as  hungry, 
would  be  in  control  within  four  years. 

The  machinery  of  government  in  New  York  has 
been  brought  to  almost  the  highest  possible  point 
of  perfection  attainable  under  the  principles  now  in 
vogue.  The  confusion  and  irresponsibility  that 
reign  in  San  Francisco  and  other  cities  have  been 
replaced  by  an  almost  complete  concentration  of 
administrative  authority  in  the  hands  of  the  mayor, 
and  the  opportunities  for  corruption  open  to  the 
common  council  have  been  nearly  eliminated.     Yet 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT.  97 

New  York  is  unable  to  secure  even  a  tolerably  good 
government  for  more  than  two  years  out  of  six. 
The  only  resource  left  to  try  on  the  old  lines  is  the 
complete  separation  of  municipal  affairs  from  State 
and  national  politics,  and  this  is  the  straw  at  which 
reformers  are  now  grasping  most  hopefully.  But  a 
little  reflection  must  show  that  no  radical  change  in 
the  present  conditions  can  be  expected  from  this 
reform,  desirable  as  it  is  in  itself.  It  has  been  tried 
in  various  cities  without  startling  results.  If  it 
were  completely  established  in  New  York,  the 
biennial  election  would  still  be  a  lottery.  The 
people  of  Brooklyn  thought  that  they  were  getting 
good  mayors  when  they  elected  Mr.  Chapin  and 
Mr.  Boody.  A  mistake  once  made,  would  be 
irrevocable  for  two  years,  and  in  that  time  a  new 
combination  could  be  built  up  as  formidable  as 
Tammany.  By  virtue  of  its  possession  of  the 
powers  of  the  city  government  it  would  control 
the  largest,  most  compact,  and  best  organized  mass 
of  votes  in  the  field,  and  to  defeat  it  all  the  antago- 
nistic elements  would  have  to  be  united  in  the 
support  of  a  single  ticket.  Two  opposition  tickets, 
under  the  prevailing  system  of  plurality  elections, 
would  insure  the  success  of  the  combination. 

If  the  plan  of  government  advocated  in  these 
pages  were  adopted  for  New  York,  it  would  be 
advisable,  for  the  sake  of  convenience,  to  put  a 
thousand  voters  in  each  precinct.  As  it  is  not 
likely  that  over  four-fifths  of  the  number  would  be 
in  attendance  at  any  one  time,  this  would  not  swell 
the  assemblies  to  an  unwieldly  size.     On  the  basis 

7 


d8  SUGCESTlnNs   oN    ( ,(  )\  IKNMENT. 

of  a  total  registration  of  three  hundred  thousand, 
the  city  council  would  contain  three  hundred  mem- 
bers. These  would  not  be  swept  into  place  on  a 
general  ticket  on  which,  to  most  of  the  voters,  the 
names  were  mere  fortuitous  collocations  of  syllables, 
but  each  would  be  elected  on  his  own  individual 
merits  by  a  meeting  of  his  neighbors  at  which  he 
was  bodily  in  evidence.  The  nominations  would  be 
made  at  the  hour  of  election,  and  the  beetle-browed 
plug-ugly,  ambitious  of  a  seat  in  the  council,  would 
have  to  stand  up  and  let  his  fellow-citizens  see  what 
they  were  voting  for.  The  candidates  could  be 
called  upon  by  any  voter  to  express  their  views 
upon  the  proper  choice  for  mayor,  and  the  nature  of 
a  desirable  municipal  policy.  This  exhibition  would 
be  followed  by  an  immediate  vote,  confined  to  the 
single  office  of  councilman  for  the  precinct,  with 
no  outside  complications. 

The  council  thus  elected  would  choose  the  mayor. 
This  action  would  be  more  closely  scrutinized  than 
any  other  in  its  career.  A  bad  choice  would  get  the 
councilmen  responsible  for  it  into  immediate  trouble 
with  their  constituents.  They  would  be  recalled 
and  replaced  by  others  who  would  vote  to  correct 
the  mistake  by  removing  the  bad  mayor  and  elect- 
ing a  better  one.  The  new  mayor  would  appoint 
his  heads  of  departments,  and  the  character  of  his 
appointment  would  be  subjected  to  microscopic 
scrutiny  by  the  press.  If  there  were  any  faults 
that  failed  to  be  detected  by  that  examination,  they 
would  be  disclosed  when  the  new  officials  took  their 
seats  in  the  city  council  and  submitted  to  a  weekly 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT.  99 

baiting  regarding  the  management  of  their  depart- 
ments. Whenever  an  acute  reporter  discovered  a 
lurking  job  in  any  corner  of  the  city  government, 
he  would  prompt  some  friend  in  the  council  —  first, 
of  course,  filing  a  caveat  on  it  for  the  benefit  of  his 
paper — to  ask  embarrassing  questions  of  the 
responsible  official. 

Under  this  system  the  government  would  have  a 
constant  tendency  to  improve,  instead  of  to  dete- 
riorate, as  it  has  now.  The  quality  of  the  council 
would  grow  better  from  year  to  year,  as  the  voters 
in  the  precinct  assemblies  became  better  acquainted 
with  each  other  and  had  time  to  observe  the  conduct 
of  their  representatives.  Unfit  councilmen  would 
be  gradually  eliminated,  and  the  men  who  had  com- 
mended themselves  to  their  precinct  assemblies  by 
their  intelligent  interest  in  public  affairs  would  be 
substituted.  Of  course  there  would  always  be  a 
number  of  bad  men  in  the  council.  There  are 
certain  districts  in  New  York  which  could  be  fairly 
represented  only  by  thieves  and  ruffians,  and  these 
would  naturally  elect  thieves  and  ruffians  to  act  for 
them.  But  the  influence  of  this  vicious  vote  would 
be  localized  and  rendered  harmless,  instead  of 
being  permitted,  as  now,  to  taint  the  elections 
of  the  whole  city,  and  even  to  determine  the  choice 
of  a  President  of  the  United  States.  The  council, 
in  the  end,  would  perfectly  reflect  the  moral  condi- 
tion of  its  constituents.  So  long  as  the  mass  of  the 
people  remains  sound,  that  is  all  we  need,  and  when 
the  mass  becomes  corrupt,  it  will  be  time  to  abandon 
the  attempt  to  maintain  self-government. 


100  Sb'GGKS'lIoNS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

Compare  the  opportunities  open  to  the  well-mean- 
ing individual  citizen  under  this  system  with  those 
open  to  him  under  the  present  methods.  In  the 
New  York  of  to-day,  the  individual  voter  can  do 
absolutely  nothing  in  the  intervals  between  cam- 
paigns. Throughout  these  periods  he  must  be 
content  to  be  governed  by  an  irresponsible  despot- 
ism. Upon  the  approach  of  an  election  it  is  open  to 
him  to  decide  whether  to  vSupport  or  oppose  Tam- 
many. Assuming  that  he  so  far  subdues  his 
feelings  as  to  determine  to  act  through  the  domi- 
nant machine,  and  further  that  he  carries  his 
devotion  to  the  public  welfare  to  such  an  extent  as 
to  heed  the  appeals  of  reformers  to  "  take  part  in 
the  primaries,"  he  goes  on  the  appointed  evening  to 
a  hall  filled  with  men  of  unfamiliar  aspect  and  not 
apparently  intent  upon  the  advancement  of  munic- 
ipal reform.  He  is  handed  a  ballot  as  large  as  half  a 
page  of  a  newspaper,  filled  with  hundreds  of  names 
in  closely  printed  columns.  Probably  not  one  of 
these  names  is  known  to  our  citizen,  but  he  can 
safely  assume  that  if  elected  their  holders  will 
stand,  in  the  general  committee  and  the  nominating 
conventions,  as  the  defenders  of  all  the  evils  which 
our  reformer  particularly  desires  to  suppress.  It 
will  be  safe,  therefore,  for  him  to  scratch  them  all 
and  make  out  a  new  list.  Supposing  this  physical 
impossibility  to  be  performed,  and  the  amended 
ballot,  with  the  names  of  three  or  four  hundred 
trustworthy  candidates  written  upon  it,  to  be 
dropped  into  the  box,  there  remains  the  problem 
of  getting  it  out.     Our  pertinacious  citizen  remains 


MUNICIPAL   GOVERNMENT.  101 

on  duty  until  the  polls  are  closed,  an'd  then  waits 
patiently  for  the  returnSi  ;As,p:^eparations  are  made 
for  putting  out  the  lights"  a£i'd:cie?.ring"tiie  hall,  he 
ventures  to  ask  when  the  coun^' i.s,  going  ;tft  begin. 
An  amiable  inspector  informs  nitn  that  tiieie  is  no 
hurry  about  that  —  the  box  will  be  taken  up  to  the 
Wigwam  and  opened  sometime  in  the  course  of  the 
next  day. 

If  the  protesting  citizen  had  a  thousand  com- 
panions, and  if  instead  of  one  hastily  scratched 
ticket  they  had  provided  a  complete  supply  of 
properly  printed  opposition  ballots  in  advance,  this 
last  precaution  would  finish  them. 

In  the  absence  of  a  quarrel  among  the  bosses,  the 
only  opportunity  to  make  a  stand  against  Tammany 
corruption  is  at  the  polls  in  a  general  election,  where 
a  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  voters  of  all  shades  of 
opinion  must  sink  their  individuality  and  loyally  sup- 
port exactly  the  same  list  of  candidates,  prepared  for 
them  by  conferences  that  must  necessarily  take  in  a 
number  of  politicians  as  little  worthy  of  confidence 
as  the  Tammany  sachems  themselves.  This  supreme 
effort  must  be  made  on  a  fixed  day,  and  a  failure  or 
mistake  then  is  irremediable  for  two  years.  In  any 
case  the  part  which  any  one  ordinary  citizen  can 
play  is  so  infinitesimal  that  the  spirit  of  independent 
revolt  against  misgovernment  is  crushed  out  in 
most  men  by  the  apparent  impossibility  of  effecting 
results. 

Under  the  suggested  reorganization  of  the  gov- 
ernment, the  individual  citizen  would  have  at  all 
times  the  fullest  opportunity  to  make  his  influence 


102  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

felt.  Whenever  he  saw  anything  going  -wrong  he 
could  brin^.ijp  the  silbjpot  in  his  precinct  assembly, 
where  he  M"ould  feel;d€"li-ome,  and  where  his  char- 
acter \yv)i'il5i-5^^y€^it3r  jiup  weight.  If  his  arguments 
were  'cb'nviiicing,'  lie  •  cfcriild  Secure  a  vote  of  the 
assembly  instructing  its  councilman  to  demand  a 
public  explanation  of  the  responsible  official,  or,  if 
necessary,  removing  the  councilman  and  substitut- 
ing one  more  in  sympathy  with  the  desires  of  his 
constituents.  If  the  explanation  demanded  of  the 
executive  official  proved  unsatisfactory,  councilmen 
from  other  precincts  would  at  once  join  in  the 
attack,  the  press  would  take  the  matter  up,  and 
before  long  there  would  have  to  be  reform  or  resig- 
nations. 

Under  the  present  system  a  corrupt  government 
is  corrupt  all  through,  and  the  only  light  that  is 
thrown  into  its  foul  recesses  must  come  from  the 
outside,  from  newspapers  or  other  amateur  investi- 
gators, with  no  official  standing  and  no  certainly 
authentic  sources  of  information.  Under  the  new 
plan,  with  each  precinct  assembly  a  living  entity  of 
itself,  there  would  always,  in  the  worst  possible  cir- 
cumstances, be  a  number  of  precincts  controlled  by 
the  best  citizens,  and  the  representatives  of  these  in 
the  city  council  would  be  in  a  position  to  possess  an 
inside  acquaintance  with  every  detail  of  the  munic- 
ipal administration.  They  would  have  the  right  to 
call  every  head  of  department  publicly  to  account, 
and  to  put  searching  questions,  demanding  categor- 
ical answers,  regarding  every  instance  of  misconduct. 
With  the  chiefs  of  the  city  government  thus  pub- 


MUNICIPAL  GOVERNMENT.  103 

licly  on  trial  at  every  meeting  of  the. council,  these 
meetings  would  be  fully  reported  in  the  newspapers, 
which  would  make  them  the  great  news  "  features  " 
of  their  next  morning's  issues.  The  effect  would 
inevitably  be  to  arouse  an  agitation  that  would  lead 
one  precinct  assembly  after  another  to  recall  its 
unworthy  representative  in  the  council,  and  as  the 
remainder  saw  their  numbers  diminishing  and  those 
of  the  reformers  increasing,  there  would  come  a 
stampede  for  the  winning  side.  The  honest  minor- 
ity would  grow  to  the  necessary  two-thirds  majority, 
the  corrupt  mayor  would  be  removed,  and  his 
successor  would  institute  a  general  house-cleaning  in 
the  departments. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  power  of  removing  the 
mayor  might  be  used  by  a  dishonest  council  to  rid 
itself  of  an  honest  executive.  This  danger  would 
be  effectively  averted  by  forbidding  the  removal  of 
the  mayor  except  on  two  months'  notice.  If  the 
mayor  were  plainly  in  the  right  and  the  council  in 
the  wrong,  the  citizens  in  their  precinct  assemblies 
could  take  advantage  of  the  delay  to  instruct  their 
councilmen  to  stop  the  proceedings,  and,  if  necessary, 
they  could  recall  their  representatives  and  substitute 
others  friendly  to  the  mayor's  policy.  If,  at  the  end 
of  two  months,  there  still  remained  a  two-thirds 
majority  of  the  council  in  favor  of  removal,  it  would 
be  because  the  people  plainly  desired  that  action. 

One  objection  to  the  proposed  plan  may  be  said 
to  be  the  fact  that  it  subdivides  the  city  so  minutely 
as  to  imprison  candidates  for  the  council  within  too 
narrow  limits.     It  should  not  be  necessary,  however. 


104  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

for  a  councilman  to  live  in  the  precinct  he  repre- 
sented. Every  assembly  should  have  the  privilege 
of  ranging  over  the  whole  city  to  find  the  man  best 
suited  to  its  purpose.  The  very  minuteness  of  the 
subdivisions  would  tend  to  break  down  the  per- 
nicious American  habit  of  the  localization  of  candi- 
dacies. A  representative  of  some  kind  can  always 
be  found  in  a  ward,  and  consequently,  even  when 
the  requirement  is  not  enforced  by  law,  there  is  a 
tendency  to  confine  candidates  within  ward  lines. 
But  the  proposed  precincts  would  be  so  small  that  it 
would  often  be  necessary  to  go  outside  of  them  to 
find  somebody  at  once  willing  to  serve  and  able  to 
make  a  creditable  appearance  before  the  voters,  and 
the  good  results  of  this  practice  would  lead  to  its 
extension  in  other  directions.  When  the  people 
once  became  accustomed  to  the  workings  of  the 
new  system,  they  would  draw  the  best  men  into  the 
public  service,  wherever  they  might  be  found. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

TOWN  AND  COUNTY  GOVERNMENT. 

The  principles  already  developed  are  equally 
applicable  throughout  the  whole  range  of  govern- 
ment in  this  country,  from  that  of  the  rural  township 
to  that  of  the  nation,  and  need  only  modifications  in 
details  to  fit  them  to  any  particular  case. 

In  cities  it  is  easy  to  carve  out  precincts  of  approx- 
imately equal  size  as  the  electoral  units.  In  the 
rural  districts  regard  must  be  paid  to  historical, 
topographical,  and  industrial  conditions.  When  a 
certain  community  has  been  in  the  habit  of  consid- 
ering itself  as  an  independent  political  entity,  it  is 
not  well  to  cut  it  up  because  it  has  more  than  five 
hundred  voters,  or  to  tack  it  to  another  because  it 
has  less.  Experience  in  New  England  has  shown 
that  a  town  can  be  satisfactorily  governed  by  a  single 
town-meeting  when  fifteen  hundred  voters,  or  even 
more,  are  entitled  to  take  part  in  the  assembly,  and 
other  towns  govern  themselves  with  fifty  voters  or 
less.  As  a  rule,  however,  it  would  be  advisable  to 
introduce  the  precinct  system  when  the  number  of 
electors  ran  much  over  a  thousand.  In  these  mat- 
ters a  very  wide  latitude  should  be  allowed  to  the 
discretion  of  localities,  and  the  central  legislative 
power  should  interfere  as  little  as  possible  with  the 
wishes  of  the  people  immediately  concerned. 

(105) 


106  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

It  is  the  custom  in  most  American  States  to  treat 
towns  and  counties  as  the  creatures  of  the  legisla- 
tures. Their  legal  powers  are  exhaustively  enu- 
merated, and  no  action  can  be  taken  that  is  not 
expressly  provided  for.  I  should  reverse  this  rule. 
Local  government  is  nearer  to  the  people  than  any 
other,  and  therefore,  if  properly  organized,  ought  to 
have  less  need  of  restrictions  in  dealing  with  mat- 
ters within  its  sphere.  The  people  of  a  given 
township  know  their  own  local  needs  and  capacities 
better  than  the  members  of  the  legislature  from  the 
other  end  of  the  vState.  If  they  feel  that  it  would  be 
to  their  advantage  to  maintain  a  town  library,  or 
gymnasium,  or  bath-house,  or  street-car  line,  or 
electric-light  plant,  or  art  gallery;  to  encourage 
manufactures  by  exemption  from  taxation;  to  estab- 
lish labor  stations  for  unemployed  workmen,  or  not 
to  do  any  of  these  things,  it  ought  to  be  in  their 
power  to  do  or  not  to  do  them  without  being  in  any 
way  hampered  by  general  or  special  laws.  Each 
town  and  county  should  be  a  sovereign  republic  in 
its  local  affairs,  subject  only  to  the  general  legal 
safeguards  of  property,  contracts,  and  order.  The 
recognition  of  this  principle  would  immensely  sim- 
plify the  work  of  the  State  legislatures,  and  remove 
a  prolific  source  of  intrigue  and  corruption.  There 
are  no  more  unscrupulous  lobbyists  than  the  repre- 
sentatives of  local  interests,  appealing  to  an  indiffer- 
ent legislature  for  privileges  that  ought  to  be 
entirely  within  the  discretion  of  the  people  immedi- 
ately concerned,  and  there  is  no  more  corrupting 
influence  in  the  legislature  than  the  habit  of  acting 


TOWN  AND  COUNTY  GOVERNMENT.      107 

on  matters  upon  which  there  can  be  no  effective 
public  opinion  among  the  constituents  of  the  mem- 
bers to  enforce  honest  decisions.  Some  of  the  most 
venal  members  of  the  New  York  legislature  are 
rural  representatives  who  purchase,  by  absolute 
fidelity  to  the  interests  of  their  own  constituents,  an 
unlimited  license  to  "  strike  "  the  corporations  and 
tax-payers  of  the  great  cities.  It  is  never  safe  to 
entrust  a  law-maker  with  jurisdiction  over  questions 
in  which  the  public  opinion  to  which  he  is  immedi- 
ately responsible  is  not  directly  interested. 

There  is  little  new  to  be  said  about  the  govern- 
ment of  the  rural  town.  Its  main  lines  have  been 
admirably  worked  out  in  the  New  England  town 
meeting.  It  would  probably  be  found  best,  how- 
ever, to  assimilate  the  town  meeting  in  its  methods 
of  action  to  the  precinct  assemblies  already  pro- 
posed for  cities.  Instead  of  coming  together  once  a 
year  for  an  all  day's  session,  in  which  thirty  or 
forty  subjects  are  to  be  disposed  of,  and  a  dozen 
officers  elected,  the  citizens  could  act  more  effec- 
tively by  meeting  once  a  month  or  oftener  in  the 
evening,  and  dealing  with  a  few  subjects  at  a  time. 
The  primary  assembly,  or,  as  it  would  probably 
continue  to  be  called,  the  town  meeting,  should 
exercise  the  legislative  and  control  the  executive 
management  of  the  town  government.  In  addition 
it  should  perform  the  other  functions  already 
described  as  belonging  to  the  precinct  assemblies  in 
the  cities.  It  should  elect  a  member  of  the  county 
board  of  supervisors,  take  its  part  in  the  election  of 
members  of  the  State  legislature  and  of  Congress, 


108  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

and  serve  as  the  organ  for  the  expression  of  the 
popular  will  through  the  initiative  and  referendum. 
The  executive  officers  of  the  town  would  be  in  effect 
a  committee  of  the  town  meeting,  just  as  the  British 
Cabinet  is  a  committee  of  the  House  of  Commons. 
Each  town  should  determine  for  itself  what  officers 
it  needed,  and  the  scope  of  their  duties.  It  would 
probably  be  found  best  in  all  cases,  however,  to 
have  one  chief  executive  officer  or  town  prCvSident, 
who  would  appoint  and  remove  all  the  minor  offi- 
cials. There  should  also  be  a  board  of  trustees  to 
attend  to  all  legislative  business  that  did  not  require 
the  action  of  the  people.  In  towns  large  enough  to 
be  divided  into  three  or  more  precincts,  one  trustee 
should  represent  each  precinct ;  in  those  in  which 
all  the  voters  met  in  a  common  assembly  all  the 
trustees  should  be  elected  at  large.  In  towns  of  the 
former  class  the  trustees  should  have  the  power  of 
appointing  and  removing  the  chief  executive ;  in 
those  of  the  latter  class  this  power  should  be  lodged 
in  the  town  meeting.  Of  course  in  any  case  every 
trustee  would  hold  his  office  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
popular  assembly  that  had  elected  him. 

In  the  government  of  the  small  towns  the  people 
could  conveniently  perform  a  much  larger  share  of 
public  duties  than  in  that  of  great  cities.  Every 
considerable  expenditure  of  mone}-,  all  street 
improvements,  all  questions  of  license  and  local 
taxation,  and  all  important  contracts,  could  properly 
be  left  to  their  determination.  In  towns  divided 
into  several  precincts,  it  would  probably  be  found  of 
advantage  to  give  each  precinct  assembly  the  con- 


TOWN  AND  COUNTY  GOVERNMENT.      109 

trol  of  such  of  its  own  street  and  road  improvements 
as  were  to  be  paid  for  by  special  assessments  on  the 
adjoining  property.  This  would. bring  such  work 
nearer  to  the  persons  who  had  to  pay  for  it,  and  it 
would  develop  a  spirit  of  emulation  among  the 
different  sections  of  the  town  which  would  tend  to 
bring  them  all  up  to  the  level  of  the  most  pro- 
gressive. 

The  government  of  counties  is  already  developing 
over  a  great  part  of  the  United  States  along  the 
right  lines.  We  already  have  the  board  of  super- 
visors, which  needs  only  to  be  suitably  combined 
with  the  town  meeting  to  be  a  satisfactory  organ  of 
legislation.  In  California  the  initiative  for  county 
ordinances  has  just  been  introduced,  and  fifty  per 
cent  of  the  voters  have  now  the  power  to  compel 
the  submission  to  the  people  of  any  measure  they 
desire  to  have  adopted.  The  principal  defects  of 
the  best  forms  of  county  organization  now  existing 
are  that  the  responsibility  of  the  supervisors  to 
their  constituents  is  not  fully  secured,  and  that 
there  is  no  unity  in  the  executive  government.  In 
some  States  the  supervisors  are  elected  by  artificial 
districts  so  large  as  not  to  permit  any  common  feel- 
ing or  interests  among  their  inhabitants.  In  Califor- 
nia, for  instance,  counties  larger  than  any  New 
England  vState,  except  Maine,  are  governed  by  five 
supervisors,  each  of  whom  represents  an  unorganized 
district  so  extensive  that  the  people  of  one  end  of 
it  are  strangers  to  those  of  the  other.  As  the  elec- 
tions are  for  four  years,  there  is  hardly  more 
effective  responsibility  than  in  the  United   States 


110  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

Senate.  In  New  York,  where  each  town  has  its 
supervisor  and  the  elections  are  annual,  the  situa- 
tion is  much  better  in  this  respect,  but  it  is  still  not 
all  that  could  be  desired.  Every  member  of  the 
board  should  represent  a  body  of  men  capable  of 
getting  together  in  a  common  assembly  and  dis- 
cussing his  character  and  conduct,  and  he  should 
hold  his  place  as  long  as  he  satisfied  this  assembly, 
and  no  longer.  If  every  precinct  had  a  supervisor, 
and  the  precincts  averaged  five  hundred  voters 
each,  a  county  of  twenty-five  thousand  inhabitants, 
or  five  thousand  voters,  would  have  ten  supervisors. 
In  very  populous  counties,  composed  of  great  cities 
with  fringes  of  suburban  towns,  such  as  Cook 
County,  Illinois;  Kings  County,  New  York;  Alle- 
gheny County,  Pennsylvania,  and  Hamilton  County, 
Ohio,  the  members  of  the  city  council  could  also 
act  as  supervisors,  the  representatives  of  the  outside 
precincts  meeting  with  them  at  fixed  times  for  the 
transaction  of  county  business. 

The  various  county  executive  officers  are  now 
usually  elected  independently.  The  same  reasons 
that  call  for  unity  and  unevadible  responsibility  in 
other  spheres  of  government  call  for  them  equally 
here. 

It  would  be  as  easy  to  have  a  single  executive 
head  for  a  county  as  for  a  city  or  State,  and  this 
head,  himself  responsible  to  the  supervisors,  and 
through  them  to  the  people,  should  have  the 
appointment  and  removal  of  all  his  subordinates. 
Two  officials,  however,  should  be  free  from  his 
control.     One  is  the  auditor,  who  should  be  elected 


TOWN   AND   COUNTY   GOVERNMENT.  Ill 

by  the  whole  people,  as  in  cities,  and  for  similar 
reasons.  The  atmosphere  of  county  seats  breeds 
"court-house  rings  "with  peculiar  facility,  and  the 
people  should  have  the  assistance  of  an  entirely 
independent  expert  in  checking  the  financial  opera- 
tions of  their  servants.  The  other  is  the  sheriff, 
who  should  not  be  elected  either  by  the  people  of 
the  county  or  by  the  supervisors,  but,  as  all  our 
recent  experience  shows,  should  be  appointed  by, 
and  responsible  to,  the  governor  of  the  State.  It  is 
the  duty  of  the  sheriff  to  preserve  the  peace  and 
execute  the  laws  without  fear  or  favor.  It  is  the 
duty  of  a  roadmaster  to  make  such  road  improve- 
ments and  repairs  as  the  people  of  the  vicinage 
desire,  but  it  is  not  the  duty  of  a  sheriff  to  give  so 
much  protection  to  life  and  property  as  may  suit  his 
neighbors.  He  must  enforce  the  laws  absolutely  to 
their  fullest  extent.  Though  all  the  voters  in  the 
county  may  join  a  lynching  party,  or  a  whitecap 
raid,  or  a  mob  of  riotous  strikers,  he  must  not 
hesitate  to  preserve  the  peace,  and  if  necessary  to 
summon  the  military  power  of  the  State  to  his  aid. 
To  ask  this  of  him  when  he  is  dependent  for  office 
upon  the  men  his  duty  requires  him  to  suppress  is 
to  put  too  great  a  strain  on  ordinary  human  nature. 
Some  men  bear  the  test  nobly,  but  from  Fire  Island 
to  Sacramento  the  country  is  full  of  warnings  that  it 
is  unsafe  to  leave  the  enforcement  of  the  laws  to 
local  sentiment.  The  sheriff  should  be  a  State 
officer  acting  within  the  county,  not  a  county  officer 
executing  the  laws  of  the  State.  If  that  were  the 
rule,  disorder  would  generally  be  suppressed  before 


112  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

it  had  time  to  grow  into  insurrection.  With  this 
one  exception  there  should  be  as  little  interference 
as  possible  with  local  self-government.  Within  its 
own  sphere  the  county  should  be  a  democratic 
republic,  just  as  the  town  should  be  in  its  .smaller 
sphere  and  the  vState  and  nation  in  their  larger 
ones. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE   STATE   LEGISLATURE. 

In  the  light  of  the  experience  of  the  past  thirty 
years  it  is  amusing  to  read  of  the  lofty  expectations 
cherished  by  the  founders  of  our  political  system 
with  regard  to  the  legislatures  of  the  States.  They 
were  to  be  composed  of  the  wisest  and  purest  men 
of  each  commonwealth,  selected  by  their  neighbors 
for  conspicuous  merit,  and  standing  as  vigilant 
sentinels  between  the  people  and  the  encroaching 
power  of  the  federal  government.  In  short,  they 
were  to  be  and  to  do  everything  which  the  modern 
legislature  most  palpably  is  not  and  does  not. 

The  failure  of  our  current  political  methods  is 
more  marked  in  the  State  legislatures  than  any- 
where else  except  in  the  government  of  cities. 
All  of  these  bodies  are  ignorant  and  inefficient 
—  most  of  them  are  corrupt.  They  are  usually 
controlled  by  corporations  and  bosses.  They  are  so 
densely  stupid  that  if  properly  managed  they  can 
even  be  cajoled  into  passing  good  laws.  Last  year 
the  legislature  of  California  passed  one  of  the  best 
and  most  stringent  corrupt  practices  acts  in  the 
world  without  knowing  what  it  was  doing.  The 
bill  was  quietly  prepared  on  the  outside  and  put 
through  as  a  harmless  concession  to  a  few  innocent 
reformers  who  might  as  well  be  humored  in  their 

8  (113) 


114  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

unpractical  theories.  The  dismay  of  the  politicians 
when  they  found  out  what  they  had  really  done  was 
pathetic. 

Legislatures  are  corrupt  and  ignorant  because, 
under  our  present  methods,  able  and  honest  men 
can  not  usually  get  into  them  without  sacrifices  for 
which  the  honor  of  membership  is  not  sufficient 
reward  ;  because  men  of  a  low  order  of  intelligence 
and  morality  can  easily  reach  them  by  methods  well 
within  their  capacity  and  congenial  to  their  disposi- 
tion, and  because  when  a  man  is  once  in,  there  are 
the  strongest  temptations  to  corruption,  and  hardly 
any  pressure,  outside  of  his  own  conscience,  in  the 
direction  of  honesty.  In  most  of  the  States  the  leg- 
islative sessions  are  biennial.  A  member  is  elected 
in  November,  goes  to  the  State  capital  in  January, 
and  sits  for  sixty  or  ninety  days.  His  constituents 
have  no  hold  on  him,  and,  unless  he  represents  a 
country  district,  most  of  them  do  not  know  his  name. 
He  is  one  of  a  crowd,  and  the  session  expires  before 
he  has  produced  a  clear  impression  on  the  public 
mind.  If  he  takes  the  precaution  to  avoid  mixing 
himself  in  some  conspicuous  scandal,  he  can  "  trans- 
act business"  every  day  with  corporations  and  syn- 
dicates without  getting  himself  especially  talked 
about.  After  the  close  of  the  session  he  has  over  a 
year  and  a  half  of  retirement  before  the  next  elec- 
tion, and  long  before  that  time  expires  nineteen 
voters  out  of  twenty  have  forgotten  his  existence. 

Moreover,  the  organization  of  the  Legislature  fur- 
nishes the  most  perfect  possible  shield  for  miscon- 
duct.    All  laws  must  have  the  concurrence  of  two 


THE   STATE   LEGISLATURE.  115 

houses  and  the  governor.  In  the  case  of  good  bills, 
nothing  is  easier  than  to  smother  them  in  committee 
in  one  house  or  the  other,  or  to  let  them  fall  between 
the  houses  through  disagreements  on  points  of 
detail,  or  to  crowd  them  out  by  other  business,  or  to 
put  them  in  such  shape  as  to  invite  a  veto.  No  indi- 
vidual member  can  be  held  responsible  for  the  fail- 
ure to  accomplish  results  in  such  circumstances. 
When  bad  bills  are  to  be  passed,  the  evasion  of 
responsibility  is  equally  easy.  In  the  tumult  of  the 
closing  hours  of  a  session  almost  anything  can  be 
slipped  through  without  fixing  the  blame  definitely 
upon  the  average  member.  At  the  worst,  the 
responsibility  for  the  enactment  of  such  measures 
is  divided  among  the  members  of  both  houses  and 
the  governor,  and  the  share  that  belongs  to  any 
ordinary  private  in  the  legislative  ranks  is  too  small 
to  be  burdensome. 

These  evils  can  be  corrected  by  precisely  the  same 
methods  that  have  been  suggested  for  the  correc- 
tion of  corresponding  ones  in  the  cities.  The  Legis- 
lature, like  the  city  council,  must  be  brought  into 
immediate  and  permanent  contact  with  the  individ- 
ual voter,  who  must  retain  an  unbroken  control  over 
its  action.  There  must  be  no  division  of  responsi- 
bility between  two  houses  and  an  executive  with  the 
veto  power.  The  arguments  for  a  second  chamber 
lose  their  force  in  any  case  when  the  people  retain 
the  right  of  reviewing  legislation  through  the  refer- 
endum, but  such  a  chamber  is  especially  undesirable 
when  it  takes  the  form  of  a  State  Senate.  Bad  as 
the  average  legislature  is,  the  Senate  is  almost  inva- 


116  SUGGESTIONS   (»\   GOVERNMENT. 

riably  its  worst  element.  It  is  a  pestiferous  little 
cabal,  always  open  to  corrupt  influences,  always 
ready  to  strangle  good  bills  and  smooth  the  way  for 
bad  ones. 

The  bicameral  system  was  defended  by  Madison 
in  the  Federalist  on  six  grounds : 

First.  That  a  Senate  "  doubles  the  security  of  the 
people  by  requiring  the  concurrence  of  two  distinct 
bodies  in  schemes  of  usurpation  or  perfidy,  where 
the  ambition  or  corruption  of  one  would  otherwise 
be  sufficient."  It  is  obvious  that  this  argument 
has  weight  only  as  against  a  single  assembly  of 
unchecked  powers.  The  function  here  assigned  to 
the  Senate  can  be  much  better,  more  effectively,  and 
more  certainly  performed  by  the  people  through  the 
referendum. 

Second.  That  "the  necessity  of  a  Senate  is  not 
less  indicated  by  the  propensity  of  all  single  and 
numerous  assemblies  to  yield  to  the  impulse  of  sud- 
den and  violent  passions,  and  to  be  seduced  by 
factious  leaders  into  intemperate  and  pernicious 
resolutions."  Clearly  the  right  of  review  at  the 
polls  would  be  equally  effective  here.  I  may  men- 
tion a  curious  incident  illustrating  the  comparative 
value  of  the  two  proposed  checks  on  "  sudden  and 
violent  passions."  During  the  last  session  of  the 
legislature  of  California  a  Sacramento  newspaper 
criticised  the  conduct  of  the  members  in  private 
life.  As  soon  as  the  infuriated  legislators  came 
together  after  reading  the  articles  the  Assembly 
proposed  a  constitutional  amendment  removing  the 
seat  of  government  from  Sacramento  to  San  Jose. 


THE   STATE   LEGISLATURE.  117 

The  Senate,  which  exists  for  the  purpose  of  moderat- 
ing "sudden  and  violent  passions  "  and  preventing 
the  passage  of  "  intemperate  and  pernicious  resolu- 
tions," promptly  concurred  in  the  resolution  by 
more  than  the  requisite  two-thirds  vote,  and  so  far 
as  the  legislature  could  accomplish  it,  a  public 
investment  of  five  million  dollars  and  the  estab- 
lished business  interests  of  an  important  city  were 
sacrificed  for  a  newspaper  squib.  The  Supreme 
Court  subsequently  decided  that  the  resolution  had 
not  been  passed  in  the  proper  form,  and  was  there- 
fore void,  but  if  it  had  been  allowed  to  reach  the 
polls  the  people  would  have  corrected  the  reckless- 
ness of  their  representatives. 

TJiird.  That  a  single  popular  assembly  would 
have  "  a  want  of  due  acquaintance  with  the  objects 
and  principles  of  legislation.  It  is  not  possible  that 
an  assembly  of  men,  called  for  the  most  part  from 
pursuits  of  a  private  nature,  continued  in  appoint- 
ment for  a  short  time,  and  led  by  no  permanent 
motive  to  devote  the  intervals  of  public  occupation 
to  a  study  of  the  laws,  the  affairs,  and  the  compre- 
hensive interest  of  the  country,  should,  if  left 
wholly  to  themselves,  escape  a  variety  of  important 
errors  in  the  exercise  of  their  legislative  trust." 
This  point  would  be  fully  covered  by  the  election 
of  members  for  indefinite  terms.  It  is  not  met  at 
all  by  the  current  methods  of  electing  vState  vSenators, 
few  of  whom  have  over  six  months  of  actual  serv- 
ice in  their  entire  time  of  office. 

FoiirtJi.  That  "  the  mutability  in  the  public 
councils   arising   from   a  rapid   succession  of   new 


118  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

members,  however  qualified  they  maybe,  points  out, 
in  the  strongest  manner,  the  necessity  of  some 
stable  institution  in  the  government."  This  assumes, 
of  course,  the  complete  renewal  of  the  assembly  at 
short  intervals.  On  the  plan  of  gradual  renewal 
proposed,  the  assembly  would  be  much  more  stable 
in  its  composition  than  any  senate  is  now. 

Fifth.  That  "  without  a  select  and  stable  member 
of  the  government  the  esteem  of  foreign  powers 
will  not  only  be  forfeited  by  an  unenlightened  and 
variable  policy,  proceeding  from  the  causes  already 
mentioned,  but  the  national  councils  will  not  possess 
that  sensibility  to  the  opinion  of  the  world  which  is 
perhaps  not  less  necessar}^  in  order  to  merit  than  it 
is  to  obtain  its  respect  and  confidence."  These  con- 
siderations, of  course,  apply  chiefly  to  national 
affairs,  but  in  any  case  they  are  fully  met  by  the 
proposed  method  of  election  and  tenure  of  office. 

Sixth.  That  without  a  senate  there  would  be  a 
"  want,  in  some  important  cases,  of  a  due  respon- 
sibility in  the  government  to  the  people,  arising 
from  that  frequency  of  elections  which  in  other 
cases  produces  this  responsibility."  Clearly  this 
objection  is  totally  irrelevant  to  an  assembly  whose 
members  serve  during  good  behavior. 

The  principles  already  developed  in  treating  of 
city  councils  apply  equally  well  to  the  composition 
of  State  legislatures.  If  we  assume  the  State  to 
be  divided  into  precincts  averaging  five  hundred 
voters  each,  any  State  containing  less  than  two 
hundred  and  fifty  thousand  voters,  or  say  one  mill- 
ion  two  hundred   and   fifty  thousand   inhabitants, 


THE   STATE   LEGISLATURE.  119 

could  conveniently  allow  each  precinct  to  elect  a 
member  of  the  single  representative  assembly  which 
would  constitute  its  legislature.  Nearly  half  of  the 
States  of  the  Union  would  come  in  this  class  at 
present,  and  their  legislatures  would  range  in  size 
from  about  twenty-five  to  five  hundred  members 
each.  The  latter  number  may  be  taken  as  the 
highest  effective  working  limit,  and  it  would  prob- 
ably be  found  best  in  practice  to  set  the  limit  lower. 
In  the  more  populous  States,  two,  three,  four,  or 
more  adjacent  precincts  would  elect  a  joint  repre- 
sentative. The  same  rule  would  be  followed  in  the 
smaller  States  in  the  case  of  country  precincts  con- 
taining much  less  than  the  average  number  of 
inhabitants.  A  representative,  once  elected,  would 
hold  his  place  until  recalled  by  his  constituents. 
He  could  be  called  upon  at  any  time  to  give  an 
account  of  his  conduct  before  the  voters  of  his 
district  in  their  primary  assemblies.  If  he  repre- 
sented a  single  precinct,  the  assembly  of  that  pre- 
cinct would  have  the  right  to  revoke  his  credentials 
whenever  he  ceased  to  give  satisfaction ;  if  he  rep- 
resented several  precincts,  a  motion  for  his  recall 
could  be  made  in  any  assembly  of  the  district,  and 
if  it  prevailed  there,  would  have  to  be  voted  upon 
by  all  the  other  assemblies  of  the  district.  The 
acts  of  the  Legislature  would  not  be  subject  to  exec- 
utive veto,  but  any  measure  on  which  the  governor, 
or  one-fifth  of  the  members  of  the  Legislature,  or 
one-tenth  of  the  precinct  assemblies  of  the  State, 
demanded  the  referendum  would  have  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  popular  vote  before  becoming  a  law. 


120  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT, 

The  Legislature  would  elect  the  governor,  and,  by 
a  two-thirds  vote,  after  two  months'  notice,  could 
remove  him.  The  reasons  for  granting  this  power, 
and  the  safeguards  against  its  abuse,  would  be  the 
same  as  in  the  case  of  the  appointment  and  removal 
of  mayors  by  the  city  councils,  and  of  executive 
heads  in  general  by  the  corresponding  legislative 
bodies.  The  heads  of  the  principal  departments  of 
the  State  government  would  have  seats  in  the  Leg- 
islature, without  votes,  and  would  be  consulting 
members  of  the  committees  dealing  with  the  sub- 
jects under  their  charge. 

It  is  certain  that  under  this  system  the  average 
member  of  the  State  assembly  would  hold  his  place 
for  many  years.  He  would  be  able  to  acquire  a 
thorough  familiarity  with  the  workings  of  the  State 
government,  as  well  as  with  the  practical  methods  of 
legislation.  Not  being  under  obligation  to  any  boss 
for  his  seat,  nobody  could  sell  his  vote  except  him- 
self. But  if  he  sold  his  vote  the  fact  would  imme- 
diately become  known  to  his  constituents,  to  whom 
he  would  not  be  a  casual  stranger,  but  an  intimate 
acquaintance.  He  would  be  in  danger  of  recall,  and 
recall  would  mean,  not  the  loss  of  the  fag-end  of  a 
cheap  sixty-day  job,  but  the  ruin  of  the  promise  of 
a  long  and  honorable  career.  Besides,  a  bribed  vote 
would  be  not  only  dangerous,  but  useless,  for  a 
reasonable  suspicion  of  such  a  thing  would  lead 
at  once  to  a  demand  for  the  referendum  on  the 
measure  in  whose  interest  it  appeared  to  be  cast. 
In  such  circumstances  nobody  would  be  offering 
money  for  votes,  and  the  members  would  be  sub- 


THE   STATE   LEGISLATURE.  121 

ject  to  no  temptation.  Thus  the  Legislature  would 
improve,  both  in  ability  and  in  character. 

The  length  of  the  sessions  would  be  a  question  to 
be  determined  by  the  needs  of  each  State.  Whether 
short  or  long,  they  should  be  held  at  least  once  a 
year,  and  the  Legislature  should  be  considered  a 
continuous  body,  in  which  measures  once  introduced 
would  retain  their  standing  until  finally  disposed  of. 
Biennial  sessions  are  popular  now,  simply  because 
legislatures  can  not  be  trusted,  and  their  meetings 
are  considered  public  calamities  that  should  be 
incurred  as  seldom  as  possible.  The  business  of  the 
State  often  suffers  by  a  two  years'  delay,  and  if  the 
law-making  bodies  were  able  and  honest  there  would 
be  no  more  reason  for  limiting  their  sessions  to  alter- 
nate years  than  for  doing  the  same  thing  in  the  case 
of  a  board  of  directors  of  a  railroad.  The  conditions 
of  modern  life  change  so  rapidly  that  when  a 
growing  State  is  bound  in  legislative  ligaments  that 
can  not  be  relaxed  except  at  brief  intervals  two 
years  apart,  there  is  certain  to  be  distress. 

That  legislative  business  should  be  continuous 
rather  than  spasmodic  is  a  proposition  that  needs 
little  argument.  More  time  and  energy  are  wasted 
in  State  legislatures,  and  in  Congress,  on  measures 
which  get  partly  through,  and  fail  for  want  of  time, 
than  are  devoted  to  those  which  finally  become  laws. 
There  are  bills  in  Congress  which  have  appeared  at 
regular  intervals  for  twenty,  thirty,  or  fifty  years, 
have  advanced  as  far  as  favorable  committee  reports, 
or  even  passage  by  one  house  or  the  other,  and  then 
have  fallen  in  the  ruck  of  crowded-out  measures  at 


122  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

the  end  of  the  short  session,  to  be  revived  in  the 
next  Congress,  and  laboriously  helped  through  the 
same  preliminary  work  as  before,  with  the  same 
futility.  When  a  legislature  meets  once  in  two 
years,  for  a  ninety-day  session,  organizes  itself  as  a 
new  body,  receives  every  suggested  project  of  law 
in  the  form  of  an  entirely  new  bill,  and  appoints  its 
committees  to  investigate  all  these  measures  from 
the  beginning  as  if  they  had  never  been  heard  of 
before,  it  has  not  much  time  left  for  the  actual  con- 
sideration of  many  bills  on  their  merits.  If  it  were 
a  permanent  body,  perpetually  changing  its  indi- 
vidual membership,  but  never  losing  its  own  corpo- 
rate identity ;  if  its  officers  and  committees  retained 
their  places  until  discharged,  and  if  a  measure  once 
placed  on  its  calendar  were  certain  of  being  event- 
ually reached,  considered,  and  disposed  of,  an  enor- 
mous amount  of  wasted  time  would  be  saved, 
heartsick  advocates  of  mildewed  legislation  would 
be  relieved  of  suspense,  the  frenzied  orgy  of  law- 
making by  which  lobbyists  profit  at  the  end  of  every 
session  would  be  dispensed  with,  and  new  needs 
would  no  longer  be  obstructed  by  the  debris  of  past 
failures. 

A  legislature  so  constituted  would  be  trusted  by 
the  people,  and  it  would  deserve  the  trust.  If.  bj^any 
chance,  the  public  confidence  were  ever  betrayed, 
the  people  would  always  have  a  remedy  within  easy 
reach. 


CHAPTER  X. 

THE   STATE   EXECUTIVE. 

The  American  lack  of  system  and  responsibility 
in  government  is  carried  to  the  last  extreme  in  the 
organization  of  the  executive  authority  of  the 
States.  Some  States  are  administered  in  a  less 
chaotic  manner  than  others,  but  as  a  rule  the 
governing  power  is  cut  up  into  so  many  discon- 
nected and  unrelated  pieces  that  it  is  impossible 
either  to  preserve  harmony  among  them  or  to 
maintain  any  approach  to  an  effective  responsibility 
for  misconduct.  The  governor  is  supposed  to  be 
the  supreme  executive  head,  but  his  nominal  sub- 
ordinates, in  most  cases,  are  absolutely  independent 
of  him.  They  hold  their  places  by  the  same  tenure 
by  which  he  holds  his  own  ;  they  are  elected  at  the 
same  time,  serve  for  the  same  terms,  and  are  subject 
to  removal  by  the  same  process  of  impeachment. 
Sometimes  the  unity  of  the  administration  is  still 
further  broken  up,  and  responsibility  still  further 
obscured,  by  the  ingenious  device  of  making  the 
terms  overlap.  The  governor  and  some  of  his 
assistants  are  elected  at  one  time,  and  the  other 
heads  of  departments  a  year  or  two  years  later.  In 
this  way  the  last  shred  of  public  control  over  the 
government  is  eliminated.  When  the  governor 
and  all  the  State  officers  are  elected  at  once,  and  all 

(183) 


124  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

happen  to  belong  to  the  same  party,  it  is  possible  to 
exercise  a  sort  of  clumsy  justice  by  turning  out  the 
party  if  anything  goes  wrong  in  any  department. 
But  if  only  half  the  officers  are  elected  at  once,  and 
things  go  wrong  during  the  next  two  years,  and 
then  the  other  party  gets  the  remainder  of  the 
officials,  and  they  misbehave,  too,  the  hold-overs  of 
the  first  party  continuing  their  misconduct,  how 
is  justice  to  be  wreaked  the  next  time  ? 

The  administration  of  national  affairs,  imperfect 
as  it  is,  is  undeniably  better  than  that  of  the  average 
State  government,  and  this  superiority  can  hardly 
come  from  anything  else  than  the  concentration  of 
executive  power  in  the  hands  of  the  President.  If 
the  governor  of  a  State  were  given  the  right  to 
appoint  and  remove  his  subordinates  there  would 
be  a  great  gain  in  administrative  efficienc}-.  But 
there  would  still  be  something  lacking.  The  gov- 
ernor would  regulate  the  minor  officials,  but  who 
would  regulate  the  governor  ?  His  responsibility, 
under  the  present  system,  would  be  limited  to  the 
possibility  of  impeachment  for  crime,  and  of  defeat 
for  reelection  at  the  end  of  his  term.  If  he  kept 
clear  of  criminal  offenses  and  did  not  expect  to  be 
reelected,  there  would  be  no  way  of  reaching  him. 
Incompetency,  reckless  mismanagement,  inexcus- 
able complaisance  toward  unfaithful  subordinates, 
or  even  corruption  in  many  of  its  most  dangerous 
forms,  might  endanger  the  public  safety  without 
subjecting  the  governor  to  impeachment,  or  hasten- 
ing the  sloAv  progress  of  his  official  term.  To  be 
sure,  his  party  could  be  punished  for  his  misdeeds 


THE   STATE  EXECUTIVE.  125 

at  the  next  election,  but  this  form  of  postponed 
vicarious  atonement  would  neither  afford  relief 
from  present  evils  nor  insure  against  their  repeti- 
tion under  the  new  administration. 

What  is  needed  is  just  such  a  continuous  responsi- 
bility on  the  part  of  the  governor  himself  to  some 
superior  power  as  he  should  have  the  right  to 
enforce  on  his  subordinates.  An  unfaithful  clerk 
can  be  disciplined,  not  through  a  party  defeat  at 
the  end  of  four  years,  but  personally  and  at  once, 
by  an  immediate  dismissal.  An  unfaithful  head  of 
department  or  governor  should  be  brought  to  account 
in  the  same  way.  The  proper  authority  to  remove 
the  head  of  department  would  be  the  governor.  The 
proper  authority  to  remove  the  governor  would  be 
the  people.  As,  under  the  system  of  continuous  leg- 
islative responsibility  described  in  the  last  chapter, 
the  people  would  at  all  times  be  faithfully  repre- 
sented in  the  Legislature,  which  they  are  not  now, 
they  could  safely  allow  the  Legislature  to  act  for 
them  in  maintaining  their  control  over  the  executive. 
The  possibility  of  the  abuse  of  this  trust  by  the  rep- 
resentatives could  be  prevented  by  requiring  two 
months'  notice  of  the  removal  of  the  governor,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  mayors  of  cities. 

There  is  no  reason  for  any  material  structural  dif- 
ference between  the  government  of  a  State  and  that 
of  a  city  on  the  one  hand,  or  that  of  the  nation  on 
the  other.  At  the  last  census  there  were  twenty- 
eight  States  with  smaller  populations  than  the  city 
of  New  York,  and  four  with  more  inhabitants  each 
than   the   Union   had  at  the   time   of  the  Revolu- 


126  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

tion.  Several  European  kingdoms  are  less  impor- 
tant in  every  way  than  the  prineipal  Ameriean 
States.  The  State  governments  have  to  deal  with 
education,  police,  and  justice,  as  those  of  cities  do, 
and  they  have  their  armies,  lands,  and  internal 
improvements,  and  work  in  aid  of  labor,  agricul- 
ture, and  mining,  like  the  government  of  the 
nation.  There  are  State  and  national  bureaus  of 
labor,  State  and  national  railroad  commissioners, 
State  and  national  weather  bureaus,  and  State  and 
national  supervision  of  banks.  The  form  of  admin- 
istration that  produces  the  best  results  in  one  sphere 
ought  to  produce  them  in  the  other. 

Perhaps  the  most  glaring  example  of  the  ineffi- 
ciency of  the  present  methods  of  government  in  the 
States  is  to  be  found  in  the  attempts  to  regulate 
railroads.  The  favorite  machinery  for  this  purpose 
is  a  railroad  commission ;  in  some  cases  having 
merely  advisory  powers,  and  in  others  invested 
with  despotic  authority.  Without  such  authority 
it  is  impossible  to  compel  obedience  to  the  decisions 
of  the  commission,  but  when  it  is  given  it  is  found 
almost  impossible  to  prevent  its  abuse.  In  California 
the  commissioners  are  elected  for  four  years,  and 
although  the  system  was  created  by  the  new  consti- 
tution of  1879,  foJ^  the  express  purpose  of  restraining 
the  exactions  of  a  single  corporation,  the  people  have 
never  succeeded  in  all  the  fifteen  years  that  have 
since  elapsed  in  electing  a  commission  which  that 
corporation  has  been  unable  to  control.  Rampant 
anti-monopoly  demagogues;  substantial,  consei-va- 
tive  citizens,  and  machine  politicians  have  all  been 


THE   STATE   EXECUTIVE.  127 

tried,  and  all  have  succumbed  without  a.  struggle  to 
the  arguments  of  the  railroad  lobby.  The  railroad 
commission  system  has  been  wrecked  by  the  one  per- 
vading political  vice  of  irresponsibility.  If,  instead  of 
a  headless  board,  intrenched  in  ofBce  for  four  years, 
there  had  been  one  expert  commissioner,  appointed 
by  the  governor,  holding  his  place  during  good 
behavior,  and  subject  to  questions  in  a  legislature, 
itself  in  immediate  touch  with  the  people,  one  of 
three  things  would  have  happened.  The  commis- 
sioner would  have  done  what  the  people  wanted 
done,  or  he  would  have  convinced  them  that  they 
were  wrong  and  he  was  right,  or  there  would  have 
been  a  new  commissioner. 

The  pest  of  executive  boards,  from  which  the 
national  government  is  comparatively  free,  but 
which  plays  such  an  important  part  in  the  demor- 
alization of  politics  in  the  cities,  is  peculiarly  preva- 
lent in  the  States.  California,  to  recur  again  to  the 
examples  with  which  I  am  most  familiar,  has  com- 
missions to  look  after  railroads,  vState  prisons,  asy- 
lums, reformatories,  harbors  at  three  different  ports, 
pilotage  at  three  ports,  the  Yosemite  Valley,  the 
State  Capitol,  fish,  health,  dentistry,  pharmacy,  vet- 
erinary, medicine.  State  burial  grounds,  horticulture, 
viticulture,  agriculture,  silk  culture,  mining,  educa- 
tion, arbitration,  banks,  building  and  loan  associa- 
tions, claims,  and  equalization  of  taxes. 

The  result  of  all  this  subdivision  of  powers  is 
extravagance  and  general  mismanagement.  The 
superfluity  of  boards  and  commissions  to  do  the 
work  that  ought  to  be  done  by  single  officers,  inten- 


128  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

sifies  the  obscurity,  which  is  the  worst  of  the  dete- 
riorating influences  to  which  our  present  State 
administrations  are  subject.  At  best  our  State  offi- 
cials are  too  much  in  the  dark.  They  are  farther 
from  the  people  than  almost  any  other  class  of  pub- 
lic servants.  Cabinet  officers  at  Washington  work  in 
a  comparative  blaze  of  light,  and  even  in  the  govern- 
ment of  cities  the  proceedings  of  unfaithful  street 
superintendents  and  police  commissioners  attract 
considerable  attention.  But  the  State  capital,  except 
when  the  Legislature  is  in  session,  is  under  the  obser- 
vation neither  of  the  individual  voter  nor  of  the 
press.  It  is  a  retired  nook,  in  which  officials  who 
avoid  glaring  scandals  may  do  or  neglect  almost 
anything  without  bringing  themselves  into  notice. 
If  at  every  session  of  the  Legislature  any  member 
could  demand  a  public  explanation  from  any  head 
of  a  State  department  of  anything  suspicious  in 
the  conduct  of  his  office;  if  an  imsatisfactory  expla- 
nation would  throw  the  burden  of  approving  or 
punishing  mismanagement  upon  the  governor,  who 
would  have  the  power  of  removal  and  would 
be  himself  responsible  to  the  Legislature  for  the 
way  in  which  he  exercised  it  or  failed  to  exercise  it, 
and  if  the  members  of  the  Legislature  themselves 
held  their  places  at  the  pleasure  of  their  constitu- 
ents, there  would  be  a  substantial  increase  in  the 
inducements  to  a  faithful  performance  of  duty. 
There  would  be  light  then  where  there  is  darkness 
now,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  same 
law  of  human  nature  which  now  breeds  deeds 
appropriate  to  darkness  would  then  engender  those 
that  could  thrive  in  the  light. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

THE   NATIONAL    LEGISLATURE. 

Congress  is  at  once  the  best  and  the  worst  of  our 
various  legislative  bodies.  It  contains  the  highest 
average  of  ability ;  it  is  much  above  the  ordinary 
level  in  honesty ;  it  has  members  representing 
almost  all  shades  of  opinion,  and  it  exhibits  con- 
siderable independence  and  sometimes  a  fair  degree 
of  capacity  for  constructive  statesmanship.  But 
these  merits  are  balanced  by  grave  faults.  Con- 
gress, like  almost  all  other  national  parliaments,  is 
clogged  with  business  to  such  an  extent  that  it  is 
ceasing  to  be  either  a  deliberative  or  a  working  body. 
At  both  ends  of  the  Capitol  true  debate  is  almost 
extinct  —  crushed  out  in  the  House  by  the  pressure 
of  the  legislative  machinery,  and  drowned  out  in 
the  Senate  by  floods  of  inconsequential  garrulity. 
Of  the  thousands  of  bills  introduced  at  every  ses- 
sion, the  vast  majority  relate  to  matters  of  no  public 
importance.  Most  of  them  deal  with  small  private 
claims,  which  should  never  come  before  Congress 
at  all  in  separate  form,  but  should  be  dealt  with  by 
a  special  tribunal;  those  which  passed  the  scrutiny 
of  the  court  being  subsequently  approved  by  Con- 
gress in  a  general  bill,  and  the  rest  being  dropped. 
Time  is  w^asted  in  every  conceivable  way,  and  the 
result  is  that  the  great  measures  of  public  policy, 

8  (129) 


130  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

which  should  absorb  the  attention  of  the  national 
legislative  body,  are  hurriedly  considered  in  the 
intervals  between  trivialities. 

In  dealing  with  possible  improvements  in  Con- 
gressional organization  and  methods,  I  shall  treat 
the  subject  from  two  standpoints — first  that  of  the 
government  as  at  present  organized ;  and  second, 
that  of  the  government  as  it  would  be  if  it  were 
symmetrically  reorganized  on  the  lines  laid  down  in 
previous  chapters.  Such  a  reorganization  would  be 
the  work  of  a  long  time,  and  meanwhile  the  need 
for  immediate  reform  is  pressing.  I  shall  first  con- 
sider, therefore,  the  changes  that  may  be  readily 
made  in  the  composition  and  procedure  of  Congress 
as  it  now  exists,  without  the  need  of  constitutional 
amendments  or  any  radical  transformation  in  the 
habits  of  the  people. 

The  great  evil  that  afflicts  Congress,  in  common 
with  almost  all  other  national  parliaments,  is  that  it  is 
an  amateur  body  set  to  do  professional  work.  There 
is  no  work  more  complicated  or  more  exacting  than 
that  of  legislation,  and  yet  it  is  taken  up  confidently 
by  lawyers  and  merchants  who  never  gave  it  a 
thought  before  their  election,  who  treat  it  as  a  minor 
avocation  during  their  terms,  and  who  drop  it  as 
soon  as  they  go  home.  The  first  requisite  to  raising 
the  character  of  Congressional  work  is  to  make  the 
members  take  it  seriously.  To  do  this  eftectively 
the  term  of  ofiice  ought  to  be  lengthened,  or,  better 
still,  made  indefinite,  but  this  would  require  a  con- 
stitutional amendment,  and  much  can  be  done  with- 
out it.     As  the  term  is  so  short,  it  is  all  the  more 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  131 

important  that  every  moment  of  it  should  be  utilized. 
At  present  a  new  House  comes  into  existence  on  the 
fourth  of  March.  Unless  called  in  extra  session  it 
meets  for  the  first  time  in  the  following  December, 
nine  months  later.  Its  organization  is  not  com- 
pleted before  the  Christmas  holidays,  when  it  goes 
home  for  two  weeks.  Sometimes  it  spends  an  addi- 
tional month  or  two  in  discussing  its  rules.  It  takes 
the  committees  until  about  the  middle  of  April  to 
mature  their  projects  of  legislation,  and  in  the  inter- 
val the  House  kills  time.  Unless  a  tariff  bill  or  some 
other  important  political  measure  demands  attention, 
the  general  appropriation  bills  absorb  most  of  the 
time  until  the  end  of  June  and  often  longer,  leaving 
new  legislation  to  slip  into  such  crannies  as  it  may 
find.  Congress  always  tries  to  adjourn  as  early  as 
July,  if  possible,  and  business  other  than  political  is 
ruthlessly  sacrificed  in  the  effort.  In  December  it 
comes  together  again.  Little  is  usually  accom- 
plished before  the  Christmas  holidays,  and  the 
remaining  two  months  of  the  term  are  monopolized 
by  the  appropriation  bills  and  such  fag-ends  of 
legislation  as  can  be  squeezed  in  between  conference 
reports. 

It  is  obvious  that  little  could  be  accomplished 
under  such  conditions,  even  if  Congressional  pro- 
cedure were  otherwise  well  adapted  to  facilitate  the 
transaction  of  important  business,  which  it  decidedly 
is  not.  If  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  appointed 
in  March,  first  visited  his  office  in  the  following 
December,  got  down  to  work  in  April,  knocked  off 
in  July,  began   again   in   January,  and  retired   in 


132  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

March  in  favor  of  a  successor  who  would  not  think 
it  necessary  to  look  at  the  office  until  the  next 
December,  the  financial  interests  of  the  Government 
would  be  likely  to  suffer.  The  interests  in  charge 
of  Congress  are  certainly  no  less  important  than 
those  in  charge  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 
The  only  difference  is  that  the  secretary's  duties 
are  taken  seriously  and  those  of  Congress  are  not. 

Every  Senator  and  Representative  should  consider 
himself  in  the  public  service,  precisely  as  the  Presi- 
dent is,  or  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  or  a  clerk  in  a 
department.  Congress  should  sit  on  every  working 
day  in  the  year,  except  during  such  short  vacations 
as  would  be  considered  reasonable  for  a  business 
man  to  allow  to  his  employes.  Meeting  on  the 
fourth  of  March,  the  House  should  complete  its 
organization  during  that  month,  and  it  would  then 
have  twenty-three  months  of  its  term  remaining  for 
the  orderly  transaction  of  business.  By  diligent 
application  it  w^ould  be  possible  to  pass  the  appro- 
priation bills  by  the  end  of  June,  but  it  would  be 
better  to  make  the  fiscal  year  coincide  with  the  cal- 
endar year.  This  would  give  ample  time  for  the 
consideration  of  the  appropriations,  and  would  avoid 
statistical  confusion. 

This  simple  expedient  would  double  the  working 
time  of  Congress.  To  increase  it  still  further,  the 
number  of  members  of  the  House  should  be  reduced. 
Almost  all  national  parliaments  are  too  large  for  the 
effective  management  of  so  much  business  as  they 
are  called  upon  to  handle,  and  almost  all,  accordingly, 
find  themselves  gorged  by  their  own  numbers.     Un- 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  133 

der  the  plan  of  organization  heretofore,  advocated  in 

this  book,  some  State  and  municipal  assemblies  would 
be  even  larger  than  the  present  national  House,  but 
this  disadvantage  would  be  more  than  offset  by  the 
benefits  derived  from  keeping  them  in  close  touch 
with  the  people.  Beside,  their  business  would  be 
simple  and  easily  managed  compared  with  that  dealt 
with  by  Congress.  As  long  as  we  retain  the  present 
irresponsible  organization  of  the  national  legislature, 
there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  not  have  the 
advantage  to  be  gained  from  manageable  numbers. 
A  House  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  members  would 
be  amply  large.  On  the  basis  of  the  last  census 
this  would  give  about  fifteen  representatives  to 
New  York,  nine  to  Illinois,  three  to  California, 
two  to  Connecticut,  and  one  each  to  Colorado, 
Delaware,  Florida,  Idaho,  Montana,  Nevada,  New 
Hampshire,  North  Dakota,  Oregon,  Rhode  Island, 
South  Dakota,  Vermont,  Washington,  and  Wyo- 
ming. Nobody  familiar  with  Congressional  meth- 
ods would  maintain  that  such  an  arrangement 
would  not  amply  represent  local  interests.  Senators 
are  now  as  intently  concerned  for  the  advancement 
of  legislation  demanded  by  localities  in  their  respect- 
ive States  as  the  representatives  from  the  districts 
immediately  affected,  and,  as  a  rule,  the  entire  dele- 
gation from  a  State  stands  together  in  such  matters. 
It  would  continue  to  do  so  if  it  were  smaller,  and,  of 
course,  if  all  the  delegations  were  proportionately 
reduced  in  numbers  their  relative  influence  would  be 
unchanged.  But  it  would  be  a  good  deal  better 
for  a  State  to  have  one  strong  man  in  a  House  of 


134  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

one  hundred  and  fifty  members  than  two  weak  ones 
in  a  House  of  three  hundred  and  fifty-six. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  fact  that  the  reduc- 
tion in  numbers  would  tend  to  raise  the  average 
ability  of  the  House.  In  the  first  place,  ability  is  not 
a  very  abundant  thing,  and  it  would  be  easier  to 
find  one  hundred  and  fifty  able  men  than  three  hun- 
dred and  fifty-six.  In  the  next  place,  it  is  always 
harder  for  a  small  man  to  make  an  impression 
on  a  large  constituency  than  on  a  small  one.  The 
Senate,  despite  its  pernicious  method  of  election, 
reaches  a  distinctly  higher  average  level  of  ability 
than  the  House.  The  President  of  the  United  States 
is  usually  a  man  of  larger  caliber  than  the  governor 
of  a  State,  and  the  governor  of  a  State  than  the 
mayor  of  a  cit3^  This  increase  in  the  average 
ability  of  the  House  would  be  immensely  promoted 
if  the  members  were  elected  by  the  method  of  pro- 
portional representation,  as  they  could  easily  be 
whenever  a  State  had  an  odd  number  of  represent- 
atives exceeding  one.  In  that  case  the  strongest 
men  of  each  party  in  each  State  would  find  their 
way  to  Congress  by  a  process  of  natural  selection  as 
unerring  as  that  which  now  keeps  them  at  home. 
Under  the  present  system  a  Representative  who  fails 
to  retain  the  favor  of  the  politicians  of  his  party  in 
a  single  district  is  unable  to  gain  a  renomination, 
and  must  retire  at  the  end  of  his  term.  This  rule 
tends  to  the  progressive  elimination  of  all  the  men 
of  original  minds  and  independent  characters.  The 
Representative  is  equally  bound  to  lose  his  seat, 
regardless  of  his  personal  merits,  in  the  event  of  a 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  135 

change  in  the  political  sentiments  .of  a  sufficient 
number  of  his  constituents  to  hold  the  balance  of 
power.  The  change  may  not  affect  more  than  a  hun- 
dred voters  out  of  fifty  thousand,  but  if  it  is  sufficient 
to  shift  the  control  of  the  district  it  drives  an  able 
man  from  public  life.  Under  the  proportional  plan 
such  a  man  would  have  no  trouble  in  finding  a  suf- 
ficient number  of  admirers  in  a  State  to  constitute 
an  electoral  quota,  and  he  would  be  sure  of  his  seat 
as  long  as  he  deserved  it. 

The  importance  of  a  reduction  in  the  numbers  of 
the  House,  from  a  business  point  of  view,  may  be 
illustrated  by  a  simple  arithmetical  computation. 
Congress  is  in  session,  on  an  average,  for  about  ten 
months  of  its  term.  If  all  this  time  were  devoted 
to  business,  for  six  days  a  week  and  five  hours  a  day, 
with  not  an  hour  wasted  in  filibustering,  prayers,  roll- 
calls,  holidays,  eulogies  on  deceased  members,  or  other 
traditional  devices  for  avoiding  work,  this  would 
allow  three  hours  and  thirty-six  minutes  to  each  Rep- 
resentative and  Delegate  during  the  whole  of  his  Con- 
gressional career.  As  less  than  half  of  the  total 
working  time  here  assumed  is  really  available,  and 
as  some  of  the  older  members  occupy  days  instead 
of  hours,  the  amount  of  time  actually  allowed  to  the 
average  member  during  his  two  years'  term  would 
be  liberally  estimated  at  an  hour.  The  value  of 
this  allotment  is  almost  destroyed  by  the  fact  that 
when  a  member  who  has  not  acquired  a  reputation 
succeeds  in  getting  the  floor,  only  the  persons  in  his 
immediate  vicinity  can  hear  what  he  says. 

In  the  Fifty-second  Congress  10,623  bills  and  214 


136  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

joint  resolutions  were  introduced  in  the  House,  and 
3,895  bills  and  161  joint  resolutions  in  the  Senate. 
If  there  had  been  seventy-eight  thousand  working 
minutes  available,  which  was  far  from  being  the  case, 
the  House  would  have  had  seven  minutes  and  twelve 
seconds  for  the  consideration  of  each  of  its  own  proj- 
ects, taking  no  account  of  those  that  came  over  from 
the  Senate.  As  there  were  single  measures  whose 
consideration  took  over  a  week  apiece,  it  is  clear  that 
there  could  not  have  been  much  time  for  the  others. 
Of  course,  the  vast  majorit}"  of  the  bills  introduced 
were  never  considered  at  all,  and  were  never  meant 
to  be  considered.  They  were  printed,  sent  to  inter- 
ested constituents  as  proof  that  their  Representatives 
were  working  for  the  good  of  their  districts,  and  were 
safely  put  to  sleep  in  committees.  They  represented 
part  of  the  enormous  glut  of  business  caused  by 
sending  to  Washington  a  mob  of  small  men  with  no 
other  means  of  securing  home  popularity  than  that 
of  acquiring  reputations  for  industry  in  the  promo- 
tion of  local  interests.  Much  of  this  glut  would  be 
relieved  by  reducing  the  number  and  raising  the 
standard  of  the  Representatives,  and  the  rest  would 
be  disposed  of  by  proper  provisions  against  special 
legislation. 

In  a  House  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  members, 
working  eleven  months  in  each  year,  or  twenty-two 
in  the  course  of  a  two  years'  term,  there  would  be  an 
average  of  nineteen  hours  available  for  each  mem- 
ber, which  would  be  ample  for  the  expression  of  all 
the  thoughts  that  would  occur  to  the  ordinary  legis- 
lator in  the  course  of  his  term.    Every  speaker  could 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  137 

be  distinctly  heard,  and  it  would  not  -be  necessary 
for  opponents  in  debate  to  catch  the  points  to  which 
they  were  replying  from  next  morning's  Record. 
In  the  Fifty-second  Congress  the  number  of  bills 
and  joint  resolutions  introduced  in  the  House  aver- 
aged thirty  to  each  Representative  and  Delegate. 
There  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  this  proportion 
would  be  materially  increased  if  the  membership 
were  reduced,  especially,  if  the  members  were  elected 
by  proportional  representation.  At  this  rate  a  House 
of  one  hundred  and  fifty  members  would  have  four 
thousand  five  hundred  measures  for  consideration 
instead  of  ten  thousand  eight  hundred  and  thirty- 
seven,  and  with  two  thousand  eight  hundred  and 
fifty  working  hours  available  there  would  be  thirty- 
eight  minutes  for  each  measure  instead  of  seven, 
and  this  time  would  be  divided  among  one  hundred 
and  fifty  members  instead  of  among  three  hundred 
and  sixty.  Moreover,  each  roll-call,  even  if  con- 
ducted according  to  the  present  wasteful  method, 
would  occupy  only  twelve  minutes  instead  of  half 
an  hour. 

But  the  present  method  of  voting  is  an  anach- 
ronism, and  should  be  abolished,  even  if  not  another 
change  were  made  in  the  habits  of  Congress.  It  is 
more  wasteful  of  time  than  any  other  single  thing, 
and  this  wastefulness  is  deliberately  perpetuated  in 
the  interests  of  obstruction.  The  House  first  votes 
on  a  proposition  viva  voce.  This  is  a  process  of 
extreme  celerity.  When  there  is  dissatisfaction 
with  the  announced  result  or  a  desire  to  delay  pro- 
ceedings, a  division  is  demanded.     Each  side  is  sue- 


138  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

cessively  asked  to  stand  up,  and  the  vSpeaker,  rap- 
idly running"  his  eye  over  the  members  voting, 
counts  them,  with  the  assistance  of  the  handle  of 
his  gavel.  This  also  is  a  reasonably  expeditious 
method,  and  does  not  usually  occupy  over  two  min- 
utes. The  next  step  is  a  call  for  tellers.  When 
this  demand  is  supported  by  one-fifth  of  a  quorum, 
the  Speaker  appoints  two  members  who  take  their 
stand  in  front  of  the  clerk's  desk,  and  all  the  rest 
file  between  them  to  be  counted.  At  its  best  this  is 
a  rather  long  process,  and  at  its  worst  it  is  very 
long.  The  members  sometimes  make  their  appear- 
ance so  slowly  that  a  good  part  of  an  afternoon  is 
consumed  in  securing  enough  votes  to  make  a 
quorum.  After  all  this  there  remains  the  resource 
of  the  yeas  and  nays.  On  demand  of  one-fifth  of 
those  present  the  clerk  is  required  to  call  the  roll, 
when  each  member  who  desires  to  vote  answers  to 
his  name.  The  roll  is  then  called  a  second  time, 
for  the  benefit  of  those  who  failed  to  hear  their 
names  on  the  first  call.  This  process  takes  half  an 
hour,  and  it  is  sometimes  repeated  a  dozen  times  in 
one  day.  On  such  days,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to 
remark,  no  other  business  is  transacted.  In  the 
Fifty-second  Congress  the  yeas  and  nays  were  taken 
in  the  House  two  hundred  and  eighty-four  times, 
representing  a  loss  of  one  hundred  and  forty-two 
working  hours,  or  twenty-eight  working  days.  As 
every  day  of  the  existence  of  that  House,  including 
Sundays  and  holidays,  cost  the  people  of  the 
United  States  about  $6,285,  the  expense  of 
maintaining  this  primitive  way  of  voting  footed  up 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  139 

not  less  than  $175,980.  This  loss -was  at  least 
doubled  by  the  waste  of  time  in  voting  by  other 
methods.  In  other  words,  over  one-fifth  of  the 
entire  working  time  of  the  House  was  thrown  away, 
at  a  cost  of  upward  of  three  hundred  and  fifty  thou- 
sand dollars,  in  the  mere  mechanical  process  of  ascer- 
taining the  opinions  of  the  members.  And,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  time  lost  in  the  act  of  voting,  there  were 
fifty-two  calls  of  the  House,  representing  an  addi- 
tional waste  of  about  five  days  and  $31,425.  All  of 
this  lost  time  and  money  could  be  saved  by  a  sim- 
ple electrical  device  by  which  each  member  could 
touch  a  button,  and  have  his  vote  registered  and 
tabulated  at  the  clerk's  desk  simultaneously  with 
those  of  all  the  rest.  Such  devices  have  not  met 
with  favor  because  they  would  prevent  filibuster- 
ing, and  that  is  a  privilege  which  the  members  do 
not  like  to  abandon.  But  filibustering  is  not  a 
thing  which  it  is  desirable  to  encourage.  It  has 
sometimes  obstructed  bad  measures,  but  it  has  more 
often  defeated  good  one.  It  is  a  species  of  legis- 
lative anarchy  which  is  totally  incompatible  with 
orderly  democratic  government,  under  which  dis- 
putes should  be  settled  by  votes  and  not  by  contests 
of  physical  endurance.  A  further  advantage  of  an 
automatic  registering  apparatus  would  be  the  possi- 
bility of  recording  every  vote  on  ever}'  question. 
At  present  in  all  cases  in  committee  of  the  whole, 
and  in  the  majority  of  cases  in  the  House,  questions 
are  decided  without  calling  the  roll,  and  constitu- 
ents have  no  means  of  knowing  how  their  repre- 
sentatives have  voted.     When  acting  in  this  irre- 


140  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

sponsible  way  members  often  cast  votes  which  they 
would  never  dare  to  cast  if  their  names  were  to  go 
on  record. 

Closely  connected  with  the  waste  of  time  by 
roll-calls  is  the  wearisome  quorum  question,  which 
kcejDS  Congress  in  a  turmoil  through  a  large  part  of 
every  session.  The  art  of  law-making  often  resolves 
itself  into  the  art  of  keeping  a  quorum.  This  end 
has  been  reached  by  the  clumsy  and  dangerous 
method  of  counting  members  present  and  not 
voting,  but  that  plan  is  manifestly  imperfect,  since 
a  member  who  does  not  wish  to  be  counted  can 
always  evade  the  necessity  by  the  simple  expedient 
of  staying  away.  The  whole  trouble  about  quorums 
is  an  illustration  of  the  remark  heretofore  sug- 
gested—  that  Congress  does  not  take  its  duties 
seriously.  There  is  no  such  difficulty  in  a  State 
legislature,  working  under  the  regulations  laid 
down  by  the  newer  constitutions.  No  measure  can 
pass  either  house  of  such  a  legislature  without  the 
recorded  affirmative  votes  of  a  majority  of  all  the 
members  elected.  This  disposes  of  all  necessity  for 
counting  a  quorum,  since  the  votes  of  a  quorum 
must  be  actually  recorded  in  the  affirmative  before 
the  measure  can  pass.  The  members  are  obliged 
to  vote  ;  they  are  subject  to  severe  discipline  if  they 
refuse,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  they  do  not  refuse. 
It  would  be  easy  to  require  every  member  of  Con- 
gress to  be  present  and  vote  unless  excused,  under 
penalty  of  suspension  for  the  first  refusal,  and 
expulsion  for  the  second,  and  that  would  instantly 
settle  the  quorum  problem. 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  141 

The  adoption  of  a  system  of  instantaneous  and 
compulsory  voting,  together  with  the  practice  of 
remaining  at  work  throughout  an  entire  congres- 
sional term,  instead  of  through  less  than  half  of  it, 
would  effectually  put  an  end  to  filibustering  without 
the  need  of  suppressing  the  minority  by  oppressive 
rules.  A  still  more  certain  extinguisher  of  obstruc- 
tion would  be  the  referendum.  A  minority  would 
not  venture  to  fight  a  measure  by  blocking  public 
business  if  it  had  the  option  of  appealing  to  a 
popular  vote.  In  such  a  case  filibustering  would 
be  directed,  not  against  an  accidental  legislative 
majority,  but  against  the  people  themselves,  and 
such  a  campaign  would  be  neither  tolerated  nor 
attempted. 

The  Congressional  Record  has  been  subjected  to  a 
good  deal  of  unthinking  criticism,  but  it  is  really 
one  of  the  most  useful  time-saving  devices  employed 
by  Congress,  and  well  worth  its  cost.  The  fact  that 
the  Senate  does  not  make  as  free  use  of  it  as  the 
House,  as  an  outlet  for  superfluous  eloquence,  is  one 
of  the  chief  reasons  for  the  comparative  dilatoriness 
of  Senatorial  proceedings.  Speeches  of  Senators  are 
not  printed  in  the  Record  unless  actually  delivered, 
at  leavSt  in  part,  while  the  House  is  generally  glad  to 
escape  the  necessity  of  listening  to  its  garrulous 
members  by  granting  them  "leave  to  print."  The 
result  is  that  the  public  business  is  blocked  for  weeks 
in  the  Senate  to  allow  prosy  Senators  to  drone  out 
interminable  dissertations  to  empty  desks,  while  the 
House  consigns  its  unnecessary  speeches  to  the 
Record   without    delivery    and    proceeds    to  work. 


142  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

The  "leave-to-print"  device  costs  a  little  money 
for  composition  and  paper,  but  the  expense  is 
trivial  compared  to  the  saving. 

The  committee  system  is  another  feature  of  Con- 
gressional practice  that  has  suffered  much  unde- 
served condemnation.  While  Mr.  Gamaliel  Bradford, 
Mr.  Woodrow  Wilson,  and  others,  have  been  setting 
the  fashion  of  an  indiscriminate  admiration  of  Eng- 
lish methods,  such  English  observers  as  vSir  Henry 
Maine  have  been  impressed  with  the  advantages  of 
our  own.  The  habit  of  specializing  the  work  of  a 
deliberative  assembly,  by  assigning  the  preliminary 
examination  and  study  of  different  varieties  of  it  to 
different  committees,  is  in  strict  accordance  with 
American  traditions,  as  illustrated  in  every  sphere 
of  life  and  every  variety  of  organization,  from 
the  trustees  of  a  college  to  Congress.  It  can  not  be 
uprooted,  but  the  practice  under  it  can  be  improved. 
The  criticism  that  the  representation  of  both  parties 
on  the  committees  destroys  party  responsibility 
ignores  the  fact  that  the  great  bulk  of  legislation, 
even  in  the  times  of  the  most  intense  political 
excitement,  is  non-partisan  in  character  and  can 
not  be  made  partisan  without  destroying  half  its 
value.  The  Congressional  committee  system  is  sim- 
ply a  recognition  of  the  economic  principle  of  the 
division  of  labor. 

It  is  beyond  question,  however,  that  this  division 
has  been  carried  altogether  too  far.  There  is  no 
necessity  for  so  many  committees,  except  that  of  pro- 
viding their  chairmen  with  clerks  and  convenient 
private  rooms,  and  the  efficiency  of  work  which  is 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  143 

promoted  by  a  moderate  specialization, is  impaired 
by  an  excessive  subdivision.  There  is  no  necessity 
for  one  committee  on  banking  and  currency,  and 
another  on  coinage,  weights,  and  measures.  These 
two  committees,  which  deal  with  different  branches 
of  a  single  subject,  on  which  it  is  imperatively  neces- 
sary to  have  a  harmonious  policy,  are  often  antago- 
nistic, and  urge  the  passage  of  radically  inconsistent 
measures.  The  work  of  the  committees  on  military 
affairs  and  militia  ought  not  to  be  divided  ;  nor  that 
of  the  committees  on  interstate  and  foreign  com- 
merce, merchant  marine,  and  fisheries,  railways  and 
canals,  and  Pacific  railroads  ;  nor  that  of  the  commit- 
tees on  rivers,  and  harbors,  and  levees  and  improve- 
ment of  the  Mississippi  River;  nor  that  of  the 
committees  on  pensions  and  invalid  pensions ;  nor 
that  of  the  committees  on  claims,  war  claims,  and 
private  land  claims  ;  nor  that  of  the  committees  on 
judiciary,  and  revision  of  the  laws.  But  the  most 
mischievous  instance  of  excessive  subdivision  of 
work  is  found  in  the  management  of  the  revenues 
and  expenditures  of  the  Government.  Here,  where, 
if  anywhere,  there  ought  to  be  unity,  there  are  nine 
committees  of  the  house,  one  with  jurisdiction  to 
decide  how  the  revenues  shall  be  raised  and  how 
much  shall  be  levied,  and  eight  to  tell  how  the 
money  shall  be  spent ;  and  there  are  three  similar 
committees  in  the  Senate.  In  addition  to  this,  most 
of  the  other  committees  have  the  right  to  report 
legislation  materially  affecting  the  expenditure  of 
the  Government.  For  instance,  the  Committee  on 
Invalid  Pensions  may  report  a  pension  bill  whose 


144  SUGGESTIONS   ON    GOVERNMENT. 

operations  will  drive  the  Treasury  into  actual  bank- 
ruptcy, and  the  committees  which  are  supposed  to 
have  charge  of  financial  matters  have  no  right  to 
interfere.  Substantially  this  very  thing  has  actually 
been  done.  The  Committee  on  Public  Buildings  and 
Grounds  may  report  bills  authorizing  the  construc- 
tion of  twenty  million  dollars  worth  of  new  post 
offices,  and,  if  they  pass,  the  Committee  on  Appropri- 
ations has  nothing  to  do  but  to  find  the  money  to 
settle  the  accounts  when  they  come  due. 

Of  the  committees  which  are  given  regular  juris- 
diction over  the  appropriations  only  one,  as  a  rule, 
pays  any  attention  to  the  question  of  keeping  the 
Government's  total  expenses  within  its  income. 
The  Committee  on  Appropriations,  which  controls 
six  of  the  general  appropriation  bills,  covering 
somewhat  less  than  half  of  the  aggregate  expenses 
of  the  Government,  considers  itself  charged,  in  some 
degree,  with  the  duty  of  keeping  an  eye  on  the 
national  balance-sheet.  The  other  committees  con- 
fine their  attention  to  the  particular  little  reserva- 
tions in  their  exclusive  charge.  If  the  army  or 
navy  appropriation  bill  compare  favorably  with  that 
of  the  preceding  year,  the  committee  on  military 
or  naval  affairs  thinks  it  has  made  a  creditable 
record,  regardless  of  the  general  condition  of  the 
Treasury.  When,  to  this  disjointed  control  of 
expenditures,  we  add  the  fact  that  none  of  the  com- 
mittees that  deal  with  appropriations  have  anything 
to  do  with  revenues,  and  the  further  fact  that  the 
taxes  are  not  adjusted  to  the  needs  of  the  Govern- 
ment, but  are  fixed  for  indefinite  periods,  and  regu- 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  145 

lated  by  consideratiorivS  in  which  fiscal  requirements 
play  only  a  secondary  part,  the  confusion  and  mis- 
management of  American  finances  will  need  no 
further  explanation. 

The  way  to  import  order  and  judicious  economy 
into  the  financial  operations  of  the  Government  is 
to  put  all  matters  relating  to  revenue  and  supply 
under  a  single  control.  There  should  be  one  budget 
committee  in  the  House,  of  which  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  should  be  a  consulting  member,  and 
this  committee  should  have  exclusive  jurisdiction 
over  the  national  income  and  expenditure.  Instead 
of  reporting  thirteen  separate  appropriation  bills, 
unconnected  with  each  other  or  with  the  revenue 
laws,  it  should  present  a  complete  budget,  in  which 
the  total  revenue  and  the  total  expenditure  would 
be  balanced  ;  any  deficit  under  existing  laws  being 
made  good  by  increased  taxes,  and  any  immoderate 
surplus  being  prevented  by  the  remission  of  imposts. 
In  England  the  passage  of  the  appropriations  accord- 
ing to  the  government  estimates  is  made  a  question 
of  confidence,  and  their  alteration  by  Parliament 
involves  the  resignation  of  the  ministry,  but  no  such 
sacredness  need  attach  to  the  work  of  the  budget 
committee  here.  It  would  be  sufficient  to  have  the 
entire  financial  operations  of  the  Government  for 
the  year  provided  for  in  one  well-considered  bill. 
If  that  were  done  Congress  would  not  amend  the 
measure  without  good  cause,  for  every  important 
amendment  would  visibly  disarrange  the  whole 
fiscal  programme,  and  would  necessitate  recasting 
the  entire  project  to  restore  the  balance.     No  such 

10 


146  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

responsibility  is  felt  now.  When  the  work  of  one 
committee  is  upset  it  is  not  felt  that  the  work  of 
other  committees  is  at  all  affected,  or  that  the  opera- 
tions of  the  Treasury  are  embarrassed.  When  the 
year's  balance-sheet  exhibits  results  ranging  all  the 
way  from  a  deficit  of  seventy  million  dollars  to  a 
surplus  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  million  dollars,  a 
discrepancy  of  a  few  millions  more  or  less  in  one  of 
thirteen  disconnected  appropriations  can  not  be 
expected  to  make  a  very  deep  impression  on  the 
Congressional  mind. 

Mill's  idea  of  a  legislative  commission  to  prepare 
all  bills,  leaving  the  parliamentary  body  nothing  to 
do  but  to  accept  or  reject  the  measures  formulated 
by  it,  or  send  them  back  for  amendment,  may  not  be 
practicable  in  this  country,  although  such  a  commis- 
sion could  doubtless  be  made  useful  in  Congress 
merely  as  an  agency  for  putting  the  crude  notions 
of  unpracticed  members  into  proper  shape,  leav- 
ing the  assembled  legislators  all  their  accustomed 
powers  of  amendment.  But  each  House  should 
certainly  have  a  committee  on  the  harmony  of  legis- 
lation, whose  duty  it  should  be  to  examine  and 
report  upon  every  measure  submitted  to  it,  not  with 
regard  to  its  merits,  but  with  respect  to  its  relations 
with  existing  laws.  Every  bill  placed  on  the  cal- 
endar, with  a  favorable  report  from  any  other  com- 
mittee, should  be  referred  to  this  committee  before 
action,  in  order  to  discover  whether  it  conflicted 
with  any  previous  law,  and  if  so,  whether  the  repeal 
of  that  law,  or  of  a  part  of  it,  would  be  desirable  or 
the  reverse.     Of  course  such  a  committee  should  be 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  147 

composed  of  expert  jurists,  thorouglily  familiar, 
not  only  with  federal  legislation  in  all  its  branches, 
but  with  the  laws  of  all  the  States,  since  it  often 
happens  that  a  new  national  statute  produces  serious 
local  results  by  its  inconsistency  with  State  enact- 
ments or  legal  customs.  A  careful  examination  of 
new  bills  by  a  committee  of  this  nature  would  greatly 
reduce  the  work  of  Congress,  since  it  would  show  a 
large  proportion  of  them  to  be  superfluous,  as  sub- 
stantially duplicating  existing  laws,  and  another 
large  proportion  to  be  harmful,  as  inharmonious 
elements  in  the  legal  fabric. 

Those  critics  to  whom  the  one  thing  needful  for 
the  reform  of  American  Congressional  practice  is 
the  creation  of  a  directing  and  co-ordinating  agency, 
like  the  English  Cabinet,  may  take  comfort  in  the 
reflection  that  something  which  bids  fair  ultimately 
to  answer  nearly  the  same  purpose  is  being  grad- 
ually developed  out  of  existing  materials  in  a 
natural  and  purely  American  way.  The  House 
Committee  on  Rules,  after  forty  years  of  modest 
growth  in  power,  rapidly  rose  in  importance  in  the 
epoch-making  Fifty-first  Congress,  and  still  further 
expanded  its  functions  in  the  Fifty-second  and  Fifty- 
third  Congresses  under  the  impulse  of  the  Demo- 
cratic desire  to  find  some  means  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  business  without  palpably  imitating  what 
they  had  so  emphatically  condemned  under  the 
Reed  regime.  Substantially  all  the  important  busi- 
ness of  the  House,  aside  from  that  of  a  routine 
nature,  is  now  under  the  control  of  this  committee. 
A  bill  to  which  there  is  determined  opposition  can 


148  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

not  even  be  considered  without  the  consent  of  the 
Committee  on  Rules,  which  sets  apart  a  day  for  the 
consideration  of  one  measure,  refuses  to  fix  a  day 
for  the  consideration  of  another,  and  arranges  the 
order  in  which  measures  shall  be  taken  up  and  the 
hours  at  which  they  shall  be  finally  voted  upon, 
in  accordance  with  its  views  of  party  policy.  Of 
course  the  special  orders  reported  by  the  committee 
have  to  be  ratified  by  the  House,  but  this  ratification 
is  hardly  ever  refused.  In  doubtful  cases  the  com- 
mittee is  now  accustomed  to  act  in  accordance  with 
petitions  signed  by  a  majority  of  the  members  of 
the  dominant  party,  so  that  the  Committee  on  Rules 
may  be  considered  the  organ  through  which  the 
majority  acts.  It  is  rapidly  assuming  the  functions 
of  the  British  Cabinet  in  laying  out  a  programme  of 
legislation,  and  it  may  very  readily  become  in  the 
course  of  a  few  years  what  the  British  Cabinet  would 
be  if  its  members  had  no  executive  duties  and  were 
under  no  obligation  to  resign  on  the  defeat  of  their 
measures. 

A  serious  interference  with  the  transaction  of 
business  in  Congress  is  caused  by  the  traditional 
methods  of  shoAving  respect  to  the  memory  of 
deceased  members.  The  death  of  a  Senator  or 
Representative  always  causes  more  or  less  loss  of 
time,  and  sometimes  absorbs  two  full  working  days 
—  one  when  the  event  is  announced,  and  the  other 
when  eulogies  are  delivered.  When  there  is  a 
funeral  service  in  the  Capitol,  the  time  lost  may  even 
reach  three  days.  This  would  be  excusable  in  a 
debating  society,  whose  business,  besides  being  of 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  149 

small  importance,  is  its  own  affair,  but  Congress, 
representing  the  entire  nation,  has  no  more  right  to 
waste  the  people's  time  in  long-drawn  conventional 
grief  than  it  would  have  to  waste  their  money  in  the 
same  way  —  which,  by  the  way,  it  regularly  does.  It 
would  be  as  reasonable  for  the  whole  population 
of  the  country  to  stop  work  for  a  day  upon  the 
death  of  a  member  of  Congress,  as  for  the  body 
which  transacts  the  collective  business  of  that 
population  to  do  the  same  thing.  Appropriate  reso- 
lutions, brief  eulogies,  and  a  committee  to  attend 
the  funeral  would  be  ample  testimonials  of  respect 
without  defrauding  the  public  by  making  every 
death  the  occasion  of  a  holiday  —  a  holiday,  it  may 
be  mentioned,  which  the  average  member  does  not 
spend  in  the  trappings  of  woe. 

The  physical  conditions  under  which  Congress 
works  are  not  favorable  to  intelligent  debate.  The 
spaces  are  too  vast,  especially  in  the  hall  of  the 
House,  and  the  members  are  too  widely  separated. 
The  English  plan  of  having  benches  with  seats  for 
only  half  the  members  would  not  work  in  Washing- 
ton, where  the  attendance  is  so  much  fuller,  and  the 
total  abolition  of  desks  would  be  a  little  too  severe  a 
privation.  But  the  desks  might  well  be  reduced  to 
half  their  present  liberal  proportions,  with  a  view 
to  having  them  serve  merely  for  convenient  note- 
taking  in  discussions  instead  of  for  private  corre- 
spondence, and  compact  cushioned  benches  could 
take  the  place  of  expansive  revolving  chairs.  The 
accommodation  of  the  newspaper  correspondents  in 
the  press  galleries  may  illustrate  the  possibilities  in 


150  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

the  way  of  the  compression  of  the  unwieldy  legislative 
bodies  that  now  sprawl  disjointedly  over  their  huge 
halls.  If  this  compression  were  carried  to  a  sufficient 
extent  the  members  would  doubtless  acquire  the 
habit  of  doing  their  letter-writing  and  newspaper- 
reading  at  home,  or  in  rooms  which  could  be  pro- 
vided for  the  purpose. 

One  of  the  most  wasteful  leaks  of  time  in  Con- 
gress is  the  habit  of  making  speeches  on  all  con- 
ceivable topics  in  total  disregard  of  the  pending 
question.  This  not  only  dissipates  time,  but  often 
entirely  prevents  the  enlightenment  that  ought  to 
come  from  a  debate.  When  a  certain  hour  has 
been  set  for  the  final  vote  on  the  question  of 
abolishing  the  Geological  Survey,  and  a  dozen 
members  absorb  all  the  intervening  time  with  a 
controversy  concerning  the  effect  of  the  tariff  on 
the  production  of  tin  plates,  the  vote  has  to  be 
taken  in  ignorance  of  the  probable  nature  of  its 
far-reaching  results.  This  abuse  could  be  easily 
checked  if  custom  justified  presiding  officers  in 
calling  members  to  order  as  soon  as  they  began  to 
wander  from  the  question.  The  rules  of  the  House 
require  debaters  to  confine  themselves  to  the  ques- 
tions under  discussion,  and  violations  of  the  rules 
in  this  respect  ought  to  be  checked  as  promptly  as 
in  any  other. 

It  may  contribute  to  a  better  understanding  of 
the  question  of  time-saving  in  Congress  if  we  con- 
template some  of  the  principal  items  of  loss  in 
tabular  form.  To  maintain  the  House  in  the  Fifty- 
second  Congress  cost  $4,593,922.60.     As  there  were 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE. 


161 


seven  hundred  and  thirty-one  days,  including  Sun- 
days, in  the  entire  term,  the  average  running 
expense  was  about  $6,285  a  day.  Dividing  the 
time  as  nearly  as  practicable  according  to  the 
way  in  which  it  was  spent,  and  apportioning  the 
cost  on  this  basis,  we  have  : 


CREDIT. 

Days  in  term,  including  Sundays 


731 


DAYS. 

COST. 

Time  lost  before  organization 

278 

147 
42 

23 
14 

28 
*3o 

$1,747,230 

Vacations 

923,895 

Sundaj^s  during  sessions. 

263,970 

Other  holidays 

Honors  to  deceased  members  . 

144.555 
87,990 

Yeas  and  nays 

175,980 

Other  voting  and  quorum-hunting 

*i88,55o 

Total  conspicuous  losses 

562 

$3,532,170 

Business  (outside  limit) 

169 

$1,062,165 

Average  cost  of  each  working  day 

$      27,183 

*  Approximate,  but  underestimated. 

The  average  cost  of  each  working  day,  of  course, 
represents  the  total  expense  of  maintaining  the 
House  through  the  entire  term,  divided  by  the  num- 
ber of  working  days. 

If  all  practicable  time-saving  devices  were  adopted 
it  would  be  possible  to  pay  some  regard  to  the 
calendars.      At    present   the    Congressional    calen- 


152  SUGGESTIONS   ON    GOVERNMENT. 

dars,  except  the  private  calendar  of  the  House,  are 
legislative  fictions.  Measures  are  supposed  to  be 
taken  from  them  in  their  turn,  but  in  practice 
almost  every  public  bill  considered  is  taken  up 
under  a  special  order,  regardless  of  its  place  on  the 
nominal  programme.  If  the  calendars  could  be 
once  completely  cleared,  the  work  of  Congress 
would  be  lightened  for  a  generation  to  come,  for 
the  majority  of  the  bills  introduced  at  the  beginning 
of  every  term  are  veterans  that  have  been  vainly 
appealing  for  consideration  for  years  or  decades  in 
the  past. 

There  is  little  to  be  said  about  reforms  peculiarly 
needed  by  the  Senate.  The  best  reform  in  that 
quarter  would  be  total  abolition,  but  as  that  is 
impracticable  there  is  little  to  be  done,  in  addition 
to  the  improvements  suggested  for  the  House, 
except  to  make  such  alterations  in  the  rules  as 
would  enable  the  majority  to  transact  business,  to 
curtail  speech-making  on  the  floor  by  enlarging  the 
privilege  of  printing  in  the  Congressional  Record, 
and  to  change  the  method  of  electing  Senators. 
The  plan  of  election  by  State  legislatures,  which 
seemed  to  the  authors  of  the  Federalist  so  obvi- 
ously the  best  conceivable  as  hardly  to  need  de- 
fense, and  which  up  to  twenty  or  thirty  years  ago 
appeared  to  have  fully  vindicated  itself  in  practice, 
has  now  unmistakably  broken  down.  It  is  turning 
out  a  poorer  quality  of  Senators  year  by  year  ;  it  is 
destroying  the  Senatorial  sense  of  responsibility, 
and  it  is  steadil}'  degrading  the  legislatures.  When 
a  legislature  that  is  to  have  the  privilege  of  electing 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  153 

a  Senator  is  to  be  chosen,  all  considerations  of  State 
policy  are  submerged,  the  proper  work  of  the  body 
is  lost  sight  of,  and  its  members  are  chosen  solely 
with  a  view  to  their  action  on  the  absorbing  issue  of 
the  Senatorship.  Often  the  election  expenses  of  the 
majority  are  paid  by  one  of  the  Senatorial  candi- 
dates, and  when  members  take  office  sold  in  advance 
on  one  question  they  are  ready  to  be  bought  on  all 
others.  A  corrupt  Senatorial  campaign  means  a 
corrupt  legislative  session  for  all  matters  of  State 
policy.  As  long  as  we  are  saddled  with  the  Senate, 
the  only  way  of  mitigating  its  evils  is  to  have  its 
members  elected  by  the  people.  One  other  impor- 
tant reform  remains  to  be  mentioned.  As  long  as  we 
retain  the  present  organization  of  the  Government, 
the  terms  of  Senators,  Representatives,  and  Presi- 
dent should  be  equalized.  The  present  discrepan- 
cies were  intentionally  created  by  the  framers  of 
the  Constitution  in  the  belief  that  the  greatest  need 
of  the  new  government  was  a  system  of  checks 
adequate  to  prevent  rash  action  on  the  part  of  the 
people.  Their  various  devices  for  attaining  this 
object  have  been  altogether  too  successful.  It  may 
be  desirable  to  restrain  the  people  from  too  hasty 
action,  but  it  is  certainly  not  desirable  so  to  tie  their 
hands  as  to  prevent  any  action  at  all.  The  disloca- 
tion of  power  in  this  country  makes  it  almost 
impossible  to  initiate  and  carry  out  a  consistent 
national  policy.  Of  the  last  ten  Congresses  only 
three  have  had  even  nominal  political  harmony 
between  their  branches  and  with  the  executive,  and 
it  is  hardly  necessar}'-  to  say  that  the  harmony  exist- 


164  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

ing  at  present  is  not  more  than  nominal.  In  no 
case  has  the  formal  accord  among  the  Senate,  Hou.se, 
and  President  lasted  for  more  than  two  years,  nor 
in  all  that  time  has  a  party  in  full  possession  of  the 
Government  ever  developed  its  policy  in  Congress 
for  as  much  as  a  year  without  being  rebuked  and 
discouraged  at  the  State  elections.  If  Senators, 
Representatives,  and  President  were  all  elected  for 
four-year  terms,  beginning  and  ending  simul- 
taneously, the  people  would  have  more  than  three 
chances  in  ten  of  having  their  will  executed,  and 
Congress  would  have  time  to  carry  out  a  policy  and 
have  it  in  operation  long  enough  to  enable  it  to  be 
fairly  judged.  In  addition,  the  House  could  clear 
its  calendar,  instead  of  rolling  the  stone  of  business 
half-way  up  the  hill,  and  then  letting  it  roll  down 
again  for  its  successor  to  attempt  to  push  up  with 
the  same  results.  Chosen  under  such  conditions, 
the  branches  of  government  would  generally  be  in 
harmony.  As  for  checks,  the  all-sufficient  brake 
on  rash  action  could  be  found  in  the  referendum. 

So  much  for  Congress  as  it  is,  and  as  it  might  be 
made  without  seriously  altering  its  structure.  But 
beyond  make-shift  reforms  is  an  ultimate  ideal,  and 
that  ideal,  it  seems  to  me,  is  to  be  found  in  the  reorgan- 
ization of  the  national  legislature  on  the  principles 
already  developed  in  treating  of  State  and  local  legis- 
latures. We  need  stability,  wisdom,  and  experience 
in  Congress.  How  can  they  be  secured  better  than  by 
abolishing  the  term  system  and  substituting  a  ten- 
ure during  good  behavior  ?  We  need  responsibility 
to    the    people  —  not    an    intermittent,    periodical 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  165 

responsibility,  but  one  felt  in  full  vigor  every  hour. 
What  better  way  of  obtaining  it  can  be  imagined 
than  to  give  the  constituents  of  every  member  the 
right  to  recall  him  whenever  his  conduct  ceases 
to  meet  their  approval?  Through  a  Congress  so 
organized  every  abuse  in  the  Government  could  be 
brought  within  the  immediate  control  of  the  voters. 

Under  this  plan,  the  members  of  the  House  would 
be  elected  by  the  local  primary  assemblies,  precisely 
as  in  the  case  of  the  members  of  the  State  legislatures 
and  of  the  county  boards  of  supervisors.  The  only 
difference  would  be  that  a  greater  number  of  assem- 
blies would  have  to  unite  in  each  election.  For  a 
House  of  three  hundred  members,  about  a  hundred 
assemblies  of  average  size  would  elect  a  Representa- 
tive. For  one  of  five  hundred  members,  about  sixty 
assemblies  would  form  a  constituency.  Once  elected, 
a  member  would  hold  his  place  until  recalled.  A 
movement  for  the  recall  of  any  member  could  be 
initiated  by  the  formal  vote  of  any  assembly  in  his 
district,  on  motion  of  any  qualified  voter.  The 
proposition  having  been  advanced  by  one  assembly, 
all  the  others  in  the  district  would  have  to  take 
action  upon  it  on  a  specified  date,  allowing  time  for 
the  Representative  to  offer  his  defense.  If  the 
recall  were  carried,  the  assemblies  would  immedi- 
ately proceed  to  a  new  election  by  the  preferential 
method,  elsewhere  explained. 

The  House  thus  constituted  would  remain  in  ses- 
sion all  the  year,  except  during  short  vacations. 
It  would  waste  no  time  in  periodical  reorganiza- 
tions.    Its  Speaker  would  remain  in  office  as  long 


156  SUGGESTIONS  ON  GOVERNMENT. 

as  lie  retained  the  eonfidence  of  his  constituents 
and  of  the  members  of  the  House.  Its  attaches 
would  constitute  a  permanent  staff.  The  House  it.self 
would  be  at  once  more  stable  and  more  responsive 
to  public  opinion  than  any  legislative  body  now  in 
existence.  Its  membership  would  be  subject  to  no 
sweeping  revolutions,  but  would  be  gradually  and 
imperceptibly  renewed.  At  all  times  the  great 
body  of  the  members  would  be  experienced  and 
competent  legislators,  and  the  apprentices  would  not 
have  to  learn  their  business  at  the  expense  of  the 
public.  The  continuous  existence  of  the  assembly 
would  never  be  interrupted ;  bills  would  hold  their 
place  on  the  calendar  until  definitely  passed  or 
rejected,  and  work  once  done  in  connection  with  any 
measure  would  never  have  to  be  repeated. 

The  initiative  and  referendum  would  add  to  the 
security  of  tenure.  Under  present  conditions,  while 
the  people  of  any  district  would  be  proud  of  the  dis- 
tinction and  influence  conferred  upon  them  by  the 
possession  of  such  a  representative  as  William  L. 
Wilson,  most  protectionist  voters  would  sacrifice 
those  advantages  and  try  to  replace  'Mr.  Wilson  with 
an  inferior  man  for  the  sake  of  carrying  out  their 
own  views  upon  the  tariff.  If  it  were  possible  to 
take  the  final  settlement  of  the  tariff  and  all  related 
questions  out  of  the  hands  of  Congress,  they  would 
gladly  vote  for  the  retention  of  the  representative 
whose  character  and  ability  were  worth  so  much  to 
the  district. 

Intellig-ent  leQ-islation  would  be  secured,  and  Con- 
gress  would  be  kept  properly  in  touch  with  the  exec- 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  167 

utive,  by  the  presence  of  the  members  of  the  Cabinet 
in  the  House,  without  votes,  but  with  an  unlimited 
right  of  discussion,  and  subject  to  the  obligation  of 
answering  any  questions  asked  concerning  the  oper- 
ations of  their  departments.  The  head  of  each 
department  would  be  a  consulting  member  of  the 
committee  or  committees  dealing  with  his  special 
line  of  work.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  would 
belong  to  the  Finance  Committee,  which  would  have 
exclusive  jurisdiction  over  all  questions  of  revenue 
and  expenditure.  The  Secretary  of  War  would  be 
attached  to  the  Military  Committee ;  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy  to  the  Naval  Committee ;  the  Secretary  of 
State  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  and  so  on. 
As  these  officials  would  hold  office  by  a  much  less 
precarious  tenure  than  at  present,  they  would  be 
much  better  acquainted  than  now  with  the  affairs 
of  their  respective  departments,  and  there  would 
therefore  be  an  assurance  that  all  proposed  leg- 
islation would  be  subjected  to  expert  scrutiny 
before  obtaining  a  favorable  report  from  a  com- 
mittee. If,  in  spite  of  all  the  opportunities  for 
enlightenment,  both  in  committee  and  on  the  floor, 
laws  which  the  executive  authorities  thought  unwise 
were  still  passed,  the  President  would  have  no  power 
of  veto,  but  he  would  have  the  right  to  demand  the 
submission  of  the  measure  to  the  referendum.  The 
same  test  would  have  to  be  accorded  on  demand  of 
one-fifth  of  the  members  of  the  House,  or  of  a  thou- 
sand primary  assemblies,  distributed  among  ten 
States.  An  appeal  could  be  taken  from  Congress  to 
the  people  in  the  case  of  measures  defeated,  as  well 


168  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

as  of  those  passed,  and  on  the  same  terms.  This 
would  be  a  form  of  the  initiative  which  would 
answer  all  practical  purposes  and  would  avoid  some 
of  the  disadvantages  of  the  inception  of  legislation 
by  volunteer  effort. 

With  regard  to  the  Senate,  as  previously  remarked, 
the  best  reform  would  be  total  abolition.  Pernicious 
even  now,  when  it  has  some  important  functions  to 
perform,  the  Senate  would  be  simply  a  useless 
excrescence  on  a  system  in  which  the  House  accu- 
rately mirrored  the  desires  of  the  people,  and  in 
which  the  power  of  ultimate  decision  in  disputed 
cases  rested  in  the  hands  of  the  entire  citizenship  of 
the  nation.  But  the  Constitution  has  tied  our  hands. 
By  guaranteeing  that  no  State  shall  be  deprived  of 
its  equal  representation  in  the  Senate  without  its 
own  consent,  it  has  made  the  superfluous  second 
chamber  an  indestructible  part  of  our  fabric  of  gov- 
ernment. But  if  we  must  have  a  Senate,  there  is  no 
reason  why  it  should  not  be  rendered  harmless.  If 
its  membership  were  reduced  to  one  Senator  from 
each  State,  the  equal  representation  of  the  States 
would  not  be  affected.  If  then,  it  were  provided 
that  in  case  of  disagreement  between  the  two 
branches  of  Congress,  they  should  meet  together 
and  settle  the  dispute  by  a  joint  vote,  the  diminished 
numbers  of  the  Senate  would  be  swamped  by  the 
votes  of  the  House.  There  are  too  many  instances, 
both  here  and  abroad,  of  meetings  between  the  two 
houses  of  legislative  bodies  in  joint  convention  for 
various  purposes,  to  permit  such  a  scheme  to  be  dis- 
missed as  an  unfair  evasion  of   the  constitutional 


THE   NATIONAL   LEGISLATURE.  159 

safeguards  of  the  Senate.  The  Senators  would  have 
no  right  to  complain,  for  they  are  elected  themselves 
in  precisely  that  way.  If,  in  addition  to  all  this,  the 
Senate  were  deprived  of  the  right  of  amending 
revenue  and  appropriation  bills,  we  might  consider 
that  its  teeth  had  been  drawn,  and,  perhaps  in  time, 
the  small  States  might  consent  to  the  abolition  of 
the  useless  incumbrance.  In  the  meantime,  of 
course,  the  Senators,  like  Representatives,  would  be 
elected  by  the  people  in  their  primary  assemblies. 


CHAPTER  XIL 

THE   NATIONAL   EXECUTIVE. 

The  executive  administration  of  the  United  States 
Government  is  carried  on  by  a  force  of  about  two 
hundred  tliousand  office-holders.  Tliis  enormous 
machine  is  regulated,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  the 
President.  He  personally  appoints  the  more  impor- 
tant officials,  subject  to  confirmation  by  the  vSenate  ; 
and  the  minor  ones  are  chosen  by  his  subordinates, 
the  heads  of  departments.  There  are  the  possibili- 
ties of  efficient  service  here,  but  they  are  neutral- 
ized by  the  customs  under  which  the  system  is 
worked.  It  is  impossible  for  any  man  or  group  of 
men  at  the  head  of  a  government  to  be  personally 
acquainted  with  the  qualifications  of  two  hundred 
thousand  minor  officials  —  still  less  with  those  of 
the  multitudinous  applicants  for  their  places.  In 
the  vast  majority  of  cases  the  men  who  hold  the 
appointing  power  must  select  their  subordinates  and 
judge  of  their  conduct  on  the  testimony  of  others. 
That  is  what  the  President  and  the  heads  of  depart- 
ments do.  They  take  advice  in  the  matter  of 
appointments,  but  unfortunately  they  take  it  from 
the  wrong  sources.  Instead  of  relying  upon  the 
recommendations  of  the  men  who  have  to  superin- 
tend the  work  of  the  persons  appointed,  and  who 
are  better  acquainted  than  anybody  else  can  be  with 

(160) 


THE  NATIONAL  EXECUTIVE.  161 

the  needs  of  their  divisions  and  the -efficiency  of 
their  subordinates,  they  depend  upon  the  sugges- 
tions of  Senators,  Representatives,  and  local  politi- 
cians. These  advisers  are  not  particularly  inter- 
ested in  the  efficient  administration  of  the  govern- 
ment, but  they  are  decidedly  interested  in  the 
advancement  of  their  own  political  fortunes.  Con- 
sequently, when  a  member  of  Congress  "  distributes 
the  patronage  "  of  his  district,  he  gives  the  places, 
not  to  the  men  who  will  do  the  best  work  for  the 
public,  but  to  those  who  can  do  the  best  work  for 
himself. 

It  is  unsafe  in  the  management  of  large  affairs  to 
depend  on  advice  from  irresponsible  sources,  espe- 
cially when  there  is  a  selfish  interest  in  giving 
unsound  recommendations.  When  a  Senator  or 
Representative  suggests  an  unfit  appointment,  he 
incurs  no  risk.  He  does  not  bear  the  blame  for 
poor  work  in  the  department  upon  which  his  man 
is  forced,  nor  can  the  President  visit  any  punish- 
ment upon  him  for  his  bad  advice.  An  administra- 
tive official  guilty  of  a  similar  betrayal  of  confidence 
could  be  degraded  or  removed. 

From  many  custom-houses,  post-offices,  and  navy- 
yards  we  hear  accounts  of  gallant,  but  unsuccessful, 
fights  on  the  part  of  the  men  in  charge,  against  the 
local  politicians  who  desire  to  debauch  the  service 
for  the  profit  of  their  retainers.  These  fights  are 
unsuccessful  because  the  superiors  of  the  men  who 
make  them  find  it  more  to  their  advantage  to  have 
the  support  of  the  local  politicians  than  to  have  a 

record  of  administrative  efficiency  in  a  particular 
11 


102  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

quarter.  Displeased  politicians  make  their  displeas- 
ure felt,  and  there  is  no  certain  retribution  for  bad 
administration.  Thus  we  have  a  grotesquely  per- 
verted form  of  responsible  government  —  respon- 
sible to  the  politicians,  but  not  to  the  people. 

A  good  collector  could  give  a  good  management 
of  any  custom-house  in  the  country  if  he  were 
allowed  a  free  hand  in  dealing  with  his  subor- 
dinates. Under  the  present  system  we  do  not 
usually  get  the  good  collector  in  the  first  place, 
because  it  is  not  to  the  interest  of  the  President's 
local  advisers  to  recommend  such  a  man,  and  he 
would  not  be  allowed  a  free  hand  if  we  had  him,  for 
similar  reasons.  Before  there  can  be  a  general 
reform  the  motives  for  the  appointment  of  the  best 
men  to  all  administrative  positions  and  their  sup- 
port in  doing  their  work  in  the  best  way,  regardless 
of  politics,  must  be  made  as  strong  as  those  that 
now  dictate  submission  to  the  demands  of  politi- 
cians. The  power  to  make  this  change  through  all 
the  grades  of  the  services  below  himself  now  rests 
with  the  President.  The  President  alone,  if  thor- 
oughly bent  upon  this  object,  could  change  the 
whole  spirit  of  the  executive  administration,  to  its 
remotest  ramifications,  although  he  would  be  con- 
siderably annoyed  during  the  process  by  the 
obstructive  exercise  of  the  confirming  power  of  the 
always  pernicious  Senate.  Even  under  our  present 
system  the  President  could  make  all  executive  offi- 
cials below  himself  look  to  the  faithful  performance 
of  their  duty,  instead  of  politics,  as  the  condition  of 
their   retention   and   promotion.     The   question   is 


THE   NATIONAL   EXECUTIVE.  163 

how  to  secure  this  determination  on  th&  part  of  the 
President.  The  subordinate  officials  would  be  held 
to  their  duty  by  the  supervision  of  their  superiors, 
upon  whom  their  retention  in  office,  promotion,  or 
removal  would  depend.  All  that  would  be  neces- 
sary to  complete  the  chain  would  be  to  subject  the 
President  to  a  similar  supervision. 

The  only  power  that  could  exercise  this  control 
over  the  chief  magistrate  would  be  Congress.  But 
Congress,  as  at  present  constituted,  would  be  mani- 
festly unfit  to  exercise  such  a  function.  Its  mem- 
bers are  the  chief  breeders  of  demoralization  in  the 
public  service.  To  make  it  worthy  to  be  trusted  with 
the  appointment  and  removal  of  the  President,  it 
must  be  made  responsible  itself  by  being  brought 
within  the  immediate  control  of  its  constituents. 
When  that  is  done  a  few  trifling  changes  will  be  all 
that  is  needed  to  give  us  a  thoroughly  capable  and 
honest  executive  administration.  All  w^e  shall  need 
will  be  the  abolition  of  the  Senatorial  power  of  med- 
dling with  appointments,  and  the  establishment  of  a 
uniform  tenure  during  good  behavior. 

In  France,  the  President  is  elected  by  the  National 
Assembly,  but  as  he  serves  for  seven  years  he  is  sub- 
ject to  no  effective  responsibility.  This  is  a  matter 
of  less  moment,  since  the  real  government  of  the 
country  is  in  the  hands  of  the  ministers,  who  are 
dependent  for  their  official  existence  on  the  majority 
of  the  moment  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The 
French  system  is  too  rigid  as  regards  the  President, 
and  too  unstable  as  regards  the  Cabinet,  beside  which 
the  people  have   no  continuous  control   over  the 


164  SUGGESTIONS   ON   (.;()\  hKNMKNT. 

Chambers.  A  nearer  approach  to  a  true  responsible 
republican  government  is  found  in  vSwitzerland, 
where  the  executive  administration  is  in  the  hands 
of  a  council,  elected  by  the  Federal  Assembly  for 
three  years  ;  and  the  President  of  the  confederation, 
whose  special  powers  are  only  nominal,  is  elected 
annually  by  the  members  of  the  council  from  among 
its  own  members.  Owing  to  the  Swiss  custom  of 
indefinite  reflections  there  is  a  more  effective  respon- 
sibility here  than  appears  on  the  surface.  An  official 
elected  for  three  years,  and  expecting  to  retire  to 
private  life  at  the  end  of  that  time,  may  be  careless 
in  the  performance  of  his  duties  ;  but  one  who  occu- 
pies a  position  which  will  be  permanent  if  he  con- 
tinues to  deserve  it,  but  which  he  may  lose  at  the 
end  of  three  years  if  he  does  not,  is  likely  to  be  cir- 
cumspect in  his  conduct.  But  the  chief  guaranty  of 
good  government  in  Switzerland  is  the  referendum. 
The  people  there  are  not  obliged  to  tolerate  bad  or 
incompetent  men  for  the  sake  of  the  measures  they 
are  supposed  to  represent.  They  vote  for  their  men 
and  measures  separately.  If  the  election  of  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States  were  thrown  into  the 
House  of  Representatives  under  present  conditions, 
no  excellence  of  administration  would  give  a  Demo- 
cratic incumbent  any  Republican  votes.  The  reelec- 
tion of  a  member  of  the  Swiss  Federal  Council, 
regardless  of  politics,  is  a  matter  of  course.  The 
recognition  of  good  service  in  Switzerland  does  not 
involve  the  indorsement  of  an  obnoxious  policy. 

The  source,  although  not  the   cause,  of  all   the 
evils    in    American    politics    is    the    Presidential 


THE   NATIONAL  EXECUTIVE.  165 

election,  and  the  Presidential  election  is  dangerous 
because  of  the  peculiar  complication  of  interests 
involved  in  it.  It  determines  at  once  a  national 
policy  that  affects  the  interests  and  inflames  the 
passions  of  millions  of  voters,  and  a  wholesale  dis- 
tribution of  offices  involving  the  livelihood  of  hun- 
dreds of  thousands  more.  The  President,  by  his 
veto  power,  can  absolutely  tie  the  hands  of  Congress, 
and,  by  his  powder  of  appointment  and  removal,  can 
dispose  of  the  fortunes,  and  almost  of  the  lives,  of 
an  army  of  men.  By  our  peculiar  electoral  methods, 
the  choice  of  this  potentate  is  made  to  depend  upon 
the  action  of  a  few  voters  in  the  doubtful  States. 
One  vote  in  New  York  may  make  a  change  of 
seventy-two  in  the  relative  strength  of  candidates  in 
the  electoral  college,  and  thereby  may  elect  a  Presi- 
dent, alter  all  the  conditions  of  industry  in  the 
nation,  and  deprive  hundreds  of  thousands  of  fami- 
lies of  their  means  of  support.  One  vote  may  do  all 
this,  and  that  vote  may  be  had  for  two  dollars,  if  not 
for  a  glass  of  whisky.  When  such  tremendous 
results  depend  literally  on  the  tossing  of  a  coin,  a 
Presidential  election  instills  the  gambling  madness 
into  the  veins  of  the  whole  people.  Nothing  is  seen 
but  the  stakes,  and  everything  that  can  help  to  v\dn 
is  justified.  Governors  and  State  legislatures  are 
chosen,  not  for  their  fitness  for  the  work  of  making 
and  administering  the  laws  of  the  States,  but  to 
strengthen  the  party  for  the  next  Presidential  cam- 
paign. Every  attempt  to  throw  off  a  corrupt  local 
ring  is  checked  by  the  plea  that  this  is  not  the  time 
—  the  coming  national  campaign  is  too  important  to 


166  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

permit  the  harmony  of  the  organization  to  be  dis- 
turbed. Bo.sscs  are  allowed  free  loot  of  city  trea.s- 
uries  in  exchange  for  votes  for  Presidential  candi- 
dates. Unfit  aspirants  are  carried  into  Congress  on 
the  back  of  a  popular  national  ticket. 

If  the  President  were  deprived  of  the  veto  power, 
and  the  people  were  allowed  to  vote  directly  upon 
measures,  all  the  formidable  pressure  of  commercial 
and  industrial  interests  would  be  lifted  from  the 
elections.  If  all  officials  held  their  places  on  the 
tenure  of  good  behavior  there  would  be  no  desper- 
ate struggle  between  ins  and  outs.  If,  finally,  the 
President  himself,  instead  of  owing  his  office  to  a 
quadrennial  scramble  for  the  floating  voters  of  the 
doubtful  States,  were  elected  by  the  deliberate  act 
of  an  assembly  truly  representative  of  the  whole 
people,  and  held  his  place  until  the  people,  through 
a  two-thirds  vote  of  that  assembly,  saw  fit  to  remove 
him,  the  whole  demoralizing  system  of  national 
campaigns  would  be  cut  out  by  the  roots,  and  local 
officials  and  policies  would  have  some  chance  of 
being  judged  on  their  merits. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION. 

It  IS  impossible  to  combine  all  conceivable 
improvements  in  government  in  one  system. 
That  unfortunate  fact  impels  me  reluctantly  to 
omit  proportional  representation  of  the  completest 
type  from  an  ideal  scheme  of  reform,  although 
I  believe  it  will  have  a  useful  and  important  part 
to  play  in  the  transition  period.  The  proportional 
plan  of  electing  representatives  to  legislative  bodies 
is  so  incomparably  superior  to  all  existing  methods 
that  it  is  not  surprising  that  its  advocates  should 
regard  it  with  a  species  of  religious  enthusiasm. 
It  enables  every  important  shade  of  opinion  at  the 
time  of  election  to  be  accurately  reflected  ;  it  pro- 
motes the  choice  of  the  best  and  ablest  men,  as  the 
present  system  promotes  that  of  the  worst  and  most 
commonplace,  and  it  destroys  the  power  of  political 
machines.  The  best  form  is  that  proposed  by 
Thomas  Hare,  with  modifications  in  points  of  detail. 
Under  this  system  the  constituencies  are  grouped, 
several  legislators  being  elected  from  each  district. 
According  to  Hare's  original  scheme,  indeed,  there 
were  to  be  no  districts  at  all,  but  the  entire  legisla- 
tive body  was  to  be  elected  in  bulk.  This,  of 
course,  would  be  subject  to  insuperable  objections. 
In   each   district   the  total  vote  is  divided  by  the 

(167) 


168  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

number  of  members  to  be  elected,  and  the  quotient 
constitutes  the  "  quota "  necessary  for  a  choice. 
The  quota,  as  was  shown  by  Mr.  Droop,  is  more 
accurately  reached  by  dividing  the  vote  by  the 
number  of  members  plus  one,  and  adding  one  to 
the  quotient.  Each  elector  votes  for  as  many 
candidates  as  he  pleases,  designating  them  as  first 
choice,  second  choice,  and  so  on,  and  his  vote  is 
counted  only  for  that  one  in  the  order  of  preference 
who  first  needs  it.  If  the  quota  is  six  thousand, 
and  A  receives  eight  thousand  votes,  only  the 
necessary  six  thousand  are  counted  for  him,  and 
the  remaining  two  thousand  go  to  the  next  indi- 
cated candidates  on  the  ballots.  It  is  in  the 
transfer  of  these  surplus  votes  that  the  system  has 
its  weakest  point.  It  is  usually  proposed  to  leave 
the  selection  of  the  surplus  ballots  to  chance,  either 
by  lot,  or  by  numbering  the  ballots  as  they  come 
out  of  the  box  and  making  up  the  quota  of  those 
bearing  the  lowest  numbers.  Aside  from  the 
objection  to  allowing  chance  to  play  any  part  in 
government,  it  is  evident  that  such  methods  offer 
too  good  an  opportunity  for  sharp  practice.  Jklr. 
W.  H.  Gove  illustrates  the  danger  by  this  example: 
"  Suppose  one  hundred  votes  cast  showing  a  first 
choice  for  X,  fifty  of  whom  show  A  as  second  choice, 
and  fifty  show  B  as  second  choice,  and  that  fifty  of 
X's  votes  are  to  be  transferred  as  a  surplus.  Then, 
although  the  votes  to  be  transferred  are  selected  by 
lot,  as  the  system  intends,  and  although  any  one 
selection  by  lot  may  hardly  produce  a  materially 
different  result  from  any  other  selection  fairly  made 


PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION.  169 

in  the  same  way,  it  is  evident  that  unfair  enumera- 
tors might,  by  selecting  the  votes  to  be  transferred, 
turn  over  all  the  fifty  surplus  votes  either  to  A  or  B 
as  they  might  choose,  and  thus  the  result  might  be 
very  seriously  affected." 

To  avert  this  danger,  Mr.  Gove  proposes  to  alter 
the  whole  character  of  the  system  by  depriving  the 
voter  of  his  liberty  of  choice  and  permitting  the 
candidate  to  determine  in  advance  the  disposition 
to  be  made  of  his  surplus  votes.  This  would  destroy 
some  of  the  principal  merits  of  the  reform,  and 
would  leave  to  political  machines  a  large  share  of 
the  power  of  which  the  Hare  system  would  deprive 
them.  The  desired  end  can  be  attained  in  a  much 
simpler  way.  In  the  example  cited  by  Mr.  Gove, 
the  fair  way  of  distributing  X's  surplus  votes  would 
be  to  give  twenty-five  to  A  and  twenty-five  to  B. 
This  is  what  would  be  accomplished  by  lot,  if  it  fell 
out  in  exact  accordance  with  the  law  of  chances. 
Why  not  do  it  directly  ?  All  that  would  be  neces- 
sary would  be  to  provide  that  the  surplus  votes  cast 
for  any  candidate  should  be  distributed  among  the 
second-choice  candidates  in  the  proportions  in  which 
they  were  designated  on  all  the  ballots  of  the  candi- 
date elected.  Suppose,  for  instance,  that  Smith, 
Brown,  Jones,  and  Robinson  are  among  the  competi- 
tors at  a  certain  election  ;  that  one  hundred  is  the 
quota  necessary  for  choice  ;  that  Smith  receives  one 
hundred  and  fifty  votes,  and  is,  therefore,  elected 
with  fifty  to  spare,  and  that  ninety  of  Smith's  ballots 
bear  the  name  of  Brown  as  second  choice,  thirty- 
nine  that  of  Jones,  and  twenty-one  that  of  Robinson. 


170  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

Distributing  the  surplus  votes  in  this  proportion, 
Brown  would  receive  thirty,  Jones  thirteen,  and 
Robinson  seven.  This  would  be  as  fair  as  the 
fairest  conceivable  lot,  and  fairer  than  any  lot  that 
would  be  realized  in  practice.  To  carry  the  illus- 
tration further:  Suppose  that  Brown  had  originally 
eighty  first-choice  votes,  which  the  thirty  transferred 
from  Smith  would  raise  to  one  hundred  and  ten, 
leaving  ten  to  be  distributed  as  a  surplus.  In  deter- 
mining the  proper  proportions  in  this  case  only  the 
eighty  original  votes  could  be  used,  as  there  would 
be  no  ballots  to  represent  the  thirty  obtained  from 
Smith.  Of  these  eighty,  suppose  forty  designated 
Smith  as  second  choice,  twenty-five  Jones,  and 
fifteen  Robinson.  Smith  being  already  elected, 
his  name  would  be  eliminated,  leaving  the  third- 
choice  names  to  be  counted  on  his  forty  ballots,  of 
which  Jones  may  be  assumed  to  have  twenty-five 
and  Robinson  fifteen.  Thus,  of  Brown's  original 
eighty  votes  Jones  would  have  fifty  as  next  choice, 
and  Robinson  thirty.  Consequently,  Jones  would 
be  entitled  to  five-eighths  and  Robinson  to  three- 
eighths  of  the  surplus  ten.  Disregarding  fractions 
and  taking  the  nearest  integer,  Jones  would  gain 
six  votes  and  Robinson  four. 

The  only  objection  to  this  method  of  transferring 
surplus  votes  is  that  the  ballots  are  not  transferred 
with  them,  and  consequently  the  persons  who  have 
cast  unnecessary  votes  for  successful  candidates  are 
limited  to  a  single  additional  choice.  It  is  not  likely 
that  this  drawback  would  prove  serious  enough  to 
overbalance  the  advantage  of  absolute   fairness  in 


PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION.  171 

the  first  transfer,  but  if  it  should  turn  out  so  in 
practice  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  lot  could  still 
be  obviated  by  the  adoption  of  the  plan  proposed  by 
Mr.  Daniel  H.  Remsen,  in  his  book  on  "  Primary 
Elections."  Mr.  Remsen's  method  is  thus  described : 
"  The  votes  which  constitute  the  quota  of  each 
candidate  having  more  than  a  quota  of  first-choice 
votes  shall  be  (i)  the  votes  of  all  those  voters  making 
no  second  choice  ;  *  (2)  the  votes  of  all  those  voters 
whose  second-choice  candidate  shall  have  received  a 
quota  of  first-choice  votes  ;  f  (3)  the  votes  of  all  those 
voters  whose  second-choice  candidate  shall  have 
received  the  least  number  of  first-choice  votes;:}; 
and  thereafter,  in  order,  the  votes  of  all  those  voters 
whose  second-choice  candidate  received  the  next 
higher  number  of  first-choice  votes  until  the  said 
quota  is  filled ;  but  when  the  excessive  votes  then 
remaining  to  be  credited  would  give  any  candidate 
more  than  a  quota,  that  excess  shall  form  a  part  of 
the  quota  in  lieu  of  an  equal  number  of  votes  having 
an  unappropriated  second  choice,  last  forming  a  part 
of  the  quota  as  aforesaid.  .  .  .  When  the  quota 
of  a  candidate  shall  be  partly  composed  of  second- 
choice  votes,  the  votes  which  constitute  this  quota 
shall  be  (i)  the  second-choice  votes  placed  to  his 
credit ;  §  and  thereafter  first-choice  votes  in  the 
order  as  -orovided  above."  il 


*  Otherwise  they  would  have  no  elective  power. 

f  As  they  are  not  needed  by  the  second-choice  candidate. 

X  As  such  a  candidate  is  supposed  to  be  the  least  desirable. 

§  Otherwise  they  would  have  no  elective  power. 

II Daniel  H.  Remsen,  "  Primary  Elections." 


172  SUGGESTIONS   ON    GOVKKNMKNT. 

The  Hare  system,  with  some  such  modification, 
would  be  an  ideal  method  of  securing  the  representa- 
tion of  all  shades  of  political  opinion  in  exact  propor- 
tion to  their  strength  in  the  community.  Under  it  no 
ingenuity  on  the  part  of  politicians  would  enable  a 
popular  minority  to  secure  a  majority  of  the  repre- 
sentatives by  any  means  short  of  fraud  in  the  count. 
No  other  plan  that  allows  complete  liberty  to  the 
individual  voter  offers  an  absolute  safeguard  against 
this  possibility.  The  Free  List  system  secures  the 
same  result  as  far  as  parties  are  concerned,  but  it 
sacrifices  the  preferences  of  the  individual.  The 
plans  of  election  by  preponderance  of  choice,  such 
as  the  Burnitz  system,  and  that  employed  by  the 
labor  party  in  Cleveland,  are  peculiarly  susceptible 
to  the  danger  of  minority  rule  in  its  most  aggravated 
form.  The  Cleveland  method  is  thus  described  by 
Dr.  L.  B.  Tuckerman : 

"(i)  Each  voter  will  write  on  his  ballot  as  many 
names  as  there  are  persons  to  be  chosen,  writing  the 
names  in  the  order  of  his  choice  ;  first  choice,  first ; 
second  choice,  second ;  and  so  on. 

"  (2)  In  tallying  the  vote,  the  tellers  will  read  the 
last  name  on  each  ballot  first,  crediting  that  name 
with  one  tally ;  the  name  next  to  the  last  second, 
crediting  the  same  with  two  tallies  ;  and  so  on,  always 
crediting  the  name  written  first  on  each  ballot  with 
as  many  tallies  as  there  names  written  on  that  ballot. 
And  if  a  voter  fails  to  write  as  many  names  as  he  is 
allowed  to,  no  variation  is  made  in  the  method  of 
tallying  —  the  voter  simply  loses  so  much  of  his 
vote,  which  he  has  a  right  to  do,  if  he  chooses  —  the 


PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION.  173 

last  name  still  counts  one  tally,  the  next  to  the  last 
two,  and  so  on. 

"  (3)  The  person  receiving  the  highest  number  of 
tallies  is  first  declared  elected  ;  the  person  receiving 
the  next  highest,  next,  and  so  on,  until  all  the  vacan- 
cies are  filled.  In  case  of  a  tie,  with  but  one  vacancy 
to  be  filled,  the  incumbent  is  determined  by  lot. 

"The  practical  working  of  this  rule  (and  we  have 
tried  it  over  and  over  again)  is  that  every  element 
in  the  electing  body  large  enough  to  have  a  quota 
finds  itself  proportionately  represented,  and  by  its 
own  first  choice  or  choices." 

This  desirable  result  would  be  attained  under  this 
system  as  long  as  all  the  voters  acted  freely  and 
independently,  but  it  would  always  be  easy  for  an 
organized  minority  to  beat  an  unorganized  majority. 
A  simple  example  will  make  the  point  clear.  Sup- 
pose a  constituency  in  which  there  are  five  hundred 
Democratic  and  four  hundred  and  fifty  Republican 
voters.  Suppose  that  five  places  are  to  be  filled,  and 
that  the  Democrats,  acting  without  concert,  divide 
their  vote  equally  among  twenty  candidates,  while 
the  Republicans,  disciplined  by  an  efficient  machine, 
concentrate  their  votes  on  five  candidates  in  uniform 
order.     The  vote  of  each  of  the  twenty  Democratic 

candidates  would  be : 

25x5+25x4+25X3+25x2+25  =  375 
The  vote  of  the  five  Republican  candidates  would 
be: 

A  — 450X5  =  2,250 
B  —  450X4  =  1,800 
C  — 450X3  -  1.350 
D  —  450X2  =  900 
E  — 450X1=     450 


174  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

Thus  the  minority  would  elect  its  entire  ticket, 
and  the  majority  would  not  secure  a  single  repre- 
sentative. The  possibility  of  such  a  result,  of  course, 
would  necessitate  the  creation  of  a  strong  Demo- 
cratic machine  to  prevent  the  waste  of  the  Demo- 
cratic vote,  and  thus  the  politicians  would  be  restored 
to  power,  independent  action  within  the  parties 
would  be  effectually  suppressed,  and  the  only 
advantage  gained  would  be  the  division  of  the  offices 
between  the  organized  parties  and  such  numerous 
bodies  of  independents  as  could  agree  upon  joint 
action  outside  of  them  in  fair  proportion  to  their 
numbers. 

The  same  results  would  follow  from  the  Burnitz 
system,  which  is  simply  the  Cleveland  system 
inverted.  Under  this  plan  the  lower-choice  votes 
are  divided  by  the  numbers  representing  the  order 
of  choice,  instead  of  multiplying  the  higher-choice 
votes  by  the  numbers  in  inverse  order.  Treating 
by  this  method  the  example  already  cited,  we  have 
five  hundred  Democratic  votes  equally  divided 
among  twenty  candidates,  each  of  whom  would 
receive : 

The  four  hundred  and  fifty  Republican  votes 
would  be  distributed  among  five  candidates  thus : 

A  — ISO  ^450 
B  —  ^f  0  =  225 
C— ^10  =  150 

0  —  ^50  =  II2i 

E  — J|o=    90 

All  the  candidates  of  the  minority  party  would 
have  more  votes  than  any  of  the  majority  party,  and 


PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION.  175 

all  would  be  elected.  This  possibility  is_inseparably 
involved  in  any  system  that  admits  the  principle  of 
decision  by  plurality.  The  only  way  to  avoid  it  is 
to  require  either  an  absolute  majority  or  a  definite 
quota  for  an  election.  With  that  safeguard  the 
original  voter  can  feel  free  to  act  as  he  pleases 
without  the  fear  of  contributing  to  the  defeat  of 
his  party.  Under  the  Hare  system  it  is  mathemat- 
ically impossible  for  a  minority  of  voters  to  secure  a 
majority  of  representatives,  unless  under  circum- 
stances so  exceptional  as  not  to  need  to  be  taken 
into  account. 

Complete  proportional  representation  requires  the 
election  of  several  members  —  to  insure  fair  results, 
an  odd  number  —  from  one  district.  It  is  therefore 
inconsistent  with  the  uninterrupted  control  of  the 
constituents  over  their  representatives,  since  no  sin- 
gle member  has  a  definite  constituency  that  can  call 
him  to  account.  It  implies  election  for  prescribed 
terms,  or  at  least  the  simultaneous  renewal  of  an 
entire  group  of  representatives,  and  I  do  not  know 
of  any  practicable  method  of  combining  it  with  the 
continuous  responsibility  of  the  individual  repre- 
sentative to  a  determinate  body  of  electors.  This 
continuous  individual  responsibility  I  regard  as  even 
more  important  than  the  maintenance  of  an  exactly 
uniform  proportion  between  the  strength  of  the 
various  groups  of  electors  and  the  numbers  of  their 
representatives  in  the  legislative  body,  especially  as 
the  referendum  and  initiative  would  furnish  a  per- 
fect corrective  for  any  injustice  that  might  occur  in 
connection  with  particular  measures.     Proportional 


176  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

representation  would  insure  the  choice  of  men  in 
whom  the  people  had  confidence  at  the  moment  of 
election,  but  it  would  not  afford  any  guaranty  that 
the  elected  representatives  would  retain  or  deserve 
that  confidence  the  next  day.  That  guaranty  would 
be  given  by  the  system  of  continuous  effective 
responsibility.  Under  one  plan  the  people  would 
make  successive  disconnected  trials  at  long  inter- 
vals, and  they  might  make  mistakes  every  time ; 
under  the  other  they  could  correct  mistakes  as  soon 
as  they  were  discovered.  It  would  be  the  difference 
between  shooting  at  a  mark  w^ith  a  pistol  and  play- 
ing on  it  with  a  hose.  A  good  shot  might  fail  to 
plant  his  bullet  in  the  right  spot,  but  anybody  could 
turn  the  stream  on  it  after  a  moment's  experiment- 
ing. 

But  although  all  the  advantages  of  proportional 
representation  in  its  most  perfect  form  can  not  be 
be  combined  with  that  election  by  single-membered 
constituencies,  which  is  essential  to  complete  and 
uninterrupted  responsibility,  there  is  no  reason  why 
some  of  them  should  not  be.  The  preferential  prin- 
ciple can  be  applied  as  well  to  the  election  of  one 
member  as  to  that  of  several.  Suppose,  for  instance, 
that  in  a  certain  assembly  four  hundred  and  fifty 
votes  are  cast,  of  which  two  hundred  and  fifty  are 
Democratic  and  two  hundred  Republican.  I  use  the 
party  names,  although  I  think  that  party  divisions 
would  not  long  survive  the  accomplishment  of  the 
various  changes  heretofore  proposed.  Suppose  the 
Democratic  vote  were  divided  among  five  candidates, 
and  the  Republican  among  two,  in  these  proportions : 


PROPORTIONAL   REPRESENTATION.  177 

DEMOCRATIC.  REPUBLICAN. 

Wilson  --_ 80  McKinley.-.l 105 

Mills  ._ 75  Reed--... 95 

Crisp 40 

Johnson 30 

Cockran- .25 

Suppose  that  a  clear  majority  were  required  to 
elect,  but  that  each  voter  were  allowed  to  indicate 
his  preference  among  the  different  candidates,  after 
his  first  choice,  his  vote  being  counted  for  the  one 
for  whom  it  would  first  become  effective.  Suppose 
that,  in  the  absence  of  a  majority  for  any  candidate, 
it  were  required  to  eliminate  successively  the  candi- 
dates having  the  fewest  first-choice  votes  and  dis- 
tribute their  votes  among  the  others  in  the  order  of 
preference.  We  should  begin,  then,  in  the  case 
assumed,  by  dropping  Mr.  Cockran.  The  distribu- 
tion of  his  votes  according  to  the  next  choice  of 
those  who  cast  them  might  give  Wilson  90,  Mills  85, 
Crisp  43,  and  Johnson  32,  with  the  votes  of  Reed  and 
McKinley  unchanged.  Johnson  would  go  next,  and 
his  32  votes  might  raise  Wilson's  strength  to  105, 
while  Mills  might  have  95,  and  Crisp  50.  Next 
Crisp  would  be  eliminated,  giving  Wilson,  perhaps, 
135,  and  Mills  115.  Reed  would  now  drop  out,  and 
all  his  votes  would  go  to  McKinley,  who  would  have 
200.  Lastly  Mills  would  be  excluded,  and,  with  the 
addition  of  his  115  votes,  Wilson  would  have  250 
and  be  elected.  The  Democratic  majority,  which 
under  the  prevailing  plan  of  plurality  elections 
would  have  been  defeated,  unless  its  members 
had  abandoned  the  privilege  of  independent  voting, 

would  be  successful,  and  would  be  represented  by 
12 


178  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

the  man  of  its  choice,  without  the  intervention  of  a 
political  machine. 

Of  course  if  a  number  of  assemblies  were  com- 
prised in  the  constituency  holding  the  election,  the 
transfers  of  votes  just  described  would  not  be  made 
in  each  assembly,  but  would  be  effected  by  the  cen- 
tral canvassing  authority.  If  it  happened  that  so 
many  candidates  were  in  the  field,  and  the  factional 
divisions  were  so  pronounced,  that  a  majority  could 
not  be  secured,  even  after  all  possible  eliminations 
and  transfers  had  been  made,  a  new  election  would 
be  ordered,  as  described  in  the  first  chapter.  The 
choice  in  this  case  w^ould  be  limited  to  the  candi- 
dates remaining  in  the  field  at  the  close  of  the  first 
count,  if  the  number  did  not  exceed  five,  or  to  the 
five  highest  if  it  did.  If  there  were  no  choice  on 
this  trial,  a  third  ballot  between  the  two  highest 
would  settle  it. 

This  system  would  absolutely  dispense  with  all 
occasion  for  caucuses,  conventions,  or  party  machin- 
ery of  any  kind.  If  parties  continued  to  exist,  which 
would  be  hardly  possible,  no  voter  would  need  to 
pay  any  attention  to  tickets  prepared  in  advance, 
for  anybody  could  vote  for  any  candidate  he  pre- 
ferred without  in  the  least  endangering  the  success 
of  his  party.  The  majority  would  rule,  whether  it 
scattered  its  first-choice  votes  or  not,  and  the  bosses, 
whose  present  influence  is  derived  from  the  fact 
that  they  can  pin  the  rank  and  file  of  the  citizens  to 
the  alternative  of  voting  the  regular  ticket  or  incur- 
ring party  defeat,  would  have  to  go  out  of  politics. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE   WORK   OF   THE   POPULAR   ASSEMBLY, 

As  our  political  system  is  now  organized,  the 
individual  voter  has  nothing  to  do  except  to  read 
his  paper — if  he  can  read — ^  attend  the  primaries, 
if  he  think  it  worth  while,  argue  with  his  neighbors, 
and  vote  once  a  year,  or  once  in  two  years,  for  a  list 
of  candidates  prepared  for  him  by  his  party  mana- 
gers. This  degree  of  political  activity  is  certainly 
better  than  absolute  stagnation,  of  the  Russian 
kind.  But  it  is  far  from  exerting  the  stimulating 
and  enlightening  effect  that  would  be  produced  by 
such  a  system  of  organized  effort  as  would  be 
created  by  the  enrollment  of  the  whole  voting 
population  in  a  network  of  primary  assemblies, 
invested  with  jurisdiction  over  all  departments  of 
government,  local.  State,  and  national. 

Let  us  suppose  this  system  in  operation,  and  try 
to  picture  to  ourselves  the  ordinary  course  of  pro- 
ceedings in  the  assemblies.  It  is  the  night  of  the 
regular  monthly  meeting  of  the  assembly  of  the 
nineteenth  precinct  of  New  York  City.  There  are 
six  or  seven  hundred  voters  in  the  hall  —  the  pre- 
cincts in  New  York  being  unusually  large.  The 
gathering  is  called  to  order  by  the  chairman  of  the 
previous  meeting,  a  new  chairman  is  elected,  he 
appoints  a  secretary,  and  the  assembly  is  ready  for 

(179) 


180  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

business.  A  member  of  Good  Government  Club  A 
rises  to  remark  that  there  have  been  rumors  of 
corruption  in  the  police  force,  and  asks  the  council- 
man for  the  precinct,  who  is  in  attendance  at  the 
meeting,  what  he  knows  about  it,  and  what  he  pro- 
poses to  do.  The  councilman  responds  that  he  has 
heard  of  the  rumors  referred  to,  and  will  bring  them 
to  the  attention  of  the  superintendent  of  police  at 
the  next  meeting  of  the  council,  and  insist  upon  a 
satisfactory  explanation,  or  the  removal  of  the 
accused  officials. 

A  citizen  complains  that  the  milkmen  disturb  his 
rest  by  rattling  over  the  streets  before  daylight. 
A  milkman  explains  that  it  is  necessary  to  be  out 
early,  but  that  the  wagons  would  cause  no  disturb- 
ance were  it  not  for  the  bad  condition  of  the  street 
pavements.  Thereupon  a  resolution  is  passed 
instructing  the  councilman  to  find  out  exactly  what 
defects  there  are  in  the  pavements  and  who  is 
responsible  for  them,  and  report  at  the  next  meet- 
ing. 

A  resolution  is  offered  calling  for  a  popular  vote 
on  the  proposition  to  abolish  the  State  and  local 
taxes  upon  personal  property  and  improvements. 
After  some  discussion  it  is  laid  over  until  the  next 
meeting  for  further  consideration. 

The  representative  in  Congress  from  the  district 
having  died,  and  due  notice  having  been  given  that 
an  election  would  be  held  this  evening,  nominations 
are  called  for.  Half  a  dozen  candidates  are  pro- 
posed, most  of  them  being  well-known  men  whose 
names  are  offered  at  the  same  time  in  all  the  other 


THE   WORK   OF   THE   POPULAR   ASSEMBLY.       181 

precincts  of  the  district.  The  hand-stamps  and  blank 
slips  of  paper  are  put  in  the  booths,  and  the  voters 
enter  one  by  one  and  prepare  their  ballots,  stamping 
as  many  names  as  they  please  in  the  order  of  their 
preference.  When  the  voting  is  completed  the 
chairman  and  secretary  count  the  ballots  in  the 
presence  of  the  meeting,  and  under  the  immediate 
supervision  of  representatives  of  the  various  candi- 
dates. The  returns  and  ballots  are  then  sealed  and 
forwarded  to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  the  final 
canvass  with  the  votes  of  the  other  precincts  in  the 
district. 

The  next  meeting,  in  addition  to  dealing  with  such 
local  matters  as  demand  attention,  may  have  to  take 
action  upon  a  new  tariff,  and  the  next  may  be  called 
upon  to  handle  the  question  of  woman  suffrage,  or 
prohibition.  In  the  course  of  a  year  all  the  great, 
practical  problems  of  government  would  receive 
intelligent  discussion,  and  some  of  them  would  reach 
a  definite  settlement. 

The  average  Athenian  citizen,  who  did  not  read 
books,  but  received  his  education  by  public  discus- 
sion in  precisely  this  way,  has  been  said  to  have 
been  better  trained  politically  than  the  average 
member  of  the  British  House  of  Commons.  The 
illiterate  American  citizen  is  now  almost  totally 
inaccessible  to  enlightening  influences,  but  the  pop- 
ular assembly  Avould  give  him  more  instruction  than 
is  enjoyed  at  present  by  the  ordinary  reader  of  books 
and  papers.  The  "  ignorant  vote  "  then  would  lose 
most  of  its  dangers,  even  if  men  unable  to  read  and 
write  were  allowed  to  continue  to  take  part  in  politics. 


182  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

But  it  is  not  likely  that  they  would  enjoy  that  privi- 
lege very  long.  The  result  of  the  referendum  in 
California,  on  the  question  of  establishing  an  educa- 
tional qualification,  indicates  clearly  that  the  masses 
of  the  people  do  not  consider  the  rule  of  illiterates 
an  essential  part  of  popular  government.  No  doubt 
one  of  the  first  acts  of  a  true  democracy  would  be 
to  make  education  universal  and  compulsory  on  the 
one  hand,  and  to  ordain,  on  the  other,  that  nobody 
should  be  intrusted  with  a  share  in  the  government 
until  he  had  availed  himself  of  the  privileges  so 
offered. 

If  the  system  of  popular  assemblies  once  took  root 
it  is  likely  that  the  meeting-hall  would  supply  the 
need  of  a  bond  of  union  for  the  neighborhood.  The 
church  used  to  be  such  a  center  of  neighborly  asso- 
ciation, and  in  the  country  districts  the  schoolhouse 
is  now.  But  the  precinct  assembly  hall  would  be 
something  more  than  either.  It  would  touch  the 
life  of  the  community  at  all  points.  In  time,  endear- 
ing associations  would  grow  up  around  it.  In  many 
cases  public-spirited  citizens  would  give  their  pre- 
cincts handsome  buildings,  which,  in  addition  to  the 
meeting-halls,  would  contain  libraries,  gymnasia, 
baths,  and  club-rooms.  In  other  cases  the  people 
would  provide  such  buildings  for  themselves  by  tax- 
ation. Instead  of  a  huge,  chaotic  aggregation  of 
unconnected  atoms,  the  nation  would  be  a  harmo- 
nious organism,  with  every  atom  occupying  a  recog- 
nized place.  The  individual  citizen  would  have  a 
civic  home ;  he  would  be  surrounded  in  his  precinct 
assembly  and  club-house  with  faces  that  would  soon 


THE   WORK   OF   THE   POPULAR   ASSEMBLY.       183 

become  familiar;  he  would  daily  enjoy  and  appre- 
ciate the  advantages  of  public  order,  and  no  man 
would  be  rendered  indifferent  to  good  government 
by  the  feeling  that  his  poverty  deprived  him  of  any 
"stake  in  the  country." 


CHAPTER    XV. 

THE    BOSS. 

America  has  made  two  striking  and  original  con- 
tributions to  the  art  of  government.  One  is  the 
Supreme  Court,  invested  with  pf)wer  to  annul  uncon- 
stitutional legislation.  The  other  is  the  Boss.  The 
former  contribution  is  the  one  in  which  the  Amer- 
ican people  take  more  pride,  but  the  latter  surpasses 
it  in  practical  importance. 

Every  form  of  government  develops  its  own  types 
of  leadership.  Some  forms  breed  demagogues,  oth- 
ers statesmen,  others  military  adventurers,  others 
seraglio  intriguers,  others  masterful  orators.  Ours 
breeds  bosses.  From  a  scientific  point  of  view  the 
system  of  boss-rule  is  one  of  the  most  perfect  and 
beautifully  complex  developments  of  modern  civili- 
zation. It  is  a  convincing  illustration  of  the  possible 
stability  of  a  pyramid  resting  on  its  apex.  The  apex 
on  which  the  boss  rests  his  pyramid  of  government 
is  a  body  of  a  few  hundreds  or  thousands  of  men, 
who  agree  to  render  him  any  political  services 
required  in  exchange  for  support  at  the  public 
expense  or  protection  in  unlawful  occupations. 
This  force  he  employs  to  gain  possession  of  the 
machinery  of  a  party  —  preferably  the  one  locally 
dominant. 

Unless  there  is  a  rival  boss  in  possession,  this  is 


THE   BOSS.  185 

not  hard,  for  it  is  an  unprofitable  political  servant 
that  can  not  make  the  tour  of  a  dozen  primary  polling 
places,  and  deposit  at  least  one  vote  at  each  in  the 
course  of  a  day.  Against  such  a  force,  an  undisci- 
plined mob  of  reformers,  limited  to  one  vote  each, 
and  giving  politics  only  such  attention  as  they  can 
spare  from  more  serious  occupations,  is  as  helpless 
as  an  infant  Sunday-school  class  against  a  regiment 
of  regulars.  When  there  are  two  aspirants  for  the 
boss-ship,  the  one  that  gets  control  of  the  member- 
ship rolls  and  the  counting  machinery  of  the  party 
wins.  So  conclusive  is  this  preliminary  test  of 
strength  considered,  that  the  embryo  boss  v/ho  fails 
here  generally  declines  to  trouble  himself  with  the 
useless  formality  of  voting  his  followers  at  the 
primaries,  but  either  bolts  or  makes  terms  with 
his  successful  rival,  and  waits  for  a  more  favorable 
opportunity. 

Having  once  carried  the  primaries,  the  new  polit- 
ical leader  finds  easy  sailing  thereafter.  He  holds  a 
convention  and  nominates  a  local  ticket,  which,  by 
virtue  of  its  "regularity,"  commands  the  support  of 
the  entire  party  and  is  duly  elected.  The  retainers 
who  have  made  the  victory  possible  are  appropriately 
rewarded,  some  with  city  offices,  some  with  contracts 
or  jobs  under  contractors,  and  some  with  police  protec- 
tion in  dive-keeping,  and  other  less  reputable  occu- 
pations, whose  profits  depend  on  a  good  understand- 
ing with  the  governing  powers.  The  hold  of  the 
boss  on  the  party  machinery  is  strengthened  by 
purging  the  rolls  of  the  precinct  clubs  or  associa- 
tions of  unruly  members,  and  manning  the  organ- 


186  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

ization  throughout  with  officers  who  can  be  depended 
upon  to  let  in  only  the  right  kind  of  votes  at  the 
primaries,  and  to  correct  in  the  counting  any  mis- 
takes that  may  accidentally  occur  in  the  voting. 
The  dictator  is  now  in  a  position  to  make  the 
political  war  pay  its  own  expenses,  and  a  handsome 
profit  in  addition.  Beside  the  regular  percentage  on 
salaries,  which  his  retainers  in  office  cheerfully  pay 
as  the  skipper's  proportion  of  the  booty  captured  on 
a  successful  cruise,  he  levies  assessments  on  rich 
corporations  in  need  of  official  favors ;  on  large 
property-holders  who  wish  to  pay  small  taxes;  on 
saloon-keepers  who  desire  to  conduct  their  estab- 
lishments under  liberal  interpretations  of  the  laws  ; 
on  gamblers,  confidence  men,  and  other  followers  of 
vicious  professions  ;  on  purveyors  of  public  supplies  ; 
on  contractors  for  municipal  work,  and  in  short  on 
everybody  whom  the  local  government  can  either 
help  or  harm.  His  power  brings  in  wealth  and  his 
wealth  procures  more  power.  He  sends  a  solid 
delegation  to  the  State  convention  of  his  party,  and, 
by  judiciovis  combinations  with  the  friends  of  candi- 
dates from  different  sections,  he  allies  his  machine 
with  the  State  organization,  and  through  it,  if  suc- 
cessful at  the  polls,  with  the  State  government.  He 
sends  another  solid  delegation  to  the  Legislature, 
and  markets  its  votes  on  the  most  favorable  terms. 
Finally,  if  ambitious,  he  exerts  his  power  as  a  State 
leader  in  the  national  convention,  and  later,  under 
favoring  conditions,  his  trades  with  the  boss  of  the 
other  party  for  local  offices  may  determine  the  choice 
of  a  President  of  the   United  States.     This  is  the 


THE   BOSS.  187 

mighty  pyramid  that  rests  upon  the  apex  of  a  little 
band  of  political  men- of -all-work  willing  to  devote 
their  entire  attention  to  the  duties  laid  out  for 
them  by  their  employer.  And  the  curious  thing 
about  it  is  that  this  delicately  balanced  pyramid  is 
in  a  state  of  stable  equilibrium.  When  disturbed  it 
always  tends  to  return  to  its  position  on  its  point  — 
never  to  one  on  the  broad  base  of  popular  rule.  If, 
by  a  superhuman  effort,  it  is  set  squarely  upon  its 
base,  it  rolls  over  on  its  point  again  as  soon  as  the 
reformers  who  righted  it  let  go  their  hold. 

This  apparent  paradox  is  merely  the  inevitable 
outcome  of  the  principles  of  human  nature.  The 
boss  wins  because  at  each  stage  of  his  proceedings 
his  forces  are  stronger  than  those  of  his  opponents. 
His  drilled  mercenaries  are  more  effective  for 
carrying  primaries  than  the  undisciplined  levies, 
hampered  by  the  troublesome  impedimenta  of  con- 
scientious scruples,  that  oppose  them.  When  the 
primaries  are  carried,  he  has  at  his  disposal  the 
potent  force  of  party  spirit.  His  fortunes  in  the 
campaign  are  linked  with  those  of  the  national 
organization  that  holds  a  prescriptive  right  to  the 
support  of  a  majority  of  the  voters  of  the  city. 
Opposition  to  his  ticket  is  disloyalty  to  the  party. 
When  he  has  attained  power  he  commands  the 
alliance  of  the  great  interests  that  consider  it 
necessary  to  stand  well  with  the  authorities ;  and 
all  the  men  for  whom  he  has  procured  office  or 
other  favors,  together  with  their  relatives  and 
friends,  are  diligent  workers  in  his  behalf.  Here, 
as  everywhere,  it  is  the  first  step  that  costs.    The 


188  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVERNMENT. 

first  primaries  of  the  boss  correspond  to  the  mil- 
lionaire's first  ten  thousand  dollars.  After  the 
foothold  is  gained,  power  flows  in  on  one  as  wealth 
on  the  other.  And  even  a  complete  victory  at  the 
primaries  is  not  indispensable,  unless  there  is  another 
boss  to  fight.  When  there  are  only  unorganized 
reformers  to  contend  with,  the  boss  can  win  if  he 
can  control  a  third  or  a  fourth  of  the  delegates  in  a 
convention.  With  that  force  available  for  trading, 
only  a  few  judicious  combinations  are  needed  to 
secure  a  majority. 

The  boss  system,  having  grown  up  of  itself  under 
our  present  political  methods,  has  thereby  proved 
its  appropriateness  to  its  environment.  It  is  a  case 
of  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  or  rather  of  creation  by 
direct  adaptation.  Boss-rule  has  come  to  fill  what 
would  otherwise  have  been  a  political  vacuum. 
And,  although  absolutely  bad,  it  is  not  relatively  an 
unmixed  evil.  It  does  for  us  after  a  fashion  what, 
without  it,  we  vShould  have  no  means  of  having  done 
at  all.  It  introduces  a  certain  unity  and  responsi- 
bility into  the  chaos  of  American  municipal  govern- 
ment. When  streets  are  dirty,  sewers  dilapidated, 
schools  inefficient,  and  police  corrupt,  the  people 
may  not  know  what  particular  officials  are  legally 
responsible,  but  they  do  know  that  their  boss  is  not 
giving  them  a  good  government,  and  that  it  is  time 
to  change  bosses.  Sometimes,  where  abuses  have 
been  flagrant  and  the  public  patience  sorely  tried, 
such  a  realization  has  been  known  to  work  an 
improvement  that  has  lasted  for  as  much  as  two  or 
three  years. 


THE   BOSS.  -  189 

As  the  boss  is  the  creation  of  our  present  methods, 
the  question  arises  whether  he  would  flourish  if  the 
system  of  government  were  changed.  The  natural 
presumption  is  that  he  would  not.  A  type  of  animal 
life  developed  in  accordance  with  the  needs  of  life 
on  land  would  not  flourish  in  the  water.  The  very 
perfection  with  which  an  organism  meets  the  require- 
ments of  one  environment  is  a  disadvantage  to  it 
when  placed  in  another,  and  certainly  there  is  no 
more  highly  specialized  type  of  animal  life  than  the 
boss.  But  let  us  imagine  the  experiment  tried. 
Suppose  an  aspirant  for  the  career  of  a  boss  to  make 
his  attempt  in  a  city  of  five  hundred  thousand  inhabit- 
ants, organized  on  the  plan  heretofore  described.  As 
there  is  no  general  ticket  to  be  elected,  there  can  be 
no  primaries  to  capture.  The  embryo  boss  must  send 
his  retainers  into  two  hundred  precinct  assemblies, 
each  containing  several  hundred  voters  of  all  parties 
(if  parties  continue  to  exist)  and  induce  at  least  two- 
thirds  of  them  to  recall  their  councilmen  and  elect 
others  favorable  to  his  schemes.  As  it  is  hardly  sup- 
posable  that  his  forces  at  the  start  will  be  numerous 
enough  to  allow  him  to  spare  more  than  five  or  six 
men  to  each  assembly,  and  as  impromptu  nomina- 
tions and  the  preferential  system  of  voting  will 
make  it  impossible  for  him  to  secure  any  advantage 
from  the  presentation  of  a  "regular  ticket,"  he  is 
likely  to  find  his  undertaking  rather  arduous  before 
he  goes  any  farther.  But  assuming  that  five  or  six 
heelers  are  able  to  hypnotize  four  or  five  hundred 
voters  in  each  precinct,  the  next  step  offers  still  more 
serious  difficulties.     The  mayor  must  be  removed, 


190  SUGGESTIONS  ON   GOVERNMENT. 

for  until  this  is  done  the  retainers  of  the  boss  can 
not  get  the  rewards  earned  by  their  extraordinary  ser- 
vices. But  to  remove  the  mayor,  two  months'  notice 
is  necessary,  and  that  means  an  appeal  to  the  pre- 
cinct assemblies,  now  fully  aroused  from  their 
hypnotic  trance.  But,  suppose  even  this  ordeal 
passed,  the  mayor  removed,  one  subservient  to  the 
boss  elected,  and  a  clean  sweep  made  of  the  subor- 
dinate officials  for  the  benefit  of  the  invading  force. 
Instead  of  being  ended,  the  work  of  the  new  dictator 
would  have  only  begun.  He  would  have  proceeded 
thus  far,  simply  because  the  people  had  allowed  him 
to  do  so.  If,  at  any  time,  they  became  dissatisfied 
with  his  rule,  they  could  resume  their  control  as 
easily  as  if  they  had  never  given  it  up.  The  boss 
could  not  fight  from  behind  the  intrenchments  of 
subservient  committees  and  packed  primaries.  He 
would  have  to  stay  out  in  the  open,  Avhere  his  vote, 
like  that  of  each  of  his  follow^ers,  would  count  one, 
and  the  majority  could  alwa^^s  rule  if  it  chose.  And 
the  fact  that  he  retained  his  political  existence  on 
one  day  would  give  no  assurance  that  he  would  keep 
it  the  next.  Whenever  the  people  took  off'ense 
—  and  a  boss  never  fails  to  offend  them  sooner  or 
later  —  they  could  extinguish  him  on  the  instant, 
without  waiting  for  a  distant  election  day  with  the 
chance  that  their  anger  might  cool  in  the  meantime. 
And  even  while  his  power  lasted  the  boss  would  be 
deprived  of  the  most  precious  privileges  of  his  class. 
He  could  not  assess  corporations  and  millionaires 
for  the  price  of  favorable  city  ordinances,  for  every 
such   ordinance  would   be   subject  to  rejection   by 


THE   BOSS.  191 

popular  vote.   In  such  circumstances,  is_  it  likely  that 
a  boss  could  even  begin  to  grow  ? 

A  boss  is  a  specialist,  who  finds  his  opportunity  in 
the  management  of  political  machinery  too  compli- 
cated to  be  worked  by  any  but  professional  hands. 
When  the  mxachinery  is  made  so  simple  that  the 
people  can  work  it  easily  and  surely  for  themselves, 
the  boss  will  disappear. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE    REFERENDUM    IN   CALIFORNIA. 

While  direct  legislation  is  still  generally  regarded 
as  a  foreign  novelty,  its  principle  is  recognized  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent  in  every  State  in  the  Union. 
No  State  has  made  greater  advances  in  this  direc- 
tion than  California,  where  the  abuses  of  power  by 
officials  have  been  so  flagrant  as  to  compel  the 
people  to  take  continually  greater  shares  of  the 
work  of  law-making  into  their  own  hands. 

Like  other  States,  California  is  governed  under  a 
constitution  adopted  by  popular  vote.  In  1S79, 
when  the  present  constitution  was  ratified,  the 
people  were  asked  to  express  at  the  polls  their 
opinion  on  the  subject  of  Chinese  immigration. 
The  result  of  this  referendum  (883  in  favor  of  the 
Chinese  to  154,638  against  them),  in  conjunction 
with  a  similar  vote  in  Nevada,  had  much  to  do  with 
the  inception  of  the  national  restrictive  legislation 
that  followed.  The  practice  of  consulting  the 
people  with  regard  to  proposed  policies  took  root, 
and  has  since  been  widely  applied.  At  the  election 
of  1892  four  propositions  were  thus  submitted  to 
vote.  One  of  them  related  to  an  educational  quali- 
fication for  the  suffrage.  It  might  have  been 
supposed  that  such  a  measure  would  be  unpopular, 
and  certainly  no  legislature  would  have  ventured  to 

(198) 


THE   REFERENDUM   IN   CALIFORNIA.  193 

commit  itself  to  it  without  knowing  what  the  voters 
thought.  The  result  showed  that  a. majority  in 
every  county  in  the  State  favored  the  restriction  of 
the  suffrage,  the  aggregate  vote  cast  for  the  propo- 
sition being  151,320  to  41,059  against  it.  With  this 
encouragement  the  next  Legislature  found  no  diffi- 
culty in  framing  a  constitutional  amendment, 
limiting  the  franchise  to  men  able  to  read  the 
constitution  in  the  English  language  and  write 
their  names,  and  nobody  undertook  to  amass  polit- 
ical capital  by  denouncing  the  scheme  as  an  attempt 
to  create  an  aristocracy.  Another  proposition  voted 
upon  at  the  same  time  was  one  to  settle  the  question 
whether  the  people  wanted  to  elect  United  States 
Senators  themselves,  or  whether  the}^  preferred  to 
have  the  work  done  by  the  legislatures.  The  people 
decided,  by  a  vote  of  187,958  to  13,342,  that  they 
would  rather  do  it  themselves,  and  again  the  fifty- 
four  counties  were  all  agreed. 

The  new  constitution  of  California  is  less  a  consti- 
tution than  a  code  of  laws.  Having  tasted  the  pleas- 
ures of  law-making,  the  people  are  pursuing  them 
with  progressive  avidity.  In  1890  they  voted  on 
one  constitutional  amendment ;  in  1892  on  five,  and 
this  year  they  will  vote  on  nine.  They  would  have 
had  ten  before  them  this  year  if  the  Supreme  Court 
had  not  decided  that  one  of  the  proposed  amend- 
ments had  been  improperly  submitted.  The  tend- 
ency of  these  changes  in  the  organic  law  is  all  in 
the  direction  of  taking  power  away  from  representa- 
tive bodies  and  giving  it  to  the  people  immediately 
interested.    For  instance,  all  city  charters  used  to  be 

13 


194  SUCiGESTIUNS   ON    (iOVlikNMENT. 

framed  by  the  Legislature.  Then  cities  of  over  one 
hundred  thousand  inhabitants  were  given  the  power 
to  adopt  their  own  charters,  subject  to  legislative 
approval.  Next  this  privilege  was  extended  to  cities 
of  twenty  thousand  inhabitants,  and  now  it  is  enjoyed 
by  all  places  with  three  thousand  five  hundred  or 
over.  A  fertile  source  of  scandal  in  pa.st  sessions  of 
the  Legislature  has  been  the  formation  of  new  coun- 
ties. A  constitutional  amendment  to  be  voted  on 
this  year  will  abolish  this  by  authorizing  the  Legis- 
lature to  pass  general  laws,  under  which  the  people 
who  desire  to  form  new  counties  will  be  able  to  do  it 
for  themselves. 

No  county,  city,  town,  township,  or  school  district 
is  allowed  to  incur  any  indebtedness  without  the 
assent  of  two-thirds  of  its  qualified  electors  voting 
at  an  election.  Whenever  a  new  schoolhouse  is  to 
be  built,  or  a  sewer  system  constructed,  or  any 
other  public  work  undertaken,  for  which  an  issue  of 
bonds  is  necessary,  the  people  have  to  sanction  it  by 
their  votes.  Even  the  Legislature  can  not  raise  the 
State  debt  above  $300,cxx)  without  the  consent  of  the 
voters,  which  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  it  can  not 
now  incur  any  new  indebtedness  at  all. 

The  establishment  of  high  schools,  by  counties, 
towns,  or  union  districts,  has  been  left  to  the  people 
at  the  polls. 

The  control  of  irrigation  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
people  of  the  localities  interested.  The  voters  in 
any  drainage  area  may  have  an  irrigation  district 
marked  off,  with  such  boundaries  as  they  desire,  and 
may  authorize  an  issue  of  bonds  for  the  construction 


THE   REFERENDUM    IN    CALIFORNIA.  195 

of  canals  and  ditches,  the  condemnation  and  purchase 
of  water-rights,  and  other  purposes  appropriate  to 
the  objects  desired,  and  the  payments  on  these  bonds 
are  met  by  taxes  on  the  lands  in  the  districts. 

But  the  longest  advance  toward  direct  popular 
rule  was  made  by  the  last  Legislature,  which 
inserted  a  provision  in  the  county  government  law, 
requiring  the  board  of  supervisors  of  any  county, 
on  petition  of  half  the  qualified  electors,  to  submit 
any  proposed  ordinance  to  vote,  and  making  such 
ordinances,  when  ratified  by  a  majority  at  the  polls, 
valid  as  if  passed  by  the  supervisors  in  the  ordinary 
way.  This,  of  course,  is  the  initiative  in  its  com- 
pletest  form,  the  only  material  variation  from  the 
Swiss  system  being  the  large  proportion  of  signa- 
tures required  to  set  it  going.  In  view  of  the  ease 
with  which  signatures  to  petitions  are  obtained  in 
this  country,  this  is  not  a  serious  defect.  Any 
measure  for  which  there  is  an  earnest,  popular 
demand,  can  easily  command  the  required  number 
of  names. 

At  the  last  session  of  the  Legislature,  an  attempt 
was  made  to  secure  the  submission  of  a  constitu- 
tional amendment  establishing  the  initiative  and 
referendum  in  State  matters.  The  referendum 
alone  could  probably  have  been  obtained,  but  the 
legislative  mind  had  not  been  educated  quite  up  to 
the  initiative,  and  the  two  fell  together.  It  is  con- 
fidently expected  that  both  will  be  gained  at  the 
coming  session.  Should  this  expectation  prove  well 
founded,  California  may  be  the  first  American  State 
to  establish  true  democratic  government. 


CHAPTER    XVII. 

SOME    PRACTICAL   EXAMPLES. 

The  test  of  a  pudding  is  traditionally  and  justly 
believed  to  be  in  the  eating.  If  the  methods  of 
government  advocated  in  this  book  had  been  in 
operation  during  the  past  quarter  of  a  century,  how 
would  they  have  affected  the  settlement  of  the 
practical  problems  we  have  been  called  upon  to 
meet  within  that  time  ? 

In  municipal  affairs  the  most  striking  instance  of 
misgovernment  recorded  in  American  history  was 
the  rule  of  the  Tweed  ring  in  New  York.  Tweed 
was  a  boss  who  rose  to  power  like  any  other  boss, 
except  in  so  far  as  his  methods  were  modified  by 
the  fact  that  he  had  the  peculiar  organization  of 
Tammany  to  work  with.  The  very  existence  of 
such  a  ruler  would  have  been  impossible  under  a 
system  of  government  which  gave  the  people  com- 
plete and  continuous  control  over  their  agents,  and 
left  no  plausible  ground  on  which  political  machines 
could  appeal  for  popular  .support.  But  if  a  Tweed 
had  been  able  to  exist  under  such  a  system  he  could 
never  have  maintained  his  frauds  without  detection 
and  punishment.  Even  if  the  ring  had  obtained 
complete  control  of  the  mayor,  the  auditor,  and  all 
the  subordinate  executive  officials,  it  could  not  pos- 
sibly have  captured  every  member  of  a  city  council 

(196) 


SOME    PRACTICAL    EXAMPLES.  197 

elected  independently  by  several  hundred  free  popu- 
lar assemblies,  and  all  subject  to  recall  at  the  pleas- 
ure of  their  constituents.  Even  one  such  member, 
representing-  one  solitary  uncorrupted  precinct,  would 
have  been  able  to  lay  bare  all  the  records  of  the 
ring,  and  after  that  the  rest  would  have  had  to  join 
in  the  pursuit  or  be  replaced  by  others  who  would. 
As  it  was,  although  it  was  generally  suspected  that 
something  was  wrong,  the  actual  exposure  of  the 
Tweed  conspiracy  depended  upon  the  coincidence 
of  two  extraordinary  events.  A  subordinate  official 
copied  off  the  secret  accounts  of  the  ring,  and  he  had 
the  good  fortune  to  intrust  them  to  an  incorruptible 
newspaper  proprietor.  There  was  no  certain,  official 
means  of  extracting  information  from  unwilling  cus- 
todians. But  for  treason  in  his  camp,  combined  with 
his  inability  to  buy  back  his  betrayed  secrets,  Tweed 
might  have  stolen  millions  more. 

A  parallel  case  is  disclosed  by  the  recent  investi- 
gations of  the  Lexow  committee.  But  for  a  combi- 
nation of  national  hard  times  and  reckless  political 
mismanagement  in  the  State,  the  party  friendly  to 
Tammany  would  not  have  lost  control  of  the  Legis- 
lature, and  if  the  other  party  had  not  secured  a  ma- 
jority there,  no  investigating  committee  would  have 
been  appointed.  But  even  after  the  investigation 
had  been  held,  and  the  truth  about  police  corruption 
extracted,  little  of  practical  importance  was  accom- 
plished. Most  of  the  smirched  officials  retained  their 
places,  and  Tammany  offered  the  excuse,  which  was 
sustained  by  the  facts,  that  the  blackmail  and 
bribery  uncovered  were  not  peculiar  to  its  own  rule, 


198  SUGGESTIONS   ON   GOVKKNMKNT. 

but  had  existed  under  all  city  administrations. 
Under  the  plan  of  popular  government  proposed, 
no  such  excuse  would  have  been  available,  for  at  the 
first  hint  of  corruption  some  member  of  the  council, 
not  needing  to  wait  for  a  partisan  legislative  majority 
to  order  an  investigation,  would  have  probed  for  the 
facts,  and  the  guilty  officers  either  would  have  been 
dismissed  at  once  or  would  have  brought  their  supe- 
riors down  with  them.  In  any  case  the  question 
would  have  been,  not  whether  one  political  organi- 
zation deserved  more  general  blame  than  another, 
but  whether  certain  individual  officials  had  been 
guilty  of  specific  misconduct  or  not.  If  they  had, 
they  would  have  had  to  go,  and  their  superiors 
could  not  have  shielded  them  without  inviting  the 
same  fate  for  themselves. 

In  State  affairs  an  excellent  example  of  the  com- 
parative working  of  the  two  systems  is  found  in  the 
course  of  the  New  York  Legislature  with  regard  to 
the  government  of  certain  cities.  The  Democratic 
Legislature  of  1893  passed  a  series  of  bills  modify- 
ing the  governments  of  these  places  in  the  interest 
of  local  politicians.  That  these  measures  were 
locally  unpopular  was  sufficiently  demonstrated  by 
their  political  results,  the  vote  of  Erie  County,  for 
instance,  changing  within  a  year  from  a  small 
Democratic  plurality  to  a  Republican  plurality  of 
over  ten  thousand.  Nevertheless,  the  bills  had 
passed,  and  they  had  to  be  subsequently  repealed, 
at  the  cost  of  much  interv^ening  trouble  and  con- 
fusion. The  only  way  in  which  Democrats  could 
resent  an  invasion  of  local  self-government  was  to 


SOME    PRACTICAL    EXAMPLES.  199 

assist  in  a  political  revolution  which  put  the  enemies 
of  their  national  policy  into  power  and  discouraged 
the  friends  of  Democratic  principles  throughout  the 
Union.  With  a  government  organized  on  the  plan 
suggested,  no  such  trouble  could  have  arisen  in  the 
first  place,  because  home  rule  is  of  the  essence  of 
the  system,  and  no  Legislature  would  have  had 
authority  to  interfere  with  it.  But  if  it  had  been 
possible  to  start  the  schemes  by  which  Mr.  Sheehan 
and  his  allies  made  so  much  trouble  for  themselves 
and  others,  they  could  have  been  stopped  before 
they  had  accomplished  any  damage.  The  people  of 
Buffalo,  and  the  other  cities  affected,  could  simply 
have  recalled  their  representatives,  and  the  matter 
would  have  been  settled  without  a  political  upheaval. 
Of  course  the  actual  procedure  would  have  been  that 
when  the  representatives  found  how  their  conduct 
was  regarded  at  home,  they  would  have  abandoned 
their  plans  before  their  constituents  had  a  chance  to 
recall  them. 

In  national  matters  the  proposed  system  would 
have  saved  us  most  of  the  troubles  we  have  experi- 
enced since  the  war.  We  should  never  had  the 
discreditable  wrangle  between  Congress  and  Presi- 
dent Johnson  over  reconstruction.  The  President 
would  not  have  had  the  veto  power,  but  if  he  had 
disapproved  of  the  proposed  legislation  of  Congress 
he  would  have  demanded  the  referendum,  and  that 
would  have  ended  the  controversy.  In  the  same 
way  the  tariff  and  silver  questions  would  have  been 
settled,  sharply  and  decisively,  nearly  twenty  years 
ago,  and  we  should  have  had  peace.     Obviously  we 


200  su(;(;kstions  on  government. 

should  not  have  had  a  disputed  Presidential  election 
in  1 876,  nor  at  any  other  time.  We  might  have  had 
occasionally  a  close  vote  in  Congress  between  two 
popular  candidates,  but  it  is  plain  that  such  an  inci- 
dent would  not  have  aroused  the  passions  engendered 
by  a  struggle  involving  the  fate  of  two  political 
armies. 

These  are  specimen  instances.  I  can  think  of  no 
problem  of  government,  national,  State,  or  local,  in 
whose  treatment  the  new  methods  would  not  bear 
comparison  with  the  old  to  equal  advantage. 


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